Consequences of the NATO Comprehensive Approach for Command and Control

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“Whoever acts with respect, will get respect.”  
Mevlana Rumi (1207-1273)
Disclaimer

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NATO-RTO-SAS-085 on C2 Agility and Requisite Maturity
Outline

1. Cybernetics and the NATO Comprehensive Approach
2. What are the Consequences of the NATO Comprehensive Approach for Command and Control?
3. Methods, objects and subjects of the study
4. Data on NATO Operations and Exercises
5. Discussion
6. Conclusions
7. Recommendations
NATO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE
AFGHANISTAN, URUZGAN, JULY 2008, Relating?
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1. Cybernetics: The Art of Steering (in any condition)

- Steering supposes a Goal
- 😊 Goal: Entity to shoot at? Three types of Goals: Air, Sea, Land?
- Steering requires Continuing Feedback
- Who is who, who is what, who is master/slave? All want to lead, no one wants to follow!
- Verbal and Non-verbal feedback: self-steering, self-esteem, self-control, self-discipline
Feedback = Information, Seeing Wind?
1.2 Working Definition of the NATO Comprehensive Approach

The integration of military security efforts in diplomacy and development

NOT:

The integration of diplomacy and development in military security efforts

Again: who is in the lead, or is that not that important?
1.3 Situational Awareness of Tanks and Platoons: Where are Markets, Schools and Hospitals?
Enablers of command and control are personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
2. Research Question

What are the Consequences of the NATO Comprehensive Approach for Command and Control?
3. Methods, objects and subjects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>NATO operations in Afghanistan</th>
<th>NATO operations in Libya</th>
<th>NATO Response Force Exercises</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Questionnaires</td>
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<td>N=215</td>
<td>N=9</td>
<td>N=45</td>
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4.1 Observations, interviews

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<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
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<td>Technical Networks</td>
<td>Collaboration in Afghan Mission Network, but president Karzai is on the phone with his ambassadors</td>
<td>Deconfliction between military networks, open internet and phone lines</td>
<td>Stand alone, no processing of hardcopy letters into NATO secret networks</td>
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<td>Knowledge Networks</td>
<td>Deconfliction of development projects</td>
<td>Stand alone</td>
<td>Not on strategic level, growing on operational and tactical level</td>
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<td>Social Networks</td>
<td>Conflicting, cultural hurdles between punishment and mercy for perpetrators</td>
<td>Stand alone, first meetings in Combined Joint Taskforce Headquarters during operation</td>
<td>Stand alone, non NATO entities feel disabled, too masculine, too many men</td>
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4.2 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan Survey MAR-APR 2012 (N=215)

- To what extent are technology gaps preventing information sharing with non-military actors?
- To what extent does lack of trust prevent information sharing with non-military actors?
- Percentage of Respondents in ISAF headquarters and commands who state that this is the case frequently or always
4.3 Questionnaires in NATO Response Force Exercise and Operation Unified Protector: Leadership

- This HQ’s leadership stimulates communication and interaction with all relevant partners.
- Percentage of Respondents who (somewhat) agree.
4.4 Questionnaires in NATO Response Force Exercise and Operation Unified Protector: Personnel

- This HQ’s personnel are capable of working in a complex and diverse cultural environment
- Percentage of Respondents who (somewhat) agree
5. Discussion

• Social Media can foster the implementation of the NATO Comprehensive Approach?

• Agility in Technical Networks, Knowledge Networks and Social Networks

• Networks are Agile, so new social networks are easily created and fade after operations?

• What is the need for Trusted Identities in Cyber?
6. Conclusions

- NATO does not yet fully implement the Comprehensive Approach in Operations and Exercises
- Social Networks are not always in place
- The NATO Comprehensive Approach changes Command and Control into Contact, Consultation, Command and Control
- Maintain a firm Civilian Lead, respecting Civilian Know How and Military Can Do
- NATO agreed in 2006 on the Comprehensive Approach, but needed 2 years to develop an action plan?
7. Recommendations

1. Foster Engagement with Non NATO entities in Contact and Consultation
2. Combine Civilian Know How with Military Can Do
3. Open rather Closed Minded Military Culture by Social Media and Gender Policy
4. End Competition between the Armed Services
5. Cut the endless wood of NATO abbreviations (BP, DHS)
6. Contact and Consult to Create Trust
7. Patience