KILLING AL QAEDA:

THE DESTRUCTION OF RADICAL ISLAM USING SOFTWAR

From the forthcoming book, KILLING AL QAEDA, Copyright 2007 by Chuck de Caro
Sea Aerospace Ground Evaluations (S.A.G.E.) A Not-for- Profit Educational Foundation
1350 Beverly Rd S-115 Mclean, Virginia 22101 SAGEINC@aol.com (703) 402 1360
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ABSTRACT

KILLING AL QAEDA defines the six principles of SOFTWAR: Counterpropaganda, Counterprogramming, Saturation, Seduction, Special Means, and Integration, which can be used to both destroy AQ's warfighter network and crush AQ's efforts to convince the Umma to join the cause of radical Islam.

AMOEBA (Aerobureau Matrix Organization for Effecting Behavioral Adjustments) is the organizational form of a "Virtual Unit," first developed for DoD in 1996. This Virtual Unit is designed for military-political SCIWPD operations globally. It uses a three part structure: Membrane, which defines the parameters for participation in operations; Protoplasm, for those designated members who perform functions for a given operation; and nucleus for the small group running the OODA loop.

The Mission of the AMOEBA is twofold:

(1) Beggaring the AQ alliance by exploiting the weaknesses of networked organizations.

(2) Overwhelming AQ propaganda with sets of “Information Tsunamis”.

By using these new organizational systems and methodologies it would be possible to exploit AQ weaknesses quickly and shatter it.
The United States (US) is not winning the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) because it is not yet organized to fight in the Infosphere. The cacophony of various US government information operations programs working in dissonance without an overarching systematic approach has grievously set back the US position.

The GWOT is a fight to the death between two credos: The first, Al Qaeda (AQ) and its networked-terrorist partners, whose belief system is composed of a mutant hybrid of Salafism and proto-fascism which utilizes modern means of communication and violence, while masquerading as a theocracy.

The second is the American credo characterized by the steadfast belief in the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These words are, in effect, America’s mission statement; in that everything that is American flows from a commitment to the spirit of that Jeffersonian phrase.

Interestingly, the antecedent phrase in the Declaration of Independence, declaring these truths to be self-evident defines the enormous task of Strategic Communications, Information Warfare and Public Diplomacy (SCIWPD) which the US must accomplish: Making the knowledge of the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, self-evident, to the Umma, the Muslim body politic of some 1.65 billion people, with little or no societal concept of such rights.

If the US can illuminate the minds of people in societies with little understanding of civil liberties and human rights, the ability of AQ to operate within those societies would be fatally reduced.

To accomplish this goal, America must spend the necessary funds to reorganize its Information Age resources for the purpose of defeating the enemy, just as our fathers and grandfathers organized America’s Machine Age economy to engage and smother the fascists and militarists in World War II (WWII).

The US must “collimate”, or arrange in parallel, all of America’s power to engage and defeat an enemy that is every bit as virulent and potentially as lethal as any ever confronted in the past.
The AQ enemy is a fluid, amorphous, four-dimensional global guerrilla movement completely adapted to the Infosphere. To accomplish its goals, AQ and its affiliates, already use portions and variations of SOFTWAR, the hostile use of global communications, especially television to shape another society’s will by changing its view of reality.

Thus, the US may have completely misread the significance of the 9/11 attacks. The horrific events of 9/11 were not just large scale terrorist attacks; from the enemy’s point of view, they were globally televised media events supporting a global marketing effort, the purpose of which was to advance the cause of Salafist Islam and gain a larger political market share within the Umma.

The US can counter and defeat the AQ efforts, and lay the groundwork for the expansion of democracy, with two parallel initiatives:

1. Beggaring the opposition by exploiting the weaknesses of networked organizations.
2. Overwhelming the marketing effort with rolling, unending sets of “Information Tsunamis”.

To do this the US must reorganize its global SCIWPD efforts with a near term fix of the broken interagency process.

This near term fix should initially take the form of a kind of Ombudsman with a supplemental budget designed to accelerate the best nascent or incipient SCIWPD programs. The Ombudsman should work directly for the President through the National Security Council (NSC).

The President’s Strategic Communications Ombudsman, or P-SCO would be a selected civilian who has both military and current large scale media experience, who would assist the interagency process in an avuncular manner and with a supplementary budget.

This style of procedure was pioneered by branch chiefs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the early days of the space age in what was then, a very large scale endeavor.\(^1\)

The NASA branch chief would hold a conference with all those working in the effort, including the range of end-users and providers. This would tend to break down the bureaucratic barriers and encourage cross talk and cooperation. Moreover, the branch

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\(^1\)“Research and Technology Program Management in a Mission Oriented Agency” MIT Department of Industrial Management Thesis 1965 by Walter Conrad Scott. Personal Interviews with WCS.
The branch chief would listen to where the diverse engineering approaches were going, and simply fund the best ideas within a strict time limit. The branch chief would then apply that brand new technology to another part of the overall project.

