ABSTRACT

KILLING AL QAEDA: The Destruction of Radical Islam Using SOFTWAR and AMOEBA

KILLING AL QAEDA defines the six principles of SOFTWAR: Counterpropaganda, Counterprogramming, Saturation, Seduction, Special Means, and Integration, which can be used to both destroy AQ's warfighter network and crush AQ's efforts to convince the Umma to join the cause of radical Islam.

AMOEBA (Aerobureau Matrix Organization for Effecting Behavioral Adjustments) is the organizational form of a "Virtual Unit," first developed for DoD in 1996. This Virtual Unit is designed for military-political/IW/SC/PD operations globally. It uses a three part structure: Membrane, which defines the parameters for participation in operations; Protoplasm, for those designated members who perform functions for a given operation; and nucleus for the small group running the OODA loop.

The Mission of the AMOEBA is twofold:

(1) Beggaring the AQ alliance by exploiting the weaknesses of networked organizations.

(2) Overwhelming AQ propaganda with sets of “Information Tsunamis”.

By using these new organizational systems and methodologies it would be possible to exploit AQ weaknesses quickly and shatter it.
The United States is not winning the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) because it is not yet organized to fight in the Infosphere. The cacophony of various US government information operations programs working in dissonance without an overarching systematic approach has grievously set back the US position.

The GWOT is a fight to the death between two credos: The first, al Q’aida (AQ) and its networked-terrorist partners, whose belief system is composed of a mutant hybrid of Salafism and proto-fascism which utilizes modern means of communication and violence, while masquerading as a theocracy.

The second is the American credo characterized by the steadfast belief in the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. These words are, in effect, America’s mission statement; in that everything that is American flows from a commitment to the spirit of that Jeffersonian phrase.

Interestingly, the antecedent phrase in the Declaration of Independence, declaring these truths to be self-evident defines the enormous task of Strategic Communications, Information Warfare and Public Diplomacy which the United States must accomplish: Making the knowledge of the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, self-evident, to the Umma, the Muslim body politic of some 1.65 billion people, with little or no societal concept of such rights.

If the US can illuminate the minds of people in societies with little understanding of civil liberties and human rights, the ability of al Q’aida to operate within those societies to be fatally reduced.

To accomplish this goal, America must spend the necessary funds to reorganize its Information Age resources for the purpose of defeating the enemy, just as our fathers and grandfathers organized America’s Machine Age economy to engage and smother the fascists and militarists in WWII.

The United States must “collimate”, or arrange in parallel, all of America’s power to engage and defeat an enemy that is every bit as virulent and potentially as lethal as any ever confronted in the past.

The AQ enemy is a fluid, amorphous, four-dimensional global guerrilla movement completely adapted to the Infosphere. To accomplish its goals, AQ and its affiliates already uses portions and variations on SOFTWAR, the hostile use of global communications, especially television to shape another society’s will by changing its view of reality.

Thus, the United States may have completely misread the significance of the 9/11 attacks. The horrific events of 9/11 were not just large scale terrorist attacks; from the
enemy’s point of view, they were globally televised media events supporting a global marketing effort, the purpose of which was to advance the cause of Salafist Islam and gain a larger political market share within the Umma.

The United States can counter and defeat the AQ efforts, and lay the groundwork for the expansion of democracy, with two parallel initiatives:

1) Beggaring the opposition by exploiting the weaknesses of networked organizations.

2) Overwhelming the marketing effort with rolling, unending sets of “Information Tsunamis”.

To do this the United States must reorganize its global IW efforts with a near term fix of the broken interagency process.

This near term fix should initially take the form of a kind of Ombudsman with a supplemental budget designed to accelerate the best nascent or incipient SC/IW/PD programs. The Ombudsman should work directly for the President through the NSC.

The P-SCO, or President’s Strategic Communications Ombudsman would be a selected civilian who has both military and current large scale media experience, who would assist the interagency process in an avuncular manner and with a supplementary budget.

This style of procedure was pioneered by branch chiefs of NASA in the early days of the space age in what was then, a very large scale endeavor.[1]

The NASA branch chief would hold a conference with all those working in the effort, including the range of end-users and providers. This would tend to break down the bureaucratic barriers and encourage cross talk and cooperation. Moreover, the branch chief would listen to where the diverse engineering approaches were going, and simply fund the best ideas within a strict time limit. The branch chief would then apply that brand new technology to another part of the overall project.

When done in parallel and on a large scale, this kind of management rapidly accelerated the flow towards the goal.

