Provenance: Information for Shared Understanding

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Abstract— Agile command and control (C2) systems allow users to draw upon diverse resources to solve complex problems. This paper describes data provenance technology being developed to support shared understanding of information and to better equip users to assess the suitability of shared information. We describe a provenance system, PLUS, and show how it can be used to assist in assessing trust and system quality. In addition, we describe novel and minimally invasive approaches to capture provenance automatically within distributed, heterogeneous C2 systems, and we compare the engineering costs and benefits of these approaches.

Index terms—provenance, trust, lineage, pedigree, agile systems, capture

I. INTRODUCTION

Threats to national security typically morph over time, and take unanticipated forms. The practice of information technology continually seeks to provide flexible systems that permit adaptation to issues that cannot be foreseen. Trends in the way that command and control (C2) systems are built to provide this flexibility mean increasing reliance on networked services and on information of all sorts, including open source, received via the Internet and from multinational coalitions. Government mandates to increase information sharing are also widening the technical scope of C2 information systems, by requiring their interaction with other systems outside of their natural user scope. Command and control systems must be agile enough to face these new, complex, and changing situations [21]. As stated in The Agility Advantage [1] (p. 335),

“By their very nature, complex endeavors require information and expertise that is widely dispersed. As a result, organic information is insufficient and information sharing is needed to construct an accurate picture of what is occurring. In complex endeavors it is not sufficient for just one person (the head of an organization) to have the answer. Rather the development of an adequate level of shared understanding is a prerequisite for a coherent and effective response.” (emphasis added)

This paper describes technology being developed to support shared understanding of information and to better equip users to assess the suitability of shared information.

Provenance\(^1\) is “information that helps determine the derivation history of a data product...[It includes] the ancestral data product(s) from which this data product evolved, and the process of transformation of these ancestral data product(s)” [19]; it is, the family tree of data creation and manipulation. Data provenance enhances the utility of information by adding context. First, provenance information helps users to make trust decisions about data, by providing them the information they need to assess how much to trust data from unfamiliar sources. Second, provenance helps users understand the impact of erroneous data or defective processes. Finally, provenance information provides essential records for forensic investigations that seek to link available data, processing chains, and outcomes. Provenance is typically captured by observing a system as it is running and reporting the information to a provenance manager. We call the software which captures provenance a provenance reporter.

As a simple running example, we will examine airborne surveillance reports used by analysts and automated processes to locate high value targets. These collaborations require the participation, services, and data of multiple military and intelligence organizations. Consider the following scenario, outlined in Figure 1a. This figure describes a distributed system which provides data and services from many different branches and organizations. These multiple systems collaborate to provide an agile environment bent to the task of locating high value targets. For instance, Air Surveillance data is available through an Air Surveillance Supplier Gateway. Meanwhile, an Analyst Gateway provides analyst reports based on available data using tools such as Palantir\(^2\), an Extract, Transform, and Load (ETL) tool. Finally, an AutoTargeting Gateway provides a geo-tagger to map location data into latitude and longitude information. The geo-tagger receives un-annotated text, such as the airborne surveillance reports, and returns a version of the text annotated

\(^1\) Sometimes also called “lineage” or “pedigree”

\(^2\) Palantir is a commercial tool designed to assist analysts in viewing data over time and in doing link analysis, see www.palantir.com.
with latitude and longitude coordinates for each place name. Suppose that a Target Acquisition Officer, wishing to identify the value of certain target locations, queries the distributed system for information about people likely to be at certain locations. To answer these queries, the system draws upon multiple different services and data sources and identifies people of interest likely to be at a certain location. Figure 1b and Figure 1c record two different ways this search could proceed. If the search proceeds as shown in Figure 1b, it produces two results: a geo-tagged airborne surveillance report and a Palantir model file generated by an analyst. If the search proceeds as in Figure 1c, the same two results are returned. However, the quality of the returned results shown in Figure 1b and Figure 1c are distinctly different: different numbers of sources were used in each case (one and two air surveillance files respectively). Figures 1b and 1c are screenshots from our provenance tool, modified to use generic names of tools and people, to protect sensitive information. Without these provenance graphs, the officer would not know how the search was accomplished and would not be able to assess the quality of the results. These two provenance graphs demonstrate that the analyst cannot determine whether the reports independently corroborate one another without provenance information, and consequently the analyst cannot determine the reliability and actionability of the information.