When done in parallel and on a large scale, this kind of management rapidly accelerated the flow towards the goal.

The elimination of cacophony, done in an avuncular manner, often called the “candyman” approach, seems to have had optimal results.²

Moreover, the Ombudsman could not only provide supplemental budgets and guidance, but creative and televisive manpower as well by using “Virtual Units” to increase the effectiveness and timeliness of various agencies programs.

The P-SCO’s mission is to coach the interagency in “best practices” in the use of informational power, especially televisive power. This includes the best use of in the public and private sectors of the United States and its closest allies, to engage, overwhelm and utterly destroy the AQ marketing effort, and with it the AQ virtual body politic.

Thus the P-SCO is, in effect, optimizing the existing Political-Military-Economic-Social-Information Infrastructure (PMESIC). Such efforts be analogous to the actions of Brigadier General Leslie Groves, who used the SILVERPLATE directive to run the MANHATTAN project, the Lend Lease efforts of Special Assistant Harry Hopkins in getting timely assistance to the UK in the early days of WWII, or the methodologies of Walter Scott in running NASA’s pioneering efforts.

The fundamental SOFTWAR Principles for achieving these and other grand strategy goals of the United States are: Counterpropaganda, Counterprogramming, Seduction, Saturation, Special Means and Integration.

1. **Counterprogramming (C-PROG):** The utilization of dissimilar programming with a higher telegenic “Q” factor and higher production values to deny ratings and share to an opposing broadcaster.

2. **Counterpropaganda (C-PROP):** Direct counterpoints to enemy point of view, with better writing, logic and telegenics, designed to blunt or deny enemy propaganda effects on a given demographic.

3. **Saturation (SAT):** The utilization of large scale budgets to out-buy and out-broadcast an enemy or co-opted broadcast by a ratio of at least three to one.

² Interviews with Walter C. Scott, November 2003 Director Programs and Resources, NASA, (ret)
4. **Seduction (SED):** The utilization of commercial counter-demographic techniques to break the effectiveness of enemy or co-opted neutral broadcasts upon a specific demographic.

5. **Special Means (SM):** The use of novelistic tactics, and stratagems to break the enemy’s influence upon a given demographic.

6. **Integration (INT):** The careful coordination of all SOFTWAR methodologies so as to have the maximum impact upon all aspects of a target audience.

In order to use these principals efficaciously within the existing PMESII framework, and before a P-SCO can be truly effective, a short course in language, art and science of television in its myriad forms must be taught at all levels. Thus with a common language, the critically important function of integration of bureaucratic efforts can be made far easier.

The P-SCO’s ultimate goal will be to use the informational power and talent of both the public and private sectors of the United States to engage and overwhelm the AQ marketing effort and with it, the AQ virtual body politic.

Private sector utilization of images can be inserted and broadcast globally and often to assist augment the political throw-weight in creating a positive response to the United States and its policies.

This private sector generated informational flow would be akin to the use of heavy artillery in general support of an infantry attack. While their effect cannot be immediately felt by the troops charging the position, the effect over time and distance makes future battles easier.

The P-SCO through consultation with Islamic scholars, will carefully review and project the language, especially Arabic words, such as Jihad, Mujahadeen, and Paradise and use negative terms such as Hirabah (an Islamic forbidden war against society); Mufsidoon (evil doers condemned by the Qur’an) and Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire) to break the impact the AQ efforts upon the Umma, the totality of the Islamic body politic.

The consultation with such scholars must be done with the utmost in diplomatic skill and cultural finesse so as not to leave them open to charges of being apostates by members of AQ or its supporters. This may require diligent sub-rosa activities and alliances for optimum effect. The P-SCO will carefully review the televisive product for maximum impact upon the Umma or its subsets, especially when those visuals show the ignominious defeat of AQ operatives, in the cultural terms of the target demographics.

(3) Interview with Jim Gerrard Truespeak Institute, Washington DC, June 2004
Military SCIWPD programs can be quickly amplified by using virtual units such as AMOEBA. Key talent to support the P-SCO could be quickly obtained through canvassing our National Guard and Reserve units for specific civilian-acquired skill sets involving all forms of mass media production. These soldiers, sailors and airmen can be organized into virtual units using Derivative Unit Identification Codes and placed in Direct Support to the P-SCO. Moreover, new relationships between the Guard and prospective members of such virtual units could provide a recruiting base in non-traditional demographics. In either case, the use of the skills of the individuals selected could be done as simply as credits for Unit Training Assemblies or additional UTAs. Moreover, because SOFTWAR talents tend to be randomly distributed, temporary duty with AMOEBA would neither necessarily cut across nor compliment most host units’ missions; readiness would only be marginally effected if one or two individuals we called and sent TDY for AMOEBA operations.

A virtual unit such as an AMOEBA can nullify the unintended effects of the loss of the draft. The primary unintended effect of an all-volunteer force is that its demographics do not reflect the massive cultural shift that has made the US the world’s premiere information-based economy. This has resulted in a US military structure which is currently unable to deal with real-world, information-based threats, especially in situations with asymmetrical, diffused opposition.

