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The Influence of National Affiliation in Multinational Endeavours: A Case Study
Topic 2: Networks and Networking, or
Topic 3: Information Sharing and Collaboration Process; or
Topic 4: Collective Endeavours
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**Abstract**
Limited research addresses the unique mix of loyalties facing staff members in temporary multinational, military staffs. This paper focuses on what is thought to contribute to the success and failure of JOC-centred organisations: the influence of staff members' national affiliations. A 16-month qualitative study of a European Union strategic military staff finds that instead of the effects of national affiliation lessening over time, these effects appear to increase in dominating national groups and remain unchanged in others. The results fail to support popular socialisation theory, which suggests that previous research may over-interpret socialisation influences in such organisations. Parallels are instead found in political research on temporary officials which links this paper's results more to rationalist and constructivist theory. This paper thus proposes that multinational strategic military staffs may be understood as politicised arenas for intergovernmental dynamics and that future endeavours should expect, and take measures to counter, the influence of multiple loyalties.

## Introduction

*Rationale*

The changing global security environment increasingly has nations scrambling to create ad-hoc temporary organisations for the strategic co-ordination of multinational endeavours. These strategic organisations are often built around "Joint Operations Centres", or JOCs, characterised by temporary and asymmetric national commitments and a proximity to the intergovernmental political level. The literature on these specific organisational forms seems to be limited and few writings address the unique mix of guiding principles and multiple loyalties facing members of such organisations. This represents a gap in our understanding which may hold significant implications for endeavour effectiveness. In this paper I focus on what is likely to contribute to the success and failure of these organisations; the influence of staff members' national affiliation.

*Previous Writings*

Previous writings paint an ambiguous picture of what social dynamics to expect from strategic-level temporary organisations. Empirical findings from operational settings often show that group cohesion builds over time (e.g. Whithener, Brodt, Korsgaard and Werner, 1998), despite differences in perspectives on mission means and ends (Bland, 1999, Okros, 2007). In particular, a study by Drnevich, Mehta, Brush, and Chaturvedi (2005) set out to test whether JOC member references are driven by their organisational and national affiliations rather than by the needs of the situation they jointly face. Through a series of exercise observations they found that organisational affiliation drives member responses early on, particularly because it helps reduce

uncertainty, but that these effects decrease over time. In contrast, Thompson *et al.* (2008) work on multinational military coalitions highlight a strong national identification among members. This aligns with recent work on multinational political collaboration. Beyers and Trondal (2004) asked European Union (EU) officials under what conditions supranational or intergovernmental approaches prevail, and found that individual's interactions and role conceptions are affected by their national environment; its influence, role and level of enjoyed trust in the EU. Also Leung & White (2006) review on alliance research, and Trondal (2008) work on political-level intergovernmental groups, show that members' commitment to their nation and permanent organisation influence how they deal with joint goals. Similarly, Yannick Hartstein (2009) recently study of how nationally seconded EU officials influence, and are influenced by, EU decision-making processes show that officials did not appear to be socialised into a European way of thinking by adopting supranational norms, values, and patterns of behaviour (Hartstein, 2008).

*Case Study Overview*
In this paper I report on field research that enables comparing these ambiguous results with the dynamics in naturally occurring situations. With the aim to investigate how temporary joint structures influence staff member's loyalties, I conduct a 16-months qualitative study of a multinational military staff. The results show that the effects of national or organisational affiliation do not lessen over time. Instead they appear to strengthen for dominating national groups and remain unchanged for others, indicating that previous research may over-interpret the socialisation influence of temporary joint structures. I mirror the results in rationalist and constructivist theories and find parallels in research on EU temporary political officials, which leads to the suggestion that multinational strategic military staffs may be better understood if viewed as politicised arenas for intergovernmental dynamics. I conclude with a series of recommendations for the deployment of similar organisations in the future.

In the following I establish the research objective and form two hypotheses for how staff members deal with national considerations over time.

**Research Objective and Hypotheses**
With the aim to better understand the dynamics of loyalty in multinational temporary strategic staffs, I investigate how staff members are committed to national affiliation, defined as the qualitatively different ways in which own and others' national considerations is experienced by staff members. Based on other's findings, which suggest that non-political contexts provide grounds for staff member's common socialisation into supranational perspectives rather than sustained national orientations, I expect to find that staff members in a temporary strategic staff over time display less national consideration. This leads to the first hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1*

> *Over time, staff members are socialised into a multinational staff identity which shifts their perspectives from national towards supranational*

In addition, I investigate the influence of the often asymmetrical investments nations make in multinational endeavours. With support drawn from the rational choice perspective, I expect staff members to display national consideration correlating with

their nation's relative investment in the mission. In other words, staff members from leading nations are expected to be more nationally biased than others. This leads to the second hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 2*

> *Staff member's consideration of national interests correlates with their nation's relative investment in the mission.*

**Object of Study**
*Framework*
The object of study was a EU military strategic headquarters made up by some 130 individuals from 27 countries. The headquarters was set up according to then-newly developed guidelines in a deepening inter-governmental framework context and was directly subordinated the political level. As a result, the organisation had to deal with a great deal of medial and political attention.

*Staff Members*
Staff members were mainly military professionals of all ranks, coming from all services; Army, Navy and Air Force. In most cases they were nationally pre-trained only, which means that the majority were strangers on arrival. Staff members were nationally seconded, meaning that they were temporarily on leave from permanent national positions, paid through national chains and in most cases expected to return to national service after their tour of staff duty. In general, they were also required to report through national channels, during and/or after the mission. Staff members were rotated according to national guidelines and periods of secondment normally varied from two to six months, although some staff members were posted for the full duration of the mission. Subsequently, the headquarters was made up by a constantly changing mix of newcomers and "old hands". The staff working language was English, but only 13% of the staff were English native speakers.

*Staff Structure*
Formally, the headquarters contained a mix of supranational and national and authorities. All staff positions were "flagged", meaning that each position was not only described in terms of tasks and responsibilities, but also assigned to a specific nation. The number of national positions and their relative dignity reflected the relative size of the national contribution to the mission, which in this staff lead to two national groups being substantially larger than others. These two nations (in this paper referred to as nations A-B) also provide key senior staff members. Other nations (referred to as nations C-Z) contributed between 1-5 staff members. Despite these national links, staff position tasks, duties and responsibilities were fully "de-nationalised" and staff members were formally expected to deal with issues from a mission perspective only. There was, however, one exception to this rule – the National Senior Officers (NSEs). NSEs existed for all troop contributing nations, mainly intended as formal channels between the Operational Commander and the nations. NSEs were also involved in national administrative issues, such as leave, national social events and disciplinary matters. National links were further manifested in the daily staff work through national uniforms and national symbols in briefings, meetings, on maps and in pictures.

