

Confrontation Analysis: a Command and Control System for Conflicts Other Than War*

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ABSTRACT

A Conflict Other Than War (COTW) is won by conducting a sequence of ‘confrontations’, just as a War is won by conducting a sequence of battles. An individual confrontation is represented by a card table, in which each player has certain cards. Each takes a ‘position’ by saying which cards should be played, by itself and others, and a ‘fallback position’, consisting of the cards it implicitly threatens to play if its position is rejected. When positions are mutually understood, a moment of truth is arrived at. By Confrontation Analysis we can find the dilemmas players then face, the emotions and rationalisations aroused, and how the dilemmas may be eliminated. Important dilemmas are: the threat dilemma (“I’d prefer not carry out my threat, if I had to”), the deterrence dilemma (“They’d rather see all threats carried out than accept my position”), the inducement dilemma (“I’d rather accept their position than see threats carried out”) and the trust dilemma (“If they accepted my position, I couldn’t trust them to carry it out.”) Eliminating dilemmas is done by using emotion and reason to change preferences, introduce new players or cards, or change positions. A confrontation is resolved when all dilemmas are eliminated. To conduct a confrontation effectively, a Commander orchestrates the process of dilemma-elimination so as to bring about a resolution in line with his objectives. A COTW Commander is usually part of a civilian-military coalition. To help this coalition win he should maintain a C2 (command and control) system that enables him to model his confrontations and linkages between them, analyse dilemmas and methods for eliminating them, store information about confrontations sorted according to relevance, formulate a Confrontation Strategy, devolve it to lower levels of command, coordinate strategies between linked confrontations, communicate new intelligence or strategy between levels of command and linked confrontations, brief newly-arrived officers on current confrontations and strategies for resolving them, and understand how confrontations were or were not resolved, enabling lessons to be learnt and training given.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. ‘Confronting’ compared to fighting

Today’s military are often tasked, not with war-fighting, but with *confronting* other players in order to bring them into compliance with the will of the International Community. This requires a new approach, different from that employed in war-fighting. Research commissioned by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA, 1997, 1999) has investigated the use of a new tool — Confrontation Analysis — to support this task.

The paradigm is: *a peace-support campaign is won by conducting a sequence of confrontations – just as a war campaign is won by fighting a sequence of battles.*

The aim of this research is a command and control (C2) system for confrontations. This system will be held, maintained and updated by the military for the benefit of the civilian-military coalition that typically represents the International Community in confrontations with non-compliant players. It is hoped to make the International Community more effective in handling confrontations, thereby reducing the time it takes to achieve its objectives in a peace-support theatre and so reducing the time that the military needs to be involved.

1.2. *Drama theory*

Confrontation Analysis is derived from *drama theory*. This is a development of Game Theory introduced by Howard, Bennett, Bryant and Bradley (1992) and further developed by Howard (1994, 1996, 1997, 1998), Bennett (1995, 1997) and Bryant (1997), as well as in the *Cooperation or Conflict* research letter (Nigel Howard Systems, 1993-97). It has been given a mathematical foundation by Howard (1998). Matthews (1998) has given a popular account. DERA (1997, 1999) and Howard (1999) have looked at its application to defence.

The theory focuses on a preplay period of communication between players called a *confrontation*. In this period, prior to implementing any strategies, players attempt to define the game (renamed the ‘frame’) and their positions within it in such a way as to completely resolve their interdependent decision problem. If they succeed, the game they then play has a trivial, agreed solution. If they fail, it may have the full spectrum of problems associated with games.

In this preplay period of attempted conflict resolution we find the phenomena associated with ‘drama’ (in the sense of fictionalised representation of conflict), as distinct from game-playing. We find actors using emotion and rational debate to try to change their own and each others’ beliefs and values. Means such as these, which are not covered by game theory, are necessary because we assume that players cannot simply *choose* how they will define the game. Their definition is based upon their honest beliefs about the opportunities open to them and their effective value systems. Thus it is based upon characteristics of the players and the world they inhabit that are changed by interactions involving emotion, reason, exploration, debate and the exchange of threats and promises, rather than by calculations based upon instrumental rationality.

The drama-theoretic hypothesis is that, through interactions of this kind, players find themselves changing in ways they could not have envisaged beforehand. A Commander confronting others in a peace support campaign must handle such interactions, so needs a practical understanding of the underlying theory.