The provenance graph can inform a user of the exact data sources and processing steps which produce each piece of information, improving the user’s ability to assess the accuracy and reliability of the information. The basic graphs show names and connections only, but actual provenance systems will typically store many additional details about the processes and data in question, in some cases including technical details of settings used to generate that information. If a problem is detected in the tools used by the distributed system, such as a mismatch in the coordinate systems used by two geo-taggers which results in inaccurate latitude and longitude information, the system can trace through the provenance graph to identify all of the affected customers and targets. Similarly, if future investigation shows that the system was corrupted or attacked and therefore produced bad data, subsequent users of that data can be informed by tracing forward through the graph to discover downstream users of that data.

In order to help understand the family tree of data, the provenance system must include certain basic information: what, when, who, where, how, why. In general, the basic information captured for each provenance item is: what the data or service was, a timestamp (when), who ran it, where it was executed, any parameters used (how), and where its inputs came

Figure 1. Multi-organizational collaboration to locate a target. a) The participants provide data and services in the distributed system. Together, these different capabilities are used in a specific workflow. b) A sample provenance graph. The ovals represent data (files or database entries), while rectangles denote processes (i.e. an execution of a software tool). c) A second sample provenance graph showing the same use of tools, but with two Air Surveillance Reports providing the raw data instead of only one.
from and outputs went to (why). Additional information, in the form of annotations, can also be stored with the basic provenance information—for example, a given user’s assessment of the quality of a particular data source. The fundamental principle is that the basic provenance information is an historical record of what actually happened and, as such, must be captured as processes are executed and as data is modified within each organization. Note that this is qualitatively different from the prescriptive notions of workflows or business processes, which describe what was supposed to have happened. Workflows or business processes may contain conditional statements (if this condition, then this execution path) or loops describing their logic; provenance has neither conditionals nor loops. It is a directed acyclic graph that could be described as the execution history of a workflow.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the PLUS prototype provenance manager. We then show how PLUS supports the agile environment application needs described above: trust assessment, and taint analysis (both in Section III). The only way these new capabilities can be provided to a user is to install provenance reporters in the distributed system. In Section IV, we discuss capture techniques based on different engineering approaches. In Sections V and VI, we provide experimental evidence of the developmental cost of capturing provenance, and guidance on where to install provenance reporters within the system. We discuss related work and conclude in Sections VII and VIII respectively.

II. PLUS

PLUS [8] is a provenance manager developed at The MITRE Corporation to address the following previously unmet requirements shared by most of our U.S. government customers:

- “Open world” collection in distributed, heterogeneous environments [2] which enables the use of provenance in real-world government systems;
- Flexible annotation management over provenance, which enables a number of important analysis applications, including the “taint analysis” application in Section III;
- Attribute-based access controls which enable flexible sharing of provenance across different classes of users with different privilege levels [20]; and;
- Security techniques which enable the provision of informative provenance even when the sensitivity of certain nodes or edges precludes sharing the entire graph [6].

Once provenance information is captured as discussed in Section IV, it must be stored for later use. PLUS can be run as a stand-alone manager with a centralized repository or as a set of provenance managers and repositories distributed across organizations [3]. PLUS uses a MySQL database for provenance storage, and it models provenance similar to the emerging Open Provenance Model standard [18]. A provenance graph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG), \( G = (N, E) \), containing a set of nodes, \( N \), and a set of edges, \( E \). Each node has a set of features describing the process or data it represents, e.g., timestamp, description, etc. Edges in the graph denote relationships, such as `usedBy`, `generated`, `inputTo`, etc., between nodes in the graph. A provenance graph may include disconnected sub-graphs.

A data node can represent any object the user wishes to register, for example, strings, files, XML messages, relational data items of arbitrary granularity, etc. The data itself is not stored in the PLUS system for security and archiving reasons; such storage is best delegated to an underlying system or historical database. However, the provenance capture mechanisms can provide any additional “breadcrumbs,” such as access method and identifier, to allow users to access the underlying information. In addition to basic provenance data, users may annotate any node in a provenance graph with additional metadata.