**Theory**
As indicated earlier, previous scholar's explanations for the complexities of interaction between collaborating individuals seem to differ depending on the context of study. Operational contexts seem to support socialisation theories whereas political contexts do not. Since the object of study was organised as an intermediate between the operational and political level, I build the theoretical foundation on competing perspectives and theories; social constructivism through socialisation theory, and rational choice through agency theory. Recognising the particularities of military hierarchies, I also borrow from organisational theory and network theory.

*Socialisation Theory*
The social constructivist perspective addresses how human interaction develops over time. Socialisation refers to the norms and values of a given community and is "oriented towards analyzing changes in beliefs, values and actions within *individual* actors who enter a new institutional setting" (Hartstein, 2009, pp. 4). Long & Hadden (1985) define socialisation as "the process of creating and incorporating new members of a group from a pool of newcomers, carried out by members and their allies" (Long & Hadden, 1985, in Hartstein, 2009). This perspective sees behavioural changes stemming from peoples' modified internal preferences rather than changed strategies. The opportunity for socialisation to occur is thought to increase with the time and intensity of interaction with established group members, since this is thought to develop perceptions of group belongingness. Jeffrey Checkel (2005) highlights three forms of socialisation; *strategic calculation, role playing* and *normative suasion*. *Strategic calculation* works through incentives for agents that are seen as pursuers of their own interests. Incentives can be material and social, positive and negative and sustained compliance may over time change the complaint's preferences. *Role playing* instead involves an unconscious or automatic adaption by agents to their environment and becomes relevant when groups are small and contacts occur over a period of time. Checkel portrays the third form of socialisation as the deepest; *normative suasion* is an agent's conscious and active process of reflection and redefinition of own values and beliefs, leading to a true internalisation (Checkel, 2005, in Hartstein, 2009). However, critics of the socialisation perspective argue that while humans may be sensitive to social influences, they are first and foremost self-interested and make conscious and balanced choices based on rational reasoning, to optimise their short- and long term benefit. These critics find the question to be about *incentives* rather than *influences*. Some of these critics instead frame their lines of thought in agency theory.

*Agency*
Agency theory is linked to the rationalist perspective that suggests that individual's modified behaviour in social interaction stems from changed strategies, not preferences (Checkel, 2001). Agency theory origins from the 1960s and economists' exploration of risk sharing, focusing on the problem of motivating someone to act on another's behalf. This is framed as the "principal–agent problem", which arises when a principal contracts an agent to performing for the benefit of the principal, when the goals of the principal and agent conflict and the principal have problems to control what the agent is doing. In her literature review, Kathleen Eisenhart's (1989) explains the focus as devising the most efficient contract governing the principal-agent relationship. Agency theory assumes that humans are self-interested, risk averse, make rational choices but are bounded in their rationality. Agency theory also carries

general assumptions on organisations, information and incentives. Organisations are assumed to have uncertain futures and uncertainty is viewed in terms of risk/reward trade-offs, not just in terms of inability to pre-plan. Information is a commodity and can be bought in order to counter agent opportunism. A payment made regardless of expected outcome or work performed cannot affect the agent's effort (Eisenhart, 1989). Agency theory embraces two different perspectives; *principal-agent* theory which focuses on the relationship in general and *positivist agency* theory which is concerned with the mechanisms that limit agent's selfish behaviour (Eisenhart, 1989, Meyer & O'Toole, 2006). The latter perspective sees organisations as collections of such mechanisms, in terms of structures, rules and standard operating procedures that guide members in what they do. In addition, the recruiting and rewarding procedures not only affect who is brought in, but also how they act. (Quaglia, DeFrancesco & Radaelli, 2008, Trondal, 2008). Scholars have argued against agency theory, suggesting that it does not take into account the social dimension, suggesting that people reason differently about social decisions than they would about problems that do not involve interdependence. This is addressed in social exchange theory, which can be seen as an intermediary between the socialisation perspective and the agency perspective.

*Social Exchange Theory*
Bottom et al. (2006) describe social exchange theory as a frame of reference for actions that motivate reactions from others in the form of exchange of materials and non-materials, such as approval or reputation. Here, reciprocity is key; individuals that give to others also expect from them, and persons that get from others feel the pressure to give back. The authors posit that social exchange theory assumes a human ability to detect cheating, understood as failure to give back and instead bias exchange in one's own favour. The theory also embraces moral reactions to cheating. Furthermore, given a cyclic pattern with mutually satisfactory outcomes, trust and affection will develop between the principal and the agent. Bottom et. al (2006) point out that exchange theory disagrees with the rational choice perspective by observing affection, talk, gestures, symbols and other forms of non-contractual incentives which the rational actor would not take into account. Whereas agency theory regards unconditioned payment as without effect on agent performance, social exchange theory suggests that the same unconditioned payment results in the agent feeling an obligation to repay. Preferences are not fixed, as in agent theory, but linked to interpersonal history and results in affection, goodwill, friendship and trust (Bottom, Halloway, Miller & Mislin (2006). To complement the mainly dyadic perspectives of socialisation, agency and social exchange, I turn to theories on organisations and networks.

*Organisational and Network Theory*
Organisational scholars would suggest that military staffs, despite their strict hierarchical structures, are not immune to staff member influences. In fact, this hierarchy may even make them more open for bottom-up authority. Herbert Simon argues that since superiors are inherently limited in time and ability to supervise, organisational members have a "zone of acceptance" within which they can be expected to obey orders. Thus, the efficiency of an organisational rests on its member's motivation to work towards common goals, which in turn relies on how they identify with the organisation. As a consequence, a major control on administrative behaviour is the values held by the member (Simon, 1947, in Meier &

O'Toole, 2006, Simon, 1991). Jan Trondal explains this with the vertical and horizontal specialisation of hierarchical organisations, which assigns for each a role that describes the problems, solutions and consequences to be concerned with. Such specialisation leads to local rationalities as well as possibilities to influence and Trondal notes that scholars have for long seen that organisational outcomes are affected by the positional and technical advantages of experts compared to management (Trondal, 2008). With military command & control in mind, Atkinson & Moffat compare the formal organisation with the concept of idealism – the thought of creating rules for human to live by together in peace – and the informal network with realism – the perspective that power and trust, as opposed to rules, guide how people and states act in a rational fight for survival (Atkinson & Moffat, 2006). Networks existing within the frame of professional activities are believed to be shaped by organisational structures and work flow requirements, more shadowing formal structures in mechanistic organisations than in organic (Das and Teng, 2000). For example, Lincoln and Miller (1979) found that rank is related to centrality in task and friendship networks, which in turn links to what Coleman (1988) calls *closure* - a network property on which effective norms depend - interconnecting members so that behaviours are monitored and disseminated through the network, thereby socially controlling its members. Social control is thus exercised through reputation and network closure has been shown to motivate cooperation (e.g. Putnam 1993, Gulati 1955). Multi-organisational contexts also seem to add potential for intergroup tension. Kwok Leung and Stephen White (2006) recent literature review on alliance research highlights three dimensions of personal conflict; *identity conflict* from the individual's loyalty split between her parent organisation and the alliance, *incompatible goals* stemming from multiple principals, and *cultural dissimilarity* in terms of differing organisational and national norms and values. The authors suggest that these conflicts may result in merging cultures, creation of a new and alliance specific culture, or consolidating of boundaries between the original cultures (Leung & White, 2006). This aligns with the constructivist perspective that human interaction over time brings socialisation effects for those involved.