1.3. *Confrontation analysis and confrontation strategies*

A key role in the theory is played by the concept of a confrontation – a pre-play bargaining situation in which each party communicates to the others

- its ‘position’, stating what actions it wants all parties to carry out
- its ‘fallback strategy’, stating the unilateral action it will take if its position is rejected.

When parties’ positions and fallback strategies are made clear and credible, a ‘moment of truth’ arrives, at which they must try to use emotion and reason to resolve various ‘dilemmas’. Confrontation analysis examines the dilemmas they face and shows their effects. The theory is able to tell us that when all dilemmas are resolved, the confrontation has been resolved by acceptance of a common position.

A peace support Commander needs to have a clear picture of the various confrontations he is in, his objectives for each one, and how one leads to another. ‘Winning’ a confrontation means obtaining his objectives. However, in the same way that a war-fighting Commander may win a campaign even though he does not win every battle (he may avoid some, and accept a lesser outcome in others), so a peace support Commander need not win every confrontation. He must conduct each one with an eye to those that will come later, and achieve his mission objectives through conducting a sequence of confrontations in which the resolution of one leads to another until all parties are brought into compliance.

By understanding the dilemmas parties face in each confrontation, the Commander sees how to employ the elements under his command to bring about the kind of change he wants. Looking at the campaign as a whole, he can plan an overall *confrontation strategy* to achieve his objectives, hopefully without actual violence – though the ability to credibly threaten and, if necessary, implement violence is generally essential. He can also devolve his confrontation strategy to the various units under his command and co-ordinate it with parties not directly under his command so that a consistent, unified confrontation strategy is carried out at all levels.

Though he may devolve his strategy to other levels, it is the Commander, at each level, that is primarily responsible for confronting other players.

This does not mean that only senior offices have such responsibilities. A private soldier, for example, will be the Commander if his task is to guard an alleyway to block potential rioters and must confront civilians wishing to pass through. This illustrates the fact that confrontations take place at every level of command. But at each level, it is the Commander *at that level* who is personally responsible for handling them.

In what follows we examine these concepts in more detail and give illustrative examples based on interviews with officers and officials in the Bosnia theatre.

2. CONFRONTATIONS AND HOW TO WIN THEM

2.1. *War, Peace and Conflicts Other Than War*

Figure 1: Peace, Conflict and War (Source: ADP Vol 1, Operations) is taken from a UK Army Doctrine Publication. (Note: all figures and tables are placed at the end of the paper so that they can be referred to throughout.) It shows how relations between players – nations or other groups – move between three states: Peace, Conflict Other Than War and War.

- Peace exists when there is no violence or threat of it. It can be followed by continued Peace or by *vulnerable peace*. This is when disputes are in danger of escalating to a point where parties do threaten or implement violence.
- *Vulnerable peace* may be followed by War or by Conflict Other Than War. This is when players use violent threats to impose their wishes.
- Conflict Other Than War may lead to War or to *fragile peace*. This is when confidence that violence is not threatened needs to be rebuilt and consolidated. If rebuilding is successful, true Peace follows.
- From War, parties may move from actual violence to merely threatening it – ie, to Conflict Other Than War. Or they may move to *fragile peace*.

In War, players plan and conduct campaigns, which are sequences of military operations such as battles. In a Conflict Other Than War, players plan and conduct confrontational missions. These consist of sequences of confrontations. In these, a Commander, often in alliance with civilian actors, confronts other parties in order to induce them to comply with his end-state – the mission objective defined by his superior. If successful, he obtains their compliance *without going to war*.

He may be forced to go to war, because one way he gets others to comply is by threatening to go to war, and their disbelief in his threat may force him to carry it out. If so he will strive to return from War to Conflict Other Than War, by the path shown in Figure 1. But if his strategy over the whole sequence of confrontations is fully successful, he never goes to war.

The principle of *deterrence* rules in confrontations. Instead of directly using violence to bring others into compliance with his objective, a Commander uses the *threat* of violence to *deter* them from non-compliance. This means he is prepared to carry out his threat if necessary, but is fully successful if he never has to.

2.2. *Civil-military alliances and linkages between confrontations*

Other threats, besides use of violence, are used to induce compliance in a Conflict Other Than War. So are promises. This is why a Commander in a confrontational mission works with non-military actors, who generally take responsibility for implementing non-military threats and promises.