III. ASSESSING TRUST IN INFORMATION

Even when collaborating C2 partners have a clear picture of the overall set of services and data available, they may only understand the details of services and data in their local systems. For example, consider the collaborative effort in Figure 1a to identify high value targets. An analyst may understand the minutiae of link analysis, but have no idea of which software services or data sources were used to perform geo-tagging. Some users may give greater credibility to some services above others, or they may be wary of using information based on open source data. In a distributed system other users with different missions will invariably have different perspectives and criteria. Additionally, as seen in Figure 1b and Figure 1c, the possible variations in combinations of data and service can lead to less trustworthy information, i.e. that supported by less data, or using poor services, etc.

Provenance gives participants greater information about actions that occurred outside their purviews. Using this information, users can more easily assess whether information meets their specific mission criteria. The provenance that PLUS captures is immutable; it is a record of past events. This basic premise matches other relevant work (see Section VII for a discussion of related work). However, in exploring our customers’ requirements, it quickly became clear that many of
them needed a flexible facility for adding annotations to provenance information. For example, a user may want to enter an opinion about his confidence in a particular piece of information or to note special circumstances that surrounded a certain process execution. These additional annotations (not strictly provenance information) are mutable, since any of these assessments might change. In this way, provenance elements can become much like products on Amazon; subject to their own individual set of reviews by their users. And again as with Amazon, the basic information about the resource (i.e. a list of book authors) does not change, and cannot be modified by users.

Flexible annotations are essential in multi-organizational information sharing because users of the data from another organization may have no knowledge of how it was generated, and whether it can truly be used for her purposes. In such cases, provenance, together with user assessments of confidence and social networks of trusted colleagues, can do a great deal to increase trust that information is suitable for the intended purpose. It is critical to note though that these decisions are made by users in context; provenance provides the necessary information to support the decision, but does not automate trust decisions.

In addition, provenance provides additional functionality that can help alert users to potentially harmful data. In a widespread collaborative enterprise, if a problem with a dataset or service is detected, the process of identifying other users of that dataset is often either impossible or at least arduous. Building a “taint analysis” application over provenance can help inform all users of potentially bad information.

Such annotations can help users of distributed systems understand the consequences of a data modification cyber-attack. For example, suppose that an administrator discovers that an attacker has subverted the geo-tagger to incorrectly geo-tag location data. Without provenance information, the compromised tool would be replaced, but information that it had already processed may still be available to downstream users of the data, such as the Target Acquisition Officer. Such information might be available in the form of copies in other systems, within other organizations. This form of data corruption can be especially pernicious in a collaborative environment, since system maintainers would have no way to determine whether, for example, a targeting order was based on corrupted data from geo-tagger. PLUS provides the ability for a user to annotate the suspect data or service invocation as being “tainted” (e.g., the geo-tagger in Figure 2) This taint marking is then automatically propagated forward to all data and processes that rely upon it (the nodes in pink in Figure 2), and can be seen by the data owners in a different organization, thus alerting them to a potentially serious issue. While orders may have already been dispatched on the basis of bad information from the geo-tagger, the provenance graph provides the ability to assess the scope and severity of the problem, which makes it possible to identify the affected analysts and consequently the potentially ill-founded orders. This “forward tracing” capability is not generally available today; some advanced auditing functionality can indicate how serious immediate uses of bad data might have been, but provenance represents a more flexible way of logging what happened, to support any number of different auditing styles after the fact. Whenever integration is being performed with data generated across multiple organizations, this is an essential capability to support proper data usage and error correction.

IV. MINIMALLY INVASIVE PROVENANCE CAPTURE IN DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS

Agile C2 systems such as those described in this paper are distributed, and will naturally contain many different kinds of components owing to the participation of different organizations. A fundamental challenge to providing provenance information to users, then, is the need to capture provenance information in these systems. There are several methods for obtaining provenance information within distributed, heterogeneous systems. Similar to [14, 23], the PLUS system supplies an application programming interface (API) that any system or application can call to log provenance information. The trick is determining where and how those API calls should be used, such that:

1. Application developer time used to encode provenance calls is minimized;
2. Application developers can be provenance unaware, and legacy applications can continue to run normally;
3. Useful provenance information is obtained.