In sum, the above described theory provides grounds for viewing the strategic military staff as a socially dynamic and complex arena with potential for multiple top-down and bottom up influences, in which common goals may converge or diverge with personal, organisational and national goals. I find two competing perspectives on what guides individual staff members; the constructionists' socialisation perspective and the rationalists' agency perspective. The constructionist would argue that staff members are influenced by the daily interaction with others and over time develop a sense of belongingness, eventually with internalised norms, values and preferences as a result – the staff member acts in a certain way because "it's the right thing to do." The more intense and frequent interaction, the faster and deeper internalisation of group preferences becomes. The rationalist, on the other hand, would suggest that staff members act rationally and selfishly within the boundaries of their contractual obligations, obligations that are relevant to the staff member only if the principal can control what the agent is doing. These two perspectives, the constructivist and the rationalist, are generally seen to promote competing theories that predict different outcomes.

**Method**

*Overview*
I conducted 14 months of continuous participating observation, 30 interviews and one survey. I made the first observations and interviews in the staff's fifth month of activation and conducted the survey seven months later, at a point when most of the staff members had been rotated at least once. The last observations and interviews were made during the final stages of the operation. Awareness of staff member's national commitment emerged from my daily noted and weekly reviewed observations (Wilkinson, in Breakwell, Hammond, and Fife-Schaw, 1995). I pursued this in 27 semi-structured interviews (Patton, 2002) with a purposive selection of interviewees to achieve a representative group of staff members. I gave consenting staff members a two-page interview guide with eight open-ended non-leading direct measure questions (e.g. Colquitt, Scott and LePine, 2007) on trust, legitimacy, friction, transparency, conflicting interests and informal networks. The interviewees were thus primed to think about differences and problems in general, but not explicitly about national commitment. I also provided information on anonymity and how the data would be stored, used and disseminated. The interviews, 45-90 minutes long, were recorded, transcribed and shared with interviewees for corrections and approval. The interviews and observations gave the nature of national commitment, but not of the overall prominence. I addressed this in a cross-sectional close-ended multiple choice questionnaire based survey which addressed national commitment in two of 14 questions. The remaining questions referred to work practices, such as number of daily contacts, information flows etc to enable me to triangulate the national commitment with people's daily activities and priorities. Of 125 distributed questionnaires I collected 108 completed forms, giving an 86% response rate.

*Data Collection*
This study evolved from explorative to descriptive, which means that my focus and measurements developed in an iterative process throughout the study. I started with a period of informal observation of work in the staff that made me aware of what I saw as staff member's behaviour shifting between supranational orientation and nationally orientation. In parallel I categorised the contents of the initial set of interview transcripts and let areas of concern emerge naturally from the words of the interviewees. These areas crystallised into three categories, *nationality*, *language* and *skills*, in falling order of prominence, which suggested that my observations may be reflected also in staff member's perceptions. This led me to adjust my focus in my observations and interviews. I began collecting field noted on what staff members said and did in collaborative situations in which outcomes were likely to affect their nation's involvement in the operation. I kept the interview guide unchanged but began encouraging interviewees to elaborate on the national dimension by non-leading follow on questions.

*Analysis*
I code the observation notes in three categories; (i) issue at hand and the context in which the situations occurred; formal or informal, (ii) the national affiliation of the individuals involved, (iii) staff members as appearing mission oriented or nationally oriented. I review the coded notes and look for regularities in staff members' orientation with regard to context and national affiliation. I code interview transcript

paragraphs in the same way as the field notes, again looking for regularities in the how interviewees framed nationality when talking about work related issues. This allows me to note a greater bias towards national affiliation for staff members that were affiliated with nation A-B. Bringing the two lines of regularities indicate a relation between national affiliation, national bias and development over time. I go back to the interviews and complete the initial category tables. I also line-by-line code the transcripts, translating interview data from a context-specific to a conceptual-dependent level by combining focused coding (Charmaz, in Smith, Harré and Van Langenhove, 1995) and interpretative exploration (Smith, in Smith, et al, 1995). This enables identifying, ranking and putting into context staff member's explanations for behaviours perceived in others as well as in self. This indicates the comparative importance staff members gave to national commitment and to what extent they saw national commitment as problematic. Since the data was collected over a period of 16 months I can also identify tendencies over time.

I triangulate my findings with survey data by tabling the response distributions for all survey questions per respondent attribute[1], in search of influential attributes that could challenge the notion of nationality as the main driver. I broadly categorise the correlations as "high" and "low" of the attribute influences and then calculated the factorial influence (Miller and Miller, 1993) in four selected questions. This allows me to verify nationality as the most influential respondent attribute. However, establishing the significance of the survey response patterns still remains a challenge. I therefore return to the survey data.

Since questionnaire responses may be viewed as subjective self-assessments rather than absolute measurement (Dittrich, Francis, Hatzinger & Katzenbeisser, 2007), I cannot regard response data as normally distributed, which prevents me from using general overall values for comparisons (Tastle, Russel & Wierman, 2008). Instead, I recognise responses as ordinal data, valid for non-parametric methods of analysis. These methods normally focus on median and mode values (Jamieson, 2004) and relies on inferential tests such as Pearson's chi-square, Spearman's Rho, or the Mann-Whitney U-test (Jamieson, 2004, with reference to Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2000). However, my limited number of respondents risks individual characteristics skewing the results to the point where such calculation-based conclusions cease to have analytical value. I instead turn to the R. A. Fisher's Exact Test for small, sparse or unbalanced data (Bower, 2003, Mehta & Patel, 1998, with reference to Fisher, 1925), used by e.g. Gartlan & Shanks (2007). The Fisher test enables me to calculate the significance of the deviation from a null hypothesis. The Fisher test requires data to be collapsed into 2 x 2 tables, so I divide respondents in pairs of national groupings and group their responses in "negative" or "positive" attitudes to national considerations. I also create categories for how long respondents have worked in the staff; more or less than (i) six weeks,(ii) two months, and (iii) four months. The resulting set of 2 x 2 tables allows me to subject the data to the Fisher test and calculate the p-values for significance.

**Results**
I establish the role of nationality as a dominating attribute and find that nationality continues to surface equally strong throughout the period of study. However, with

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[1] Age, rank, nationality, number of previous missions and time of service in the staff

time staff members generally frame nationality in less problematic terms. I also find that staff members from the two leading nations become more nationally oriented with time, while others do not. In the following I present evidence for this based on my observations, interviews and survey results.