The elimination of cacophony, done in an avuncular manner, often called the “candyman” approach, seems to have had optimal results.[2]

Moreover, the Ombudsman could not only provide supplemental budgets and guidance, but creative and televisive manpower as well by using “Virtual Units” to increase the effectiveness and timeliness of various agencies programs.
The P-SCO’s mission is to coach the interagency in “best practices” in the use of informational power, especially televisive power. This includes the best use of in the public and private sectors of the United States and its closest allies, to engage, overwhelm and utterly destroy the AQ marketing effort, and with it the AQ virtual body politic.

The fundamental SOFTWAR Principles for achieving these and other grand strategy goals of the United States are: Counterpropaganda, Counterprogramming, Seduction, Saturation, Special Means and Integration.

1. **Counterprogramming (C-PROG):** The utilization of dissimilar programming with a higher telegenic “Q” factor and higher production values to deny ratings and share to an opposing broadcaster.

2. **Counterpropaganda (C-PROP):** Direct counterpoints to enemy point of view, with better writing, logic and telegenics, designed to blunt or deny enemy propaganda effects on a given demographic.

3. **Saturation (SAT):** The utilization of large scale budgets to out-buy and out-broadcast an enemy or co-opted broadcast by a ratio of at least three to one.

4. **Seduction (SED):** The utilization of commercial counter-demographic techniques to break the effectiveness of enemy or co-opted neutral broadcasts upon a specific demographic.

5. **Special Means (SM):** The use of devious tactics, skullduggery and stratagems to break the enemy’s influence upon a given demographic.

6. **Integration (INT):** The careful coordination of all SOFTWAR methodologies so as to have the maximum impact upon all aspects of a target audience.

The P-SCO’s ultimate goal will be to use the *informational power and talent of both the public and private sectors* of the United States to engage and overwhelm the AQ marketing effort and with it, the AQ virtual body politic.

Private sector utilization of images can be inserted and broadcast globally and often to augment the political throw-weight in creating a positive response to the United States and its policies.

This private sector generated informational flow would be akin to the use of heavy artillery in general support of an infantry attack. While their effect cannot be immediately felt by the troops charging the position, the effect over time and distance makes future battles easier.
The P-SCO through consultation with Islamic scholars, will carefully review and project the language, especially Arabic words, such as Jihad, Mujahadeen, and Paradise and use negative terms such as Hirabah (an Islamic forbidden war against society); Mufsidoon (evil doers condemned by the Qur’an) and Jahannam (Eternal Hellfire) to break the impact the AQ efforts upon the Umma, the totality of the Islamic body politic.³

The P-SCO will carefully review the televisive product for maximum impact upon the Umma or subsets of the Umma, especially when those visuals show the ignominious defeat of AQ operatives, in the cultural terms of the target demographics.

Military IW/IO/SC programs can be quickly amplified by using virtual units such as AMOEBA/JRVIO.⁴ Key talent to support the P-SCO could be quickly obtained through canvassing our National Guard and Reserve units for specific civilian-acquired skill sets involving all forms of mass media production. These soldiers, sailors and airmen can be organized into virtual units using Derivative Unit Identification Codes and placed in Direct Support to the P-SCO. Moreover, new relationships between the Guard and prospective members of such virtual units could provide a recruiting base in non-traditional demographics.

A virtual unit such as an AMOEBA can nullify the unintended effects of the loss of the draft. The primary unintended effect of an all-volunteer force is that its demographics do not reflect the massive cultural shift that has made the United States the world’s premiere information-based economy. This has resulted in a US military structure which is currently unable to deal with real-world, information-based threats, especially in situations with asymmetrical, diffused opposition.

The answer to these problems is the utilization of the broad Information Age skills available only in the Guard and Reserves whose personnel are involved in all manner of leading-edge civilian occupations. This vast pool of Information Age knowledge and experience could be of direct use to US national interests in the field of Information Warfare. In its initial iteration a team composed of such people could be used to simulate adversaries using information age technologies, and thus could give Unified Combatant Commanders and their staffs some out-of-the-box tactics which can be employed against non-traditional foes. A bigger follow-on unit could easily organize and execute large-scale operations against the enemy.⁵

Usama bin Laden is an Information Age guerrilla leader adapted in four dimensions clashing with Machine Age US forces organized to operate in three dimensions.
What is needed is a four dimensional military-political force, integrated with all the informational means available to the United States Government, molded into a virtual organization and tended by the P-SCO. It should be a military-political force that operates with equal facility on land, air, sea, or the Infosphere; a force that is doctrinally guided by an *integrated Information Warfare plan with kinetic adjuncts*, rather than by the current, traditional kinetic plan with IW adjuncts.  

Until such a new force, doctrine and collimation process are created and made operational, the United States will remain an ungainly Goliath, unquestionably vulnerable to a more nimble David, waiting for the fatal stone to strike it squarely between the eyes.

[2] Interviews with Walt Scott, November 2003 Director Programs and Resources, NASA, (ret)