These desiderata shape our strategy for minimally invasive provenance capture, as contrasted with previous
provenance systems which require custom application revisions. Our first technique for “minimally invasive” provenance capture is to insert provenance reporters into system coordination points, such as an enterprise service bus (ESB). However, depending on the users of the system and on the intended uses of the resulting provenance information, this method may not yield complete coverage and may miss some desired content. In the following subsections, we discuss three other methods, Single Application Modification, Owning the System, and Wrapping/Scraping Legacy Systems, that can be used to augment the capture via the system coordination backbone(s).

A. Insertion in a System Coordination Backbone

Distributed systems require coordination backbones to perform the command and control functions of the systems themselves, including the following duties:

1. Collect/route messages, and handle component interactions; and
2. Provide a mechanism to enable actors to use remote data and processes.

Even in very loosely coupled systems, there are standard mechanisms for passing messages, accessing data, running services, etc. Our first minimally invasive provenance capture technique focuses on these system coordination backbones.

An ESB is often used as a point of coordination for applications from many different organizations. We have modified Mule\(^3\), a popular open source ESB, to automatically capture and report provenance for all messages passed through the ESB, as well as to provide some introspection into the processes being executed [2]. Our Mule-based provenance collector is the first provenance capture facility of which we are aware to collect provenance in heterogeneous multi-organizational environments. This capture technique scales effectively and does not noticeably affect the underlying systems [8], but it does enable users of integrated information greater insight into that information’s usefulness and flaws. Figure 3 shows an example of the Mule ESB provenance capture. In a nutshell, this method captures provenance by observing the functioning of the ESB as it happens, and reporting appropriate provenance.

A second example showing the effectiveness of capturing provenance from a single coordination backbone is the Ozone Widget Framework (OWF)\(^4\). Used within the Intelligence Community as a tool for providing application and data resources to analysts, the OWF is a messaging framework that allows applications, called widgets, to be run within a web browser. Widgets and data can be built and released by any organization and found within a repository, or marketplace.

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\(^3\) www.mulesoft.com

\(^4\) Widget.potomacfusion.com

Figure 3: An example of provenance captured through the MULE ESB System Coordination capture point. a) Shows the workflow that uses the MULE coordination backbone for cross organizational collaboration to produce a loan quote (from mulesource.org). b) The sample provenance graph captured from one execution of the LoanBroker. Ovals indicate data; rectangles are processes. Notice that provenance shows the actual data and services used in an instance, not the available set indicated by the workflow.
The OWF provenance collector thus allows provenance to be captured about interactions that take place across organizations. However, OWF also highlights a challenge for provenance capture: finding the appropriate points at which to insert provenance collection calls. While OWF is a government off-the-shelf (GOTS) tool, with a recommended API, its underlying use of web technology means that there are multiple possible methods for a widget developer to access data or processes. For instance, there are multiple ways that a widget can access data from a repository. The chief three ways are:

1. Using a JavaScript library (Dojo) to channel all data requests. This is the method followed by most widget developers;
2. Writing JQuery within the widget to directly query a repository for the data;
3. Writing custom JavaScript to call directly to a specific repository.

These are merely the top three routes widget developers use to access data from repositories within the framework, although there are other less popular methods. In the case of OWF, tapping into the Dojo channels captures the largest percentage of data accesses. However, some information may be missing from the provenance store because of the use of other data access methods. We believe that some provenance is better than none, and other provenance capture points can be added through time. Even if robust provenance capture required implementing all three methods of capture, it is worth noting that those three methods would scale to dozens or hundreds of different applications on top of OWF; contrast this with the scalability of attempting to capture provenance on a per-application basis.

