Establishing Fair Principles of Cooperation for Complex Civil-Military Operations

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Overview
Civil-Military Operations are complex, involving a spectrum of organisations and agencies.

The concepts emerging to guide interactions and relationships emphasise coordination – but this is underpinned by cooperation.

**A new concept**: Complement existing efforts at fostering cooperation by introducing structured bargaining on the principles to be adopted.

Base such bargaining on an extension of John Rawls approach to justice in social cooperation, a work seen as *the most significant event in moral philosophy in the late twentieth century* (Grayling – *What is Good*).

*My hope is that justice as fairness will seem reasonable and useful, even if not fully convincing…….*

**John Rawls – A Theory of Justice**
Civil-Military Operations
Operations must now be integrated and coordinated with the activities of other departments, agencies and organisations contributing to crisis resolution.

Networks of interdependence raise mission complexity.

A spectrum of cultures, resources, capability, experience & technology.
Principle Concepts for Civil-Military Coordination

- Executive Steering Group (ESG)
- Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centre (HACC)
- Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)
- Multinational Interagency Group (MNIG)
- Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC)
- Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC)
- Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
- On-Site Coordination Centre (OSCC)

Extending standard C2 Approaches
Cooperation & Fairness
Conflict resolution requires a unified approach, with comprehensive coordination encompassing all plans – security, humanitarian, economic, and political – in ways that prove mutually supportive.

LTGEN R. A. Dallaire

Greater cooperation spreads responsibility and accountability.

excessive independent action on the part of some NGOs … are best resolved through direct military contact … rather than attempting to correct the offending NGOs.

Joint Publication 3-57

Require a sense of mutual accountability which is fair, open and balanced.
The Social Contract
Civil-Military Interactions are Inherently Social

Lasting bonds will at times demand that concessions be made to other parties in return for collective benefits.

Some compromise that limits the freedom of individual agencies may be required to gain consensus.

Joint Publication 3-08

The fundamental Command & Control question is how to achieve unity of effort and “win-win” outcomes in the absence of direct authority.
The Theory of the Social Contract

Thomas Hobbes

Man was born free and everywhere he is in chains

Jean-Jacques Rousseau

a war of all against all in which existence is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short

REPUBLICAN CONTRACT WITH AMERICA

As Republican Members of the House of Representatives and as citizens seeking to join that body we propose not just to change its policies, but even more important, to restore the bonds of trust between the people and their elected representatives.
we are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form of government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object of the original agreement. They are the principles which free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association.

John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*

The ‘original position’ replaces the traditional concept of the ‘state of nature’

The veil of ignorance

An imaginary choice situation where individuals are deprived of information about the structure of society, including their status, commitments to creeds and loyalties to particular groups.
Behind the ‘veil of ignorance’ individuals are not required to discard their history, only information on their status and role in society as currently constituted, dispensing with *ad hoc* ethical assumptions about behaviour in the state of nature.

Emphasis is placed on binding arrangements which are self-policing through the mechanism of self interest.

*Calculated self interest, not emotion, is what counts.*

David Kilcullen – Twenty Eight Articles
Fair Cooperative Principles from Partial Ignorance
Develop Principles of Cooperation between contributing military and civilian organisations through bargaining under a partial veil of ignorance

Develop a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU), or similar instrument, incorporated into the strategic planning process.

Participation of representatives from relevant organisations in structured bargaining prior to undertaking the mission.

Introduce ‘Judges’ acting behind a veil of ignorance.
Principles & Self Interest

Cooperative, interest based, outcomes between disparate groups has already been achieved – for example the Kyoto Protocol.

Such an approach is also relevant to complex civil-military operations:

*There’s got to be a conference, literally or metaphorically, of neighbours in the region working perhaps with the UN, with the powers that have a stake in Iraq, to create an agreement that the insecurity in Iraq won’t spill over everywhere else.*

*Sir Jeremy Greenstock*

A focus on principles can shape understanding and behaviour.

The principles underlying the LOAC:

- Military necessity
- Discrimination
- Proportionality

The principles derived are open and public
The Role of Structured Bargaining
Evolutionary Game with Spatial Structure

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<th></th>
<th>Cooperate</th>
<th>Defect</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Player 1</strong> Cooperate</td>
<td>b-c, b-c</td>
<td>-c, b</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>b,-c</td>
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Taking the cue from biological systems, successful strategies receive a greater pay-off and so are viewed as increasing their fitness, leading to more offspring who will behave similarly or to imitation by others.

Some spatial structures can behave as selection amplifiers.
An Illustrative Example: Imitation Selection

Other Player

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Judge</th>
<th>Cooperate</th>
<th>Defect</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate</td>
<td>2(b-c), b-c</td>
<td>b-c, b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defect</td>
<td>b-c, -c</td>
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Probability of Cooperative Fixation for Different Bargaining Arrangements

- **20 Players**
  - $b = 4.5$
  - $c = 1.0$
  - Fitness = $1-w+wP$
  - $P = $payoff$
  - $w = 0.01$

- Table:
  - Initial Number of Cooperators
  - Percentage Chance of Achieving Cooperative Fixation (%)
Conclusion
Research into how best to organise and use collaboration is one of the areas where future research and experimentation should focus.

Alberts & Hayes – Understanding Command & Control

Make an extension into more realistic bargaining situations:

- Complexity of the network structure
- Reputation
- Bluff
- Signalling
- Coalition formation

A target for experimentation
The End