*Relative Prominence*

I compare the relative influence of four personal attributes on staff member's work-related reflections; *nationality*, *previous experience*, *rank* and *time in the staff*. I rely on interview and survey data rather than observations, since I have not way of knowing the reflections behind staff member's observed behaviour. For the interviews, a full 28 of the total 30 interviewees refer to nationality, others and own, when reflecting on work-related issues. This makes nationality almost five times more prominent than the second strongest attribute (Table 1, below).

*Table 1. Interviews: Staff Member References to Personal Attributes (codified)*

| Rank | Staff member attribute associated with work related friction by the interviewee (codified) | Emerge in no. of interviews | Percentage of total interviews |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Nationality (national interests, agendas, chains etc) | 28 | 93% |
| 2 | Previous experience (background, mission experience) | 6 | 20% |
| 3 | Rank | 4 | 13% |
| 4 | Time in staff | 2 | 7% |

The survey results point in the same direction. Response patterns for nationality emerge in 8 of the 14 questions when respondents are collapsed into two groups; A-B nationals and C-Z nationals, which is significantly more than for any other attribute (Table 2, in Appendix). Given that nationality comes across as prime in my observations, interviews as well as survey results I find grounds for further concentrating on the role of nationality.

*Sustained Presence*

I assess whether the prominence of nationality in staff member's work and reflections changes over the period of study. Of all my observed working situations, I find that 29 emerge clearly enough to be considered valid for analysis (Table 3, in Appendix). The situations span over a range of issues in both formal and informal contexts and involve different combinations of staff members from the national groups A-B and C-Z. I am unable to see any time related change in the balance between mission oriented behaviour and nationally oriented behaviour, which indicates that national bias may remain equally prominent over time. My interview data supports this suggestion; nationality emerges as often in late interviews as in those made early in the period of study (Table 4, in Appendix). Also the survey data show that respondents having worked long in the staff seem at least equally nationally oriented than relative newcomers (table 2, below):

*Table 2. Survey Results: Consideration of National Interests,*

| Time in staff | 1-4 weeks | 5-8 weeks | 9-16 weeks | 17 weeks or more |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Staff members with strong national orientation[2] | 44% (N=16) | 30% (N=10) | 48% (N=25) | 46% (N=56) |

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[2] Indicating that they consider national interests daily, or as a natural part of work. see Figure 1, in Appendix.

Taken together, the data show a sustained and strong presence of national bias, which is contrary to what I expect. This leads me to look for other signs of longitudinal development, in other words, if I can find any form of time-dependant pattern.

*Diminishing Concern*
I pursue this by looking at the qualitative aspects of staff member's national considerations over time. The observations provide an indication of a time-related shift in that situations become more difficult to observe later in the period of study. Early observations saw staff member's statements and actions as generally more engaged, discussions more confrontational and frustration more evident. Later observations saw similar messages, signals and reactions as more subtly expressed and received. This tendency is also reflected in the interview transcripts; early interviews frame nationality in mainly problematic and emotional terms, whereas late interviews instead use mainly pragmatic terms. (Graph 1, below).

*Graph 1.  Samples of Framing of Nationality: Change over Time*

**Interviewee's framing of national interests: change over time from Jan 08 to Apr 09**

"double decision making processes"                    "unproblematic"
"concealed motives"                                    "understandable"
"hidden agendas"                              "comparable to other missions"
"conflict"                          "aligned with mission's common interests"

**Jan 2008**                                              **April 09**

In addition, the interviews show an increasing tendency over time to provide explanations for other's as well as own behaviour. These tendencies are illustrated by the following typical quotes from early and late in the period of study:

Early quotes:
*All critical... decisions and such, they suddenly just drop into your face without... any open debate or...working group... information is withheld and it is being processed somewhere else and decided and then it is delivered as a response in the staff... if you don't succeed in the meeting then you have your national meeting in the evening, which is very disturbing."*

(Colonel, non-leading nation, Jan 08)

*"I am full of suspicion and have no faith in any form of European openness... from (leading nation A) (but) I have been here since mid-November and seen a change, how (A nationals) have become more open, or less excluding."*

(Major, non-leading nation, Jan 08)

Later quotes:
*"You are paid for from by through national chain, you of course have to be receptive and support your own, eh, national agenda. If you don't you're going to have issues along the way"*

(LtCol, non-leading nation, Dec 08)

*"You have to accept that within the multinational dimension there are national peculiarities, I would say that it is more culture than malevolence"*

(Colonel, non-leading nation, Dec 08)

*"...they try to support the best interest of their countries so it is not coming from organized control from a specific agency it is coming from inside every personality."*

(Colonel, non-leading nation, Mar 09)

Surprisingly, this shift seems to follow the time line of the staff rather than the time line of individual staff members. Newcomer staff members that are interviewed early in the period of study generally express nationality in more problematic terms than newcomers that are interviewed later in the period of study, This may indicate that the general maturity *of* the staff is more important than the staff member's maturity *in* the staff. The dynamic of the staff as an entity is illustrated by the following quote:

*"It has taken time for the operational head quarters to mature in the concept of nationality but the maturity is taking place. The (staff members from leading nation A) themselves will openly admit to the challenge that they are facing.*

(Colonel, leading nation B, Apr 08)

Overall, I find that while nationality remains a prominent factor for staff members throughout the period of study, the level of concern that staff members associate with nationality diminishes with time. This motivates me to investigate if these tendencies are equal between A-B staff members and C-Z staff members.

*National Divergence*
I cluster the data in two groups; staff members from leading nations (A-B) and staff members from non-leading nations (C-Z). I compare these groups for signs of differences and similarities in how national orientation develops over time. The observations suggest that while both groups are equally prominent in formal and informal contexts, A-B staff members consider national interests slightly more often than C-Z staff members (Table 3, in Appendix). This comes across also in the interviews, where interviewees from these groups focus on different aspects. While A-B staff members mostly talk about culture, language and training, C-Z staff members focus on national networks, interests and agendas (Table 4, in Appendix) and then often with reference to leading nations:

*"...the leading nation, they have the same languages; they can express what they want to say more easily, they feel more comfortable. So they use these informal networks."*

(Lieutenant Colonel, non-leading nation, Jan 09)

*"...all (A nationals), they call directly to (their)) headquarters, and get information, right, which is not disseminated, this is totally clear."*

(Colonel, non-leading nation, Jan 09)

*"I have, as a (C-Z national), two deputies, one (A national) and one (B national), and I can feel that my superior level tend to run things directly to the national officer... but there is no secrecy in that, I am always informed."*

(Colonel, non-leading nation, Dec 08)

The survey results provide further indications for a difference in attitudes between these two groups. Overall, A-B respondents indicate that they consider national interests significantly more often than C-Z respondents (Graph 2, below).