A final example of a very simple system backbone is insertion into a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) web proxy. For their protection, organizations often funnel all requests from their organization through a web proxy. The proxy essentially sees all data requests being sent from within the organization to the internet, as well as the response. Additionally, SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) and other web service interactions typically run over HTTP. Thus, a method for tracing public data use is to embed provenance capture points within the web proxy. We have modified the Rabbit web proxy to log all HTTP messages that it intercepts. This provides the ability to see not only which information a user within the organization uses, but also the sources within the internet that provide specific parts of that content. For example, Figure 4 shows the provenance store of a very simple web request. It indicates that multiple parties contribute information to the page finally shown to the user. This is of particular interest when tracking who owns the data, or whether data passes through untrusted sources. One drawback of using web proxies, though, is that while it gives great insight into process inputs and outputs, it does not provide much detail on the nature of the processes running on remote web servers, other than their names, inputs and outputs.

The key issue is that the coordination backbone must capture as much information as possible about the collaboration. In our examples, the multi-organizational enterprise runs on a common technical infrastructure, providing a coordination backbone for provenance capture. The use of an ESB, OWF, or a web proxy is not required; however, the use of a central coordination backbone provides a simple one-stop place for provenance collection to occur. Even in a system of systems, the coordination backbones of components can each contribute to the provenance store. Alternatively, if no central coordination backbones are available, this technique can still be used when collaborators agree on a tool set such that each tool can itself be provenance enabled (i.e., each of these tools can report provenance to the PLUS API).

B. Owning the System

In highly specialized circumstances, all data and processes will be owned and operated within one system. When this is the case, since the entire system is owned by a single authority, it is possible to place provenance capture points within the executing system itself. We have two examples of this strategy implemented for use with PLUS: PASS [19] and a rudimentary workflow manager. These systems show very different levels of system ownership.

For instance, PASS assumes that everything is run on a single operating system, on a single box. PASS modified the Linux kernel to add provenance reporting calls. Whenever a program executes, the file system activities are logged in the provenance system. This method has the advantage of seeing everything that occurs in the file system. However, it has the disadvantage of being at a very low level of granularity, and capturing possibly uninteresting information such as intermediate file read and writes. Additionally, we are not aware of work that would provide for provenance capture scalability across multiple machines; that is, connecting the provenance records of system calls on one machine with those of another.

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1http://www.khelekore.org/rabbit
Meanwhile, a workflow execution system is also considered centrally owned system if all the enterprise’s computing is performed within it. The workflow system controls the calling of processes and the access of data. As such, provenance calls from within the workflow system itself can see all – particularly environmental parameters to which other provenance capture methods may not have access.

C. Single Application Modification

In many cases, provenance-enabling a system coordination backbone, such as an ESB, OWF, or a web proxy, may not be enough. As described above with OWF, users, processes or data may circumvent the methods that have been enabled to capture provenance. Additionally, even if the system backbone can capture the information about a particular process or data item, it may not be detailed enough for the user’s needs. In order to fill in the gaps, specifically targeted single application modification is appropriate. For instance, if we find OWF users all love a particular widget that uses an esoteric data access method instead of DOJO’s publish/subscribe model to access its data, we can provenance-enable this specific widget to provide better coverage to our users. We have implemented several examples of single application modification, including Palantir, D-Tool, and M-Tool.

As mentioned above, Palantir is a Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) tool designed to assist analysts in visualizing the data and performing link analysis. D-Tool is a Common Data Warehouse (CDW), a data warehouse designed to serve as a common repository for multiple structured and unstructured datasets. M-Tool is a configurable tool for performing extraction, transformation and loading of documents into a common data warehouse. For instance, a Palantir file could be ingested by M-Tool, and any location information found therein would be geo-tagged. Because Palantir, D-Tool and M-Tool were each heavily used by analysts in certain environments, they were considered good candidates to provide extra information insight.

While single application modification provides good additional insight whenever holes in the provenance of a distributed system are found, adding provenance reporting to single applications should be undertaken with caution. The development time to add provenance reporting to a single application is on par with doing so for an entire system coordination backbone, while the provenance information gained is for that single application instead of every application on the backbone. This may be an acceptable tradeoff if the single application is used often enough, or the interesting provenance details cannot be accessed from the backbone, but an analysis of other options should be performed before proceeding.

Because D-Tool and M-tool are U.S. government-owned systems, we do not use their actual names.