The answer to these problems is the utilization of the broad Information Age skills available only in the Guard and Reserves whose personnel are involved in all manner of leading-edge civilian occupations. This vast pool of Information Age knowledge and experience could be of direct use to US national interests in the fields of SCIWPD. In its initial iteration a team composed of such people could be used to simulate adversaries using information age technologies, and thus could give Unified Combatant Commanders and their staffs some out-of-the-box tactics which can be employed against non-traditional foes. A bigger follow-on unit could easily organize and execute large-scale operations against the enemy.

(4) AMOEBA (Aerobureau Matrix Organization for Effecting Behavioral Adjustments) is the organizational form of a "Virtual Unit," first developed for DoD in 1996. This Virtual Unit is designed for military-political SCIWPD operations globally. It uses a three part structure: Membrane, which defines the parameters for participation in operations; Protoplasm, for those designated members who perform functions for a given operation; and nucleus for the small group running the OODA loop.

(5) The first AMOEBA was created using Army and Air Guard personnel from the state of Vermont under a study for OSD/NA in 1996.
NEEDED: A FOUR DIMENSIONAL MIL-POL FORCE

Usama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri are classical guerrilla leaders who are completely adapted to the terrain of the Infosphere and who are waging a four dimensional (Air, Land, Sea and Information) war, clashing with obsolescent US Industrial Age forces organized to engage and destroy nations states and capable of operating in only three dimensions.

What is needed is a four dimensional military-political force augmented by efforts from the private sector, integrated with all the informational means of the Interagency, and molded into a virtual organization and tended by the P-SCO.

This integrated four dimensional force would operate with equal facility on land, air, sea, or the Infosphere; a force that is doctrinally guided by an integrated Information Warfare plan with kinetic adjuncts, rather than by the current, traditional kinetic plan with IW adjuncts. 6

In the immediate future, the principles and policy ideas suggested here might be augmented by an action strategy which would quickly create a prototype force using the AMOEBA model and using the unit in large scale war games or notional qualitative war games to demonstrate the efficacy of such a new age design. Such an autonomous, prototype unit can be created in 90 days with a budget of about $5 million.

Until such a new force, doctrine and collimation process are created and made operational, the United States will remain an ungainly Goliath, unquestionably vulnerable to a more nimble David, waiting for the fatal stone to strike it squarely between the eyes.

(6) SOFTWAR Video, by author under contract from NSA and JFSC 2004.
http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&requesttimeout=500&folder=66&paper=2659
Chuck de Caro is President of SEA AEROSPACE GROUND EVALUATIONS (SAGE) Corporation, a not-for-profit, tax-exempt (pending), educational foundation designed to assist the US government and designated allies in transformation to Information Age capabilities. SAGE also supports disaster assistance, rescue, recovery and regeneration, around the globe.

Mr. de Caro is also the founder and CEO of the AEROBUREAU Corporation. He and his team have designed, built and flown the world's first flying news-center in a four engine Lockheed Electra airliner. The aircraft, dubbed The Amazin' Lady can fly over 4,250 miles and begin world-class, news bureau operations from a 3,000 foot airstrip anywhere on the planet. The aircraft is equipped with airborne and terrestrial satellite radio and video links, television production and post production gear, side and forward looking radars, optical, near and far infrared sensor systems, modern communications systems, a helicopter, remotely piloted vehicles, all terrain vehicles and enough gear to operate autonomously anywhere for up to a week without re-supply.

Mr. de Caro is a former CNN Special Assignments correspondent who specialized in combat reporting from Nicaragua, Grenada and Surinam; investigative reporting on illegal drug operations, foreign espionage and criminal gangs; and defense reporting on US and foreign military activities. He has written front page stories for the New York Daily News, the Providence Journal Bulletin, the Colorado Springs Gazette-Telegraph, the New Orleans Courier and Army Times. He has also written major stories for the Atlantic Monthly, Washington Post, Defense News, and Air Progress. He has been a technical advisor to TV magazines such as Hard Copy, Sightings, and Encounters, as well as to dramas such as Quantum Leap, and J.A.G and currently NCIS. He is also an active member of the Screen Actors Guild. Mr. de Caro was educated at the Marion Military Institute, The US Air Force Academy and the University of Rhode Island. He served with the 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne), speaks Spanish and Italian, and is an experienced parachutist. He is qualified to fly single, multi-engine and glider aircraft.

Mr. de Caro is concurrently an occasional lecturer on Information Warfare at the National Defense University. He is the author of the monographs Soft War Handbook, and Gulf War Strategic Psychological Operations (TV) Study, and contributing author of the books, Cyberwar: Security, Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age, Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality and Cyberwar 3.0: Human Factors in Information Operations and Future Conflict. His current work-in-progress is called “Killing Al Qaeda.”