*Graph 2. Survey Results: Consideration of National Interests, Overall*



In order to see if this difference is constant over time, I plot the responses according to how long staff members had worked in the staff at the time of the survey. I find that the resulting curves have slightly different characteristics. At a first glance it would seem that A-B staff members have a "mid term dip" in their national biases, while C-Z staff members instead have a "mid term peak" (Graph 3, below).

*Graph 3. Survey Results: Time Related Average Consideration of National Interests*



However, the number of respondents behind these early and mid term data points is limited, which prevents from drawing any conclusions from this. Furthermore, the time intervals between the values are not equal. I instead collapse the data points for each curve into "less established" and "more established" staff members, which

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creates a generic 2 x 2 table in which the break point in time can be varied. I select three different break points; *six weeks* for newcomers versus others, *two months* for the upper limit of the shortest period of secondment in the staff, and *four months* for the median of the respondent population. I note that establishment and national bias seems to moderately correlate for A-B staff members, but inversely and weakly correlate for C-Z staff members. Applying Fisher's Exact Test to calculate the statistical significance shows that in isolation, neither A-B respondents nor C-Z respondents differ significantly in any of the break point cases. However, when brought together, the divergence between A-B and C-Z is close to significant for the four months break point (Table 7 and 8, in Appendix) and significant for the two months break point (Graph 4, below).

*Graph 4. Survey Results: Significance of Time Related Divergence*



This suggests that staff members from leading nations change their attitudes to national interests differently than staff members from non-leading nations; while the latter seem to diminish their national awareness, the former do not. In fact, they instead seem to slightly strengthen their national awareness, which also is contrary to what I expect to find. Taken together, I see clear differences between the groups of leading and non-leading staff members; firstly, what aspects of nationality staff members are concerned with, secondly, the degree to which they consider national interests, and, thirdly, how national interests evolve over time.

*Summary of Findings*
In sum, I find that nationality as a personal attribute not only dominates in staff member's reflections and perceptions, but also continues to emerge equally strong over the period of study. However, with time staff members tend to frame nationality in less problematic terms which interestingly seems to be more related to the *staff* timeline rather than *individual* timelines. I also find differences between staff members from leading nations and non-leading nations; staff members from the two leading nations become more nationally oriented with time, while staff members from

non-leading nations instead become slightly less nationally oriented. These findings both support and contradict my hypotheses, which are discussed in the following.

**Discussion**

I set out to investigate the influence of staff members' national affiliations in a multinational strategic level military staff. In line with popular theory and recent findings I expected to find evidence of socialisation but also influences from participating nations' relative investment in the mission. I framed my expectations in two hypotheses:

*Hypothesis 1*

> *Over time, staff members are socialised into a multinational staff identity which shifts their perspectives from national towards supranational*

*Hypothesis 2*

> *Staff member's consideration of national interests correlates with their nation's relative investment in the mission.*

I found that nationality continues to emerge equally strong over the period of study. However, I also found that with time, staff members tend to frame nationality in less problematic terms which seems to be more related to the staff timeline rather than to individual timelines. I finally found that staff members from the two leading nations become more nationally oriented with time, while staff members from non-leading nations instead become slightly less nationally oriented.

In line with my first hypothesis, rooted in a social constructivist perspective, I see signs of socialisation on two levels. On an individual level, established staff members express greater understanding and suggest more explanations for others behaviour than relative newcomers. However, socialisation also appears on a collective level. Staff members' shift in perceptions seems to relate also to the staff timeline. This suggests a dynamic, common for the entire staff that influences staff members in parallel with the dynamics of their individual integration in the staff. I speculate that such a staff-common dynamic relates to a combination of an *internal maturing process* and exposure to *external pressures*. The *internal maturing process* would be a result of finding working practices, developing rules and guidelines, and establishing lines of communication. For the object of study, this work seemed to be most intense, and associated with long hours and interpersonal friction, during the first three or four month. After that the staff seemed to gradually transition into a state of routine and successive refinement. The *external pressure* would the constant input from superior and subordinate levels, in this case input from the political level with EU bodies and governments, and the Force Headquarters and the fielded units. While having little insight in the input from the superior level, the mission apparently ran relatively smoothly throughout the period of study. While there were always urgent issues engaging the staff, no signs of pressure peaks or long-term trends were obvious. The staff would thus have experienced a stress dynamic characterised by a short demanding period followed by a longer period of relative harmony. This notion which has been supported by former staff members post-duty and could be an indication to why staff member's framing of nationality on average transitioned from problematic to pragmatic over the period of study – the staff as a working place became more

structured and predictable, leading to less cognitive stress for its members. This in turn suggests that the first hypothesis is incomplete, by focusing on individual dynamics and failing to take into account staff-common dynamic.

Further problems emerge for the first hypothesis. Staff members seem to largely maintain a national bias over time, instead of shifting perspective from nationally oriented to supranational, Where I expect signs of socialisation I instead see evidence of persistently rational perspectives. This emerges in staff member's explanations of others and own behavioural, in which references are made to permanent organisational affiliation in terms of expectations, loyalty and career. Interestingly, while other's findings from sub-political contexts support socialisation theories (e.g. Drnevich et. al, 2005), findings from intergovernmental political contexts do not (e.g. Hartstein, 2008). Instead, these individuals' role conceptions seem to be affected by their national affiliation and their nation's influence, role and enjoyed level of trust (Beyers and Trondal, 2004). Turning to the work of Hartstein (2008), one may see a similarity between Hartstein's intergovernmental political contexts and this military staff, in how the double affiliations of individuals are constructed. In both cases, individuals are technically fully independent from their permanent organisations and subordinated a supranational chain of command. At the same time they remain in the service of, and are paid by, their national body. This construct results in what Hartstein calls "institutional schizophrenia" (Hartstein, 2008, pp. 10). Subsquently, sustained national commitment could stem from each member's knowledge that their deployment is temporary and that longer-term rewards for their performance will be assessed against their allegiance to nation or organisation rather than mission goals. However, it could be argued that since staff members are evaluated in their multinational chain of command, there is also an incentive to be loyal to the multinational staff. I counter this by suggesting that staff member's hierarchically embedded working conditions allow Herbert Simon's "zone of acceptance" in which their values can affect outcomes (Simon, 1947, in Meier & O'Toole, 2006, Simon, 1991) without necessarily impacting on evaluations. Furthermore, staff members may take into account that multinational evaluations are likely to be blunted by a tradition of courtesy; as long as you "stay within the lines" you will always get a standardised and complementary evaluation.

In sum, the findings seem to provide weak support for the first socialisation-oriented hypothesis. Staff member's perceptions remain nationally biased, which becomes more problematic for others when working conditions are stressful, ambiguous and demanding. However, staff members seem to become socialised in terms of increased mutual understanding and pragmatism stemming from increasing stability as well as familiarity with the multinational context. Overall, the findings fit theoretically better in *adaptive behaviour* rather than true socialisation, corresponding to Jeffrey Checkel's, *strategic calculation* and *role playing,* than the deeper *normative suasion* (Checkel, 2005). This  suggest that individuals return home with improved skills as a multinational staff member, not by changed perspectives but by having developed refined ways to interact in multinational contexts.

