Command and Control
Of Civil Military Operations

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Perspective
The Critic’s View

- Military
- American
- Experiential
- Connective Theory
- Applied Model
Critique: Military Orientation

- All organizations are living systems
- All organizations “do” operations
- Militaries are forms of organizations
- Militaries are living systems
- Militaries “do” operations
- Military operations’ experience should apply to the generic organizational set
Critique (implied): American

- U.S. has large experiential base with CMO
- U.S. has large doctrinal base with CMO
- U.S. does have cultural bias
- U.S. bias should not blind researchers to value of the relevant parts of that experience and doctrine
Critique: Measurement of Operational Success and Failure

- Success/failure based on match between outcomes and goals
- Match determined by expert judgment
- If that is insufficient, then I make the call.
Critique: Connective Theory

- Original Effort to tie three theoretical models too ambitious
- Modified case is to explore utility of Adaptive Cycle theory and C2 Approach Space in CMO C2
Adaptive Cycle Theory

- Adaptive Cycle Theory based on several decades of Ecological research (from 1970s)
- Original research now extended to human-ecology interface
- Captures dynamics and uncertainty of complex organizations and operations
- Introduces logic and mathematical rigor into operational thinking (enhances scientific acceptance)
- Conceptually captures multiple stakeholders’ and environmental actions (use of multidimensional state space)
- Provides lessons on limitations of human management in these types of operations

Adaptation or Transformation?
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*CMO OBJECTIVES: 1=Support to Civil Authority; 2=Population & Resource Control; 3=Humanitarian Assistance; 4=Nation Assistance; 5=Civil Information Management
Observations

- Adaptations more frequent, more successful than Transformations
- C2 model for adaptation requires creativity, flexibility
- “Edge” Organization Model fits required C2 model
- Adaptive Cycle Theory is a productive “lens” thru which one can view C2 for CMOs