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Figure 4: An example of provenance captured via the RabbIT Web Proxy capture point.
D. Legacy System Capture

Finally, as with adding provenance reporting to a single application, there are instances when the provenance obtained through a system’s coordination backbone has holes, or is lacking information of interest. In the previous subsection, we discussed adding provenance reporting to single applications, however not all applications can be modified in this way. In every example above, an API or source code was available for the application. In many instances, particularly well-established legacy applications, this is not the case. These applications are often central to an organization’s work, and much information flows through them, but they were created so long ago that no open API or code base exists. For these systems, we have two potential solutions for provenance capture: wrapping the application, or scraping the logs of the application.

In the first case, a simple wrapper is placed around the legacy application. The wrapper merely passes all inputs directly to the legacy application, and routes all outputs back out. However, while doing this message passing, calls are made to the provenance system, thus capturing the provenance of what was being sent to and returned from the legacy system. The interface to the legacy application remains the same for any caller, but its functionality is augmented by the provenance wrapper which puts itself in the middle to observe the legacy application’s usage patterns.

In the second example, the log file of the legacy application can be scraped, and any interesting information placed within the provenance system. This typically involves parsing log files generated by tools, or monitoring facilities of an operating system. We have a working example of both these strategies using STrace. STrace is a UNIX tool that traces system-level calls. When a program is executed through STrace, a user can write an output file of system calls. In other words, STrace is effectively a wrapper for the shell script, allowing it to run unimpeded, but watching what occurs. The output file from STrace can then be scraped to populate a provenance store. System calls (such as open(), read(), and close()) become processes, while their inputs and outputs are data sent to and from those processes. While most legacy solutions will involve one or the other strategy, not both, our work with STrace uses both methods effectively.

V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

The highest cost for provenance is the developer hours needed to customize provenance capture points. We have tracked developer hours in a number of the provenance capture methods discussed above. Figure 5 shows an example of the possible spread of costs for providing provenance capture. The backbone shown in Figure 5 is the development time required to add provenance capture to a MULE ESB backbone. N-Tool and X-Tool, both shown as instances of a backbone, is the time required to configure the provenance-enabled MULE ESB to a particular environment. Meanwhile,

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7 See http://linux.die.net/man/1/strace
8 Because X-Tool and N-Tool are U.S. government-owned integration systems, we do not to use their actual names.
the Single Application category shows how long it took to add provenance capture to M-Tool. In other words, while it took longer to add provenance capture to the backbone, configuring subsequent instances of that backbone in new environments were trivial. Furthermore, adding provenance capture to the coordination backbone provides provenance for the many applications running over the backbone, instead of just the one application singly modified.

Figure 6 shows a breakdown of the time required to integrate PLUS with each of the tools. The basic ESB provenance capture was excluded from this analysis, since the nature of the work was fundamentally different. It consisted of finding the appropriate places to put a provenance capture point, and how to get information out of the ESB and to PLUS. The tasks shown here include modifying a single application (M-Tool) and standing up instances of the ESB in a new environment (X-Tool and N-Tool).

M-Tool is written in C#, takes in unstructured data, parses it, extracts entities from it, looks up additional information on those entities using tools such as MetaCarta9 and then integrates all information on those entities in a single location. N-Tool is a set of services written in many different languages, but combined via an ESB; the goal of N-Tool is to pass a series of messages amongst distributed services to generate a final product; LoanBroker10 is a similar open source version of the N-Tool setup. Finally, X-Tool is comprised of two unconnected systems, with their own ESBs, and a message-pass between them.

For each of these third-party systems, we provided a .jar file with PLUS code, a README file, and access to a PLUS developer for basic questions. We then asked developers on each of the third-party systems to deploy PLUS, insert appropriate capture points in their system, test the entire setup and report how long each step took.

Figure 6 shows how long it took to orchestrate a third-party tool with PLUS. M-Tool took the longest by far, 49hrs; however, an interview with the third-party developer indicated that the bulk of this time was spent on the one-time cost of converting PLUS’s .jar file to DLLs for use in the .NET/C# environment. This time investment would not be repeated, even for subsequent deployments in a .NET environment. N-Tool and X-Tool, which are very similar environments, both using an ESB, show the effect the system complexity has upon the orchestration time. While both use a basic ESB (or two for X-Tool), N-Tool is more complex in terms of the number of flows and services than X-Tool. In the case of configuring capture for the ESB, users can select to log provenance on a per-service basis to focus only on key chosen flows. Setup can be more rapid if all services are selected, while it may take more time for a complex orchestration where only some portions are selected for capture. However, none of these installations were undue burdens, and can be accomplished within a week.