The second hypothesis addresses the implications of the asymmetrical investments nations often make in multinational endeavours. Based on agency theory I expect staff members to display national consideration correlating with their nation's relative investment in the mission. The findings support this expectation. Not only do staff

members from leading nations behave more nationally oriented than others, they also to a greater extent indicate that they consider national interests a natural part of work. Surprisingly, this category grows significantly more nationally oriented with time than others. I recall that leading nations not only have a greater share of the fielded forces, they also have more people in the staff and more of their staff member's in leading positions. Subsequently, these staff member's colleagues, subordinates and superiors in the temporary and permanent organisation are more likely to be of the same nationality. It seems possible to mirror this in several theoretical perspectives. Organisational theory would suggest that they thereby see less of a difference between the national and the multinational dimension, which in turn would lead to a greater identification with mission goals, less identity conflict and less cultural dissimilarity (Leung & White, 2006). Translated to agency theory, the staff members are agents in temporary organisations that act on behalf of a number of principals, permanent and temporary. The multiple goal conflicts that may emerge, not agent-principal but principal-principal, is likely to be less when the interests of these principals converge. Also, the combined set of intra-organisational and inter-organisational mechanisms affect how autonomous the agents are in relation to each of their principals (Eisenhart, 1989). Agency theory would thus suggest that leading nation staff members see their principals, incentives and contractual obligations as more aligned, and experience less autonomy, than would other staff members. Network theory, finally, provides yet another point of view. Translated to the object of study, staff members from leading nations would find themselves more than others embedded in informal national networks in which central members are likely to be high ranking and hold important staff positions. This would lead to a stronger social control of the individual staff member in terms of national loyalty. The following quotes seem to support this notion:

*"There has been times when I've been asked or told, (name) put on your (national) hat and tell me this or do this"*

(Non-Comissioned Officer, leading nation B, Jan 09)

*"If there is a (national) that has been there from the beginning I would go to him then, to have... the, let's say the (national) point of view or maybe some clarification on what was the process and... yes, I am a multinational but I am also a (national), in the staff."*

(Leutenant Colonel, leading nation A, Jan 08)

In sum, organisational theory suggests that staff members from leading nations identify more with the mission and experience less identity conflict and cultural dissimilarity. Agency theory posits that they experience less autonomy and see their principals, incentives and contractual obligations as more aligned, whereas network theory holds that they are subject to stronger social control. Whereas these perspectives offers plausible explanations for the increasing difference over time between staff members from leading nations and others, they fail to address the surprising *increasing* difference over time. This may be linked to socialisation theory and Jeffrey Checkel, who notes that the chance for socialisation to occur is likely to increase with the time and intensity of interaction with established group members, leading to perceptions of group belongingness (Checkel, 2005). In line with this I speculate that the leading nations' greater number of staff members, and stronger presence of influential staff members, leads to a stronger socialisation within the national group. In effect, the growing national orientation would then be expressing a growing loyalty to the national group in the staff, *in addition* to the underlying loyalty

to the permanent organisation back home. However, to explain this temporal dynamic of national orientation further research is needed.

Before drawing overall conclusions and offering recommendations for future multinational staffs, the limitations and strengths of this study need to be addressed.

*Limitations and Strengths*
Firstly, the data was collected by the author alone, while serving as a staff officer. This brings a risk for skewed data, in that the data interpretation was not only done by a single person, but also one subject to the same influences that the study set out to investigate. Although care was taken to avoid this by making extensive notes and transcribing all interviews, as well as discussing the analysis with other staff members, this paper thus risks a epistemological bias. Secondly, there is a risk for cultural confounds linked to the fact that almost half of the staff came from one of the leading nations, sharing a native language different from the official staff language. This opens up for suggesting that the divergence in national bias that we link to organisational, agency and network theory could simply be a case of language barriers that brought this group together and distanced them from others. On the other hand, only a minority (13%) of the staff had English as a native language so in that respect almost everyone had a similar language barrier to overcome. Furthermore, the survey results indicate that the language problem was significant but universal; these nationals did not indicate language as a greater problem than others. Thirdly, the findings presented in this paper are triangulated with data from one survey, made at a point in time when the staff was well established and not subject to great levels of stress. Although the data it provides supports observational and interview data, the overall validity could be questioned. Ideally the same survey questions should have been asked at different points in time. Unfortunately this was not possible; getting access to individuals as well as time and understanding for data collection remained a diplomatic challenge throughout the period of study.

Although the above points suggest potential problems related to how the data was collected, it may be argued that there is no better practical way. I strongly believe that a researcher embedded as a working staff member offers far greater access to interactions, decision making and reflections than what an "outsider" may accomplish. In fact, many staff members were concerned about confidentiality and explicitly said that they accepted to offer their thoughts only because I was "one of them". The limitations of this study are therefore also some of its strengths. Furthermore, the data was gathered continuously over a period of 16 months, which enabled not only a vast richness of data but also an in-depth understanding stemming from every-day interaction during and outside working hours. There is also a value in that the data reflects a live organisation in which problems, goals, values and stresses are real, affecting people in earnest. I believe that this would be hard to replicate in more controlled settings, such as exercises and experiments. Finally the reliability of findings from a single case may be questioned. While agreeing that all staffs are different in terms of composition, mission focus and the challenges they face, I suspect that what this object of study displays in terms of dynamics is representative for a great deal of staffs. I find support for this in several comments made by some very experienced staff members, as illustrated by the following quote:

*"...the human interaction and human relationship of the Headquarters itself, and social interaction, is exactly what I expected in a multinational organisation. All the good parts in there, all the bad parts in there. And I think if we come back in twenty years and do something, it will look the same again. Because one of the things that I have found, people do not change that much."*

(Colonel, leading nation A, Apr 08)

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

Overall, my findings seem to contradict the general idea that people working together over time inevitably develop a group identity. According to popular theory, physical proximity should override permanent affiliation. In this case, however, it seems that the permanent affiliation remained prominent in staff member's minds. My findings instead suggest that socialisation effects in temporary JOC-centred multinational and trans-organisational teams are likely to be weak when its members retain institutional links with their permanent organisations. Instead of internalising supranational perspectives through changed norms, members appear to adapt to their temporary setting by changing strategies. In other words, individuals remain conscious of their permanent affiliation. I link this to current and expected rewards such as payment and career opportunities, and parent organisations relative investment in the temporary endeavour when mirrored in the staff composition. The multitude of national artefacts in the staff environment is likely to acts as reminders of these links. From theoretical point of view, I find stronger support for the rational choice perspective than the social construction perspective, which positions this paper closer to finding from political contexts than non-political.