Confrontations in a Conflict Other Than War take place at various levels. For example, the Dayton agreement arose out of a confrontation between the International Community (IC), the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosniacs. As a result, a NATO Commander in Bosnia, allied with civilian organisations such as the Office of the High Representative, has to confront the national leadership of ethnic groups. As a result, a divisional commander under the NATO command, allied with regional representatives of civilian agencies, has to confront regional ethnic groups. As a result, battalion commanders, allied with local representatives, have to confront local ethnic groups. As a result, company commanders under each battalion commander have to conduct confrontations over specific issues. And so on.

Thus confrontations are linked vertically. When a commander is in a confrontation, his subordinates get into linked confrontations.

Confrontations are also linked chronologically in that one leads to another. After resolving a confrontation with one party, a Commander confronts another. How he resolves the first confrontation affects the second.

Chronological linkages between confrontations give linked sequences of confrontations, from which we get the idea of a confrontation strategy. This is a way of defining objectives in each of a linked sequence of confrontations so that, by resolving each one in line with his objectives, a Commander brings about the next confrontation in the sequence and, in the last confrontation, reaches his end-state (mission objective).

For planning purposes, the set of confrontations is actually more than a sequence. At various points it branches into a number of alternatives, depending on external events and the outcomes of particular confrontations. Thus the planner sees a tree of confrontations rather than a sequence. In the event, however, only one sequence is pursued.

While a Commander sees his confrontational campaign as a linked sequence of confrontations, from a higher-level viewpoint it is a single confrontation. This is the viewpoint of the Commander's superior, who sees the whole campaign as one component of his own, higher-level campaign.

2.3. *Dilemmas and the card-table model*

To implement a confrontation strategy, a Commander needs to know how to resolve an individual confrontation in line with his objectives. He needs this both because the whole campaign can be seen as a single confrontation, and because (seeing it as a sequence of confrontations) he needs to obtain his objectives in at least some confrontations to obtain his campaign objectives.

He does so using confrontation analysis, which identifies for him the dilemmas (change points) in a confrontation so that he can use them to pressure other parties while resisting pressure on himself.

He first builds a simple model of his confrontation as it is at the moment. In this model, called a 'card-table', each player has a number of 'cards' it can play or not play. The outcome depends on which cards are played.

A model of a confrontation at a particular time consists of

- A set of *players*, each holding a number of *cards*. Players may be governments, groups or alliances. Players are not (on the whole) individuals. They are organisations. Often an organisational player is represented by an individual, but then the true player is not the individual. It is the organisation. A player's position, preferences and strategy are generally arrived at via internal confrontations between subplayers in its organisation. A player's cards are the elements of the situation that it controls.
- For each player, a *position*, specified by specifying which cards should be played and which not played (by all players). A player's position represents the future it proposes that all players should accept and implement. A Commander's position is generally a way of fulfilling his objectives in the confrontation.
- For each player, a *fallback position*, specified by specifying which of its own cards that player will play. This is the unilateral action the player implies it will take if its position is not accepted – or is accepted, but without a genuine intention of implementing it. If all players implement their fallback positions, the expected result is a particular future called the *threat* or *fallback future*.

Table 1: A Company Commander Confronts A Roadblock illustrates. It shows a card-table model of a simple confrontation between a company commander and paramilitaries manning a roadblock. This table might be drawn up by the company commander to help him decide his tactics for this confrontation.

Table 1 is the simplest possible card table. It has two players, each with one card. Our other tables show more possibilities.

A confrontation comes to a head as players take 'final' positions and 'final' fallback positions. (We put 'final' in quotes because the players merely *regard* these positions as final; they may actually be forced, by encountering dilemmas, to change them). When these 'final' positions become *common knowledge* – meaning that each player knows them, knows that the others know them, and so on – the card table that shows them represents a *common reference frame*. This means that messages passed between the players assume the information in this card table. *The common reference frame is the minimal set of common references needed for the confrontation* – ie, for players to understand each other's threats and promises.

Players now face a *moment of truth*. They realise that 'something has to give' – ie, unless attitudes or positions change, they face the fallback future.

The exception is when all take the same position and can trust each other to implement it. In this case the confrontation has ended in a *resolution*.

The aim of a Commander in a confrontation is to make it end in a resolution conforming to his objectives. To achieve this, he needs to understand the pressures felt by players at a moment of truth which cause them to change their positions or preferences or take irreversible action. This means understanding the dilemmas they face.

2.4. Dilemmas, emotion and rational argument

As dilemmas are the ‘change points’ in a confrontation, a Commander uses them to bring about change in the direction of his objectives.