VI. CHOOSING CAPTURE POINTS

If an agile C2 system is designed such that data and applications can be pulled from anywhere and either used locally or run remotely with results delivered locally, then we recommend exploiting the system coordination backbone. There must be a coordination backbone to enable applications and data to be exchanged in these ways, and the backbone provides a high-value provenance capture point.

Depending on the ways in which provenance information will be used (e.g., taint analysis, assessing the suitability of data, forensics), the provenance provided by the backbone can be augmented by adding provenance reporting to the single applications or to the legacy applications of greatest value to the user base.

Figure 7 shows an overview of our experience with different provenance capture techniques. Neither modifying a coordination backbone nor modifying a single application is trivial, and each takes roughly the same amount of

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9 See www.metacarta.com
10 http://www.mulesoft.org/documentation/display/MULE2INTRO/Loan+Broker+ESB+Example
development effort. The detail of the provenance information obtained may be higher from a specifically modified single application (because the user can pinpoint exactly what from that application is interesting); however, when multiplied over the large number of applications available within an agile C2 environment, the backbone development is the better bargain in terms of development hours and amount of provenance information. Our experience has also yielded observations about a general trade-off between scope of provenance captured, and detail available; capturing provenance in systems such as Mule ESB provides a wide scope of possible capture (many systems and organizations) with some sacrifice in terms of how much technical detail can be obtained about any one piece of software in the distributed system. On the other end of the spectrum, PASS integration provides an example of extremely detailed technical capture of provenance, at the expense of a very narrow scope of capture (one Linux system). Individual application modification resides between these two extremes, with its exact location in this trade space dependent on the specifics of the application.

VII. RELATED WORK

Provenance, or the history of information, has garnered interest in government, commercial and scientific circles. Topics of provenance study include capture [7, 14], storage [9], reasoning [5, 12], security [15, 24], usability [10, 17, 22], etc. In particular, provenance has been touted as a tool to assist with scientific collaboration. A large number of scientific applications [4, 7, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, 23] have been built to help scientists harness the power of provenance using specific applications. These scientific collaborations have explored some of the capture methods we outline in this work. For instance, in ES3 [13], the applications used by scientists for data analysis are modified to capture provenance; i.e. single application modification. [7] uses a similar single application modification method. Many scientific provenance systems require the user to operate solely within the confines of a system, PASS [19], or workflow manager [4, 16, 22] which quietly collects provenance information. Each of these methods, single application modification and owning the system, is limiting in terms of the applications and environments that scientists are constrained to use.

In addition to the PLUS system described in this work, Karma [23] and PreServ [14] allow more general capture by positioning capture points anywhere of interest. Like PLUS, this open API can be used for all of the capture methods discussed within this work.
[11] describes provenance-based techniques for assessing data trustworthiness using data and path similarity. The work does not address provenance collection and could leverage PLUS's "open world" collection techniques. In addition, their trust assessment framework could be implemented on top of the PLUS annotation facility.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

In this work, we describe how provenance contributes to the "shared understanding" needed for the "coherent and effective response" [1] required of an operational agile C2 system. Provenance adds value in large-scale, multi-organizational environments by helping users assess the suitability of unfamiliar data and by allowing users to manage the downstream consequences of faulty data or process executions. We showcase PLUS, a working provenance system with robust capture, storage and administrative capabilities. We discuss novel, minimally invasive provenance capture strategies in distributed, heterogeneous systems, describe examples that we have implemented, and provide engineering guidance for determining where to insert provenance capture points.

We have begun to consider how provenance capture and querying would operate across multiple security enclaves, but more work needs to be done in this area. We also hope to investigate in more detail the ways in which data quality annotations can be combined with basic provenance information to give users more nuanced understanding.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