The findings suggest that future Commanders in charge of institutionally similar frameworks should be prepared to face similar enactments of permanent national or organisational affiliation. They should to take into account such bottom-up dynamics a likely and possibly influential part of every-day staff work. The effects of such influences may range from insignificant to serious, from mere staff-internal frustration to slower decision making processes or less than optimal decisions, the latter carrying increased risk for deficiencies in the field. Besides direct operational implications, signal effects may be important. It should be in the interest of multinational staffs to display internal cohesion and unity of effort, since staff external legitimacy and enjoyed trust are likely to relate to the perceptions and actions of its partners as well as adversaries. An organisation that on the strategic level that appears internally divided is less likely to attract strong partner support and adversary compliance.

It is unclear if permanent affiliation influences really are detrimental to temporary in any way. However, if they would prove to be, the question then becomes what can be changed. I mentioned earlier that intergovernmental (rather than supranational) frameworks may be associated to the phenomena. In the EU context, the current arrangement for the use of military force (intergovernmental) is likely to remain and similar frameworks may thus be the norm for the foreseeable future. However, efforts could be made to transfer personnel authority and resources from permanent organisations to temporary bodies in order to disengage staff member from their permanent affiliations as much as possible. In this respect it would be interesting to investigate the effects of staff members in temporary structures receiving payment, evaluations, and career opportunities through central bodies (in the EU case, possibly the EU Military Staff in Brussels) rather than national. Also the resources involved in

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the temporary endeavour, such as units, equipment and services, could be fully funded by a central body rather than permanent organisations, thus reducing the need for these organisations to monitor and control their seconded staff members. This would possibly provide grounds for moving away from what I see as the underlying problem, namely multiple loyalties and interests facing these seconded staff members.

**Future Research**
This study has shown the presence and influences of national affiliations in one multinational temporary staff. However, as mentioned above, it needs to be investigated if that these influences are both recurring as well as detrimental to mission effectiveness. If so, the mechanisms behind need to be further explored. Future research should thus aim for replicating the multiple loyalties in experimental settings to enable testing different variables linked to the above. If successful, this would enable determining to what extent it is a negative for temporary multinational staffs and, if needed, finding ways to reduce such multiple loyalties and its influences.

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## Appendix

## 1. Observations

*Table 3. Observations: Staff Member Behaviour January*

| Time | Issue Subject to Staff Processing (Single occasion in formal context; (e.g. briefing, meeting, , or informal context; e.g., discussion) | Staff Members Affiliated with Nation A-B | | Staff Members Affiliated With Nation C-Z | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Mission Oriented | Nationally Oriented | Mission Oriented | Nationally Oriented |
| Jan 08 | Decision making process (formal) | x | x | x | |
| Feb 08 | Intel dissemination (informal) | | x | x | |
| May 08 | Force protection (formal) | x | | | x |
| May 08 | Internal info. dissemination (formal) | | x | x | |
| May 08 | Information dissemination (informal) | | x | x | |
| June 08 | Status of Forces (formal) | x | | x | x |
| June 08 | Use of fielded assets (informal) | x | | | x |
| June 08 | Intel dissemination (informal) | | x | x | |
| Jul 08 | Movement transparency (informal) | | x | x | |
| Aug 08 | Sending. info. to own nation (informal) | | | x | x |
| Aug 08 | Outsourcing to civilian firms (formal) | | x | x | |
| Sep 08 | Violation of rules (formal) | x | x | | |
| Oct 08 | Logistics priority (formal) | | x | | |
| Oct 08 | Logistics priority (informal) | x | x | | |
| Nov 08 | Sending info. to own nation (informal) | | | | x |
| Nov 08 | Recovery planning (informal) | | x | x | |
| Dec 08 | Recovery planning (informal) | x | x | | |
| Dec 08 | Use of fielded assets (formal) | | | x | x |
| Jan 09 | Lessons learned process (informal) | | | x | x |
| Jan 09 | Code of conduct (formal/informal) | | x | x | x |
| Feb 09 | Recovery planning (informal) | x | x | | |
| Feb 09 | Transportation planning (formal) | | | | x |
| Feb 09 | Finance for fielded assets (formal) | x | x | | x |
| Mar 09 | Recovery planning (informal) | | x | x | |
| Mar 09 | Sending info. to own nation (informal) | | | | x |
| Mar 09 | Material transfer toFOF (formal) | | | | x |
| Mar 09 | Lines of Communication (formal) | | x | x | |
| Apr 09 | Recovery planning (formal) | x | x | x | |
| Apr 09 | Recovery planning (informal) | | | | x |
| *SUM* | | *10* | *18* | *16* | *13* |

## 2. Interviews

*Table 4. Interviews: Personal Attributes Associated with Work Related Issues*

| Time | Nat | Rank | In tour | Associations (top three in falling order of prominence) |
|------|-----|------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------|
| Jan 08 | CZ | Col | early | National interests, national agendas, |
| Jan 08 | CZ | Maj | early | Nationality, personality, field distance, |
| Jan 08 | AB | Maj | early | Previous training, time in staff, personality |
| Jan 08 | AB | LtCol | mid | Service, operational background, national management culture |
| Jan 08 | CZ | Col | late | National culture, national guidance, political context |
| Jan 08 | CZ | Capt | mid | Experience, national transparency, working standards |
| Feb 08 | AB | Col | mid | Field distance, background understanding, national culture |
| Apr 08 | CZ | Col | late | Nationality, national agendas, personality |
| Apr 08 | CZ | Maj | late | Nationality, meetings |
| Apr 08 | AB | LtCol | mid | Commitment, national responsibility, culture |
| Apr 08 | AB | Col | mid | Nationality, common terminology, levels of skills |
| Apr 08 | CZ | Maj | mid | National mentality, language skills, mission experience |
| Apr 08 | CZ | LtCol | mid | Personality, management culture, national agendas |
| May 08 | CZ | Col | late | National agendas, personality, branch |
| Jun 08 | AB | Maj | late | National military culture, national bonds, rank |
| Sep 08 | AB | Capt | early | Nationality, personality, time in staff |
| Oct 08 | CZ | LtCol | mid | Personal relations, commitment , nationality/language |
| Nov 08 | CZ | Col | early | National networks, nationality and other cultures, need for control |
| Dec 08 | CZ | Col | early | National culture, national chains, |
| Dec 08 | CZ | LtCol | early | Professionalism, language, national agendas |
| Dec 08 | CZ | Capt | mid | Nationality, national chains, skills/position mismatches |
| Dec 08 | AB | NCO | late | National agendas, personal goals |
| Jan 09 | CZ | Maj | mid | Nationality, rank, position |
| Jan 09 | CZ | Col | late | Language, nationality, previous experience |
| Jan 09 | CZ | LtCol | late | Nationality, previous experience, external pressures |
| Jan 09 | AB | NCO | late | Personal integrity, language, national networks |
| Feb 09 | CZ | LtCol | late | Personality, personal goals, theatre distance |
| Jan 09 | CZ | Maj | late | National interests, personal characteristics, language |
| Mar 09 | CZ | Maj | late | Personality, information exchange, language |
| Mar 09 | CZ | Col | late | Personal goals, personal character, perceived national interests, rank |

