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SEGURIDAD
MULTIDIMENSIONAL

**Colombian
Armed Forces
restructuring
process**



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
Colombia overview



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SECURI
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Strategic location





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Geography



- Area: 1.15M Km²
 - 2 oceans
 - 5 land boundaries
 - 9 sea boundaries
- Population: 45M
 - 72% urban
 - 28% rural
 - Capital: Bogota (7M)
- Key features
 - mostly tropical
 - 3 mountain ranges
 - deep jungles




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Demographics

42 % Territory
94,5% Population



2 COLOMBIAS

58 % Territory
5,5% Population



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Context 1995



- Narcotrafficking permeating society and financing irregular groups
- Security not a central issue
- No political will to end the 40+ years conflict
- Terrorist threat had the military initiative
- Outdated/demoralized Armed Forces
- Legislation for peace, not for war
- Conflict misunderstood at international level
- Civil society frightened and distrustful



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Context 2005

- Improved governance/credibility
- Security is the key political issue (DD&SP)
- Initiative regained by Armed Forces
- Terrorist threat contained/marked activity slow-down
- Civil society highly committed and sympathetic with Armed Forces
- Sensitivity and awareness around conflict, people more actively involved
- Favorable security perception
- Better understanding by international community





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c2 evolution



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C2 - what was wrong

- Absence of strategic direction at highest level
- Bureaucratic decision making processes
- Inadequate size and correlation of Forces
- Deficient interaction/disputes among Forces
- Confusing institutional roles
- Low mobility/flexibility
- Poor communications/control
- Limited technological capacity
- Poor technical intelligence





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C2 – what improved

- State posture towards its principal security challenge
 - President assumed true leadership
 - Security initiatives consolidated in government Policy (DD&SP)
 - Armed Forces present in all municipalities
- New mindset and strategic concept oriented to joint operations
 - Shared vision among the Forces
 - Enhanced military team work (commanders)
 - Creation of professional soldier career (troops)
 - Improved operational capacity thru specialized units
 - Developed capacity to launch simultaneous operations
 - Quick, calculated, decisive strikes



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C2 – what improved (cont.)



- Offensive attitude based on objectives set forth in campaign plans
- Better allocation of resources
- Clarified roles and missions
- Compatible/integrated communication systems
- New air power organization and logistics
- Increased emphasis on technical intelligence
 - Adequate combination of means and equipment



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C2 – shortcomings

- Articulation between government and Armed Forces to consolidate recovered areas
- Flaws in planning process
- Inadequate balance between quantitative and qualitative growth
- Operational errors due to accelerated increase in manpower
- Difficulties in adjusting logistic support structures to operational requirements
- Prevailing distrust amongst intelligence services
- Poor progress in terms of self sustainability
- Difficulties to feedback the system
- Weakening of external defense structure



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C2 – lessons learned

- Political pre-eminence: civil authority/political objectives should drive military decisions
 - Military actions lose transcendence if they do not produce political effects
- Changing balance between security and defense
 - Multidimensional vision of C2
 - Transient military role of Police
- Adaptability: internal conflicts have a mixed nature that demands a mixed treatment
 - Challenge strives in the articulation of actions performed by different Forces
 - Permanent EBO analysis required to cope with the dynamic nature of the conflict



C2 – lessons learned (cont.)



- Unity of effort: common strategy for all Forces based on individual, yet complementary missions
- Legitimacy: all actions should be focused on gaining the hearts and minds of the people
 - Importance of civilian cooperation/information
 - Military action must go together with legislative initiatives
 - Media strategy needs to be developed simultaneously
- Perseverance: reject minor, short-term successes in favor of long-range goals



C2 – what's still to be done



- Security policy as a long-term State strategy, not just a government program
- Gradual replacement of manpower by technology
 - Economy of means and synergy of capabilities
 - Balance between manpower and financial resources
- Emphasize war games as the key operations planning device
- Maintain internal financing efforts to consolidate sustainable international aid
- Strengthen National Police role based on proximity with people/communities
- Establish a national mobilization system (active reserve)