Nat = Nationality, affiliated with nation A-B (AB) or nation C-Z (CZ)
Time = Month when interview was done
Rank = Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), Captain (Capt), Major (Maj), Leutnant-Colonel (LtCol) or Colonel (Col)
In Tour = When the interview was done in relation to the interviewee's period of secondment
Association = Words used by the interviewee when reflecting on the source of work related friction

## 3. Survey

Survey date: 2008-12-12
Printed copy handout, anonymous return in sealed envelope (one per Branch)
Response attributes: age, rank, nationality, number of weeks/months in staff
14 closed ended questions, multiple choice
N=108, Response Rate: 86% (last completed copy received two weeks after handout)

*Question on national interests as appearing in questionnaire 2008-12-12:*

**9. How often do you think about the interests of your nation in your daily work?**

Never        Very seldom        Every week        Daily        It is natural part of work
☐          ☐          ☐          ☐          ☐

Negative responses ("Never &"Very Seldom"):   40
Neutral responses ("Every Week):             20
Positive responses ("Daily" och Always"):     48

*Table 5. Survey Correlation between Response Pattern and Attribute, Q1-14 (high/low)*

| Survey Question | Repondent attribute explanatory value to response pattern | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Nationality | Previous Experience | Rank | Time in staff |
| Q1 No. of daily contacts out | low | low | high | high |
| Q2 No. of daily contacts in | low | low | low | high |
| Q3 Latest branch meeting | low | high | high | low |
| Q4 Latest national meeting | high | low | low | low |
| Q5 Source for advice | high | low | low | high |
| Q6 Source for info updates | high | low | low | low |
| Q7 Context for info updates | high | low | low | high |
| Q8 Ease of info. sourcing | high | low | low | low |
| Q9 National interest concern | high | high | low | low |
| Q10 Work contact attributes | low | low | high | low |
| Q11 Social sphere size | high | low | low | high |
| Q12 Social sphere attributes | high | low | low | low |
| Q13 Work difficulty sources | low | high | low | low |
| Q14 Working standard | low | low | high | low |
| *No. of high correlations* | *8* | *3* | *4* | *5* |

*Table 6. Q9Attribute Factorial Influence Cross Calculation*

| Attribute | Average | Total Average |
|---|---|---|
| Delta Nationality/Rank | Average: 20% | |
| Delta Nationality/Experience | Average: 25% | 24,0% |
| Delta Nationality/Time | Average: 27% | |
| | | |
| Delta Rank/Nationality | Average: 23% | |
| Delta Rank/Experience | Average: 16% | 18,0% |
| Delta Rank/Time | Average: 15% | |
| | | |
| Delta Experience/Nationality | Average: 11% | |
| Delta Experience/Rank | Average: 21% | 22,0% |
| Delta Experience/Time | Average: 35% | |
| | | |
| Delta Time in Staff/Nationality | Average: 10% | |
| Delta Time in Staff/Rank | Average: 13% | 10,6% |
| Delta Time in Staff/Experience | Average: 9% | |

Legend: Cross calculation of relative influence of respondent attribute (ordinal data), step 2: Comparison of delta % between ordinal categories.

*Table 7. Significance of Difference between National Groups ( Fisher's Exact Test)*

| Newcomers vs. others (<6< weeks ) | | |
|---|---|---|
| p= 0.4531418475573951 | Negative | Positive |
| A < 6 weeks | 2 | 5 |
| A > 6 weeks | 35 | 41 |
| p= 0.272727272727276 | Negative | Positive |
| B < 6 weeks | 1 | 0 |
| B > 6 weeks | 2 | 8 |
| p= 1 | Negative | Positive |
| AB < 6 weeks | 3 | 5 |
| AB > 6 weeks | 37 | 49 |
| p= 0.6195773081201313 | Negative | Positive |
| CZ < 6 weeks | 2 | 2 |
| CZ > 6 weeks | 18 | 10 |
| p= 1 | Negative | Positive |
| AB < 6 weeks | 3 | 5 |
| CZ < 6 weeks | 2 | 2 |
| p= 0.08047826882050882 | Negative | Positive |
| AB > 6 weeks | 37 | 49 |
| CZ > 6 weeks | 18 | 10 |
| End of shortest national secondment (<2< months ) | | |
| p= 0.7223793336878177 | Negative | Positive |
| A < 2 months | 5 | 6 |
| A > 2 months | 12 | 22 |
| p= 0.272727272727276 | Negative | Positive |
| B < 2 months | 1 | 0 |
| B > 2 months | 2 | 8 |
| p= 0.31345168774175447 | Negative | Positive |
| AB < 2 months | 6 | 6 |
| AB > 2 months | 14 | 30 |
| p= 0.6757194603690773 | Negative | Positive |
| CZ < 2 months | 4 | 4 |
| CZ > 2 months | 15 | 8 |
| p= 1 | Negative | Positive |
| AB < 2 months | 6 | 6 |
| CZ < 2 months | 4 | 4 |
| p= 0.01090257680359849 | Negative | Positive |
| AB > 2 months | 14 | 30 |
| CZ > 2 months | 15 | 8 |
| Respondent Population Median (<4< months) | | |
| p= 0.7613127738098295 | Negative | Positive |
| A < 4 months | 12 | 17 |
| A > 4 months | 6 | 11 |
| p= 0.272727272727276 | Negative | Positive |
| B < 4 months | 1 | 0 |
| B > 4 months | 2 | 8 |
| p= 0.410070425012961 | Negative | Positive |
| AB < 4 months | 13 | 17 |
| AB > 4 months | 8 | 19 |
| p=1 | Negative | Positive |
| CZ < 4 months | 9 | 5 |
| CZ > 4 months | 11 | 7 |
| p= 0.33188888026226704 | Negative | Positive |
| AB < 4 months | 13 | 17 |
| CZ < 4 months | 9 | 5 |
| p= 0.06362711322467083 | Negative | Positive |
| AB > 4 months | 8 | 19 |
| CZ > 4 months | 11 | 7 |

*Table 8. Summary: Significance of Difference between National Groups ( Fisher's Exact Test)*

| Newcomers vs. Others | < 6 weeks | > 6 weeks |
|---|---|---|
| AB | p = 1 | |
| AB vs CZ | p = 1 | p = 0.08047826882050882 |
| CZ | p = 0.6195773081201313 | |
| End of Shortest National Secondment | < 2 months | > 2 months |
| AB | p = 0.31345168774175447 | |
| AB vs CZ | p = 1 | p = 0.01090257680359849 |
| CZ | p = 0.6757194603690773 | |
| Population Median | < 4 months | > 4 months |
| AB | p= 0.410070425012961 | |
| AB vs CZ | p= 0.33188888026226704 | p= 0.06362711322467083 |
| CZ | p=1 | |