According to drama theory, there are six dilemmas that a player may face at a moment of truth. Each one puts it under specific pressure to redefine the confrontation. The player is under pressure to change its own or others’ positions or preferences, or to irreversibly change the confrontation, *so as to eliminate the dilemma.*

In making these changes, players are motivated by emotion and use rational argument.

A Commander needs to understand this rational-emotional pressure in order to use it. The clue is: *each player uses emotion and reason to try to eliminate the dilemmas it faces.*

If all dilemmas have been eliminated, it has been proved (Howard, 1998) that *all players must be taking the same position and can trust each other to carry it out.* The confrontation is then resolved at this common position.

Dilemmas are of two kinds. The first kind arise only when players’ positions conflict. These are the dilemmas of *threat, deterrence, inducement and positioning.*

- Player A has a *threat* dilemma if it prefers not to implement its fallback position when others implement theirs. Its fallback position is then incredible. **Example:** Suppose that, in Table 1, the Company Commander prefers column **default** to column **threat**. Then he has a threat dilemma, (a) because of this preference, (b) because, if column **threat** were going to be carried out, he could move to column **default** by changing just his own selection of cards – ie, but not playing the ‘air-strikes’ card. Thus he is tempted to ‘defect’ from the **threat** column. **Another example:** In **Table 2: Serbs vs The International Community 1991-94**, the IC has a threat dilemma in that during this period it preferred not to carry out its threat of military intervention against the Serbs.

A player may react to a threat dilemma, if not by changing its fallback position, then by emotions such as anger, defiance and indignation. These prompt it to find reasons to change its preferences in favour of the **threat** future, thereby eliminating the dilemma.

- Player A has a *deterrence* dilemma with respect to player B if B prefers the **threat** column to A’s position. B is then under no pressure to accept A’s position. **Example:** In Table 1, suppose that the Company Commander prefers column **threat** to column **PARA**. Then the paramilitaries have a deterrence dilemma. The fallback future (the **threat** column) puts the Commander under no pressure to accept their position. **Another example:** In **Table 3: Serbs vs IC If IC Had Withdrawn Its Military Threat**, the IC has a deterrence dilemma in that it is no longer pressuring the Serbs to discontinue their aggression.

Player A may react by angrily demonising B. This helps A to find and threaten a fallback position more damaging to B. This is an escalatory reaction, driven by negative emotion and negative rationalisations. Alternatively, A may offer B a positive position that B likes better than A’s present position. This is a conciliatory reaction, rationalised by positive feelings towards B’s interests. The dilemma is got rid of in either way.

The deterrence dilemma is contingent upon the elimination of the threat dilemma in that player A will say, when someone's fallback position is incredible, 'even if this **threat** future were credible, it would not pressure B to accept my position.' Until a credible **threat** future is arrived at, the dilemma remains hypothetical in this sense.

- Player A has an **inducement** dilemma with respect to B if A prefers B's position to the **threat** column. A is then under pressure to accept B's position. **Example:** In Table 1, suppose the paramilitaries prefer column **COM** to column **threat**. Then they have an inducement dilemma. **Another example:** In **Table 4: The IC Gets Tough With The Serbs**, the Serbs have an inducement dilemma. They prefer to cease aggression rather than have the IC intervene militarily (including as it does US support for Croat-Muslim coalition forces). **Another example:** In **Table 5: Serb Returnees Into A Muslim Area**, the Muslims and the IC both have an inducement dilemma.

Player A may react negatively to this dilemma, with anger and attempts to rationalise a preference for the **threat** future rather than B's position. Such reactions are escalatory, since they give B a deterrence dilemma that it may overcome by further escalation. Alternatively, A may react positively (with sympathetic consideration for B's priorities and hence with suggestions for a position B might accept). If this eliminates the dilemma, it does so by creating a joint position. Like the deterrence dilemma, the inducement dilemma is contingent upon the elimination of the threat dilemma. Player A will say, when someone's fallback position is incredible, 'if the **threat** future were credible, I would be under pressure to accept B's position.' A is not necessarily under pressure until a credible **threat** future is arrived at.

- Player A has a **positioning** dilemma with respect to B if it prefers B's position to its own. This can happen if A is rejecting B's position, not because it dislikes it, but because it considers it unrealistic – eg, because B has a deterrence dilemma with respect to a third player. A's dilemma is then that its preference for B's position makes it hard to argue against it. **Example:** In **Table 11: The US Has To Confront Either The Muslims Or The Serbs**, the US is rejecting the Muslim position (a strong Presidency for the proposed federation) not because it dislikes it, but because it thinks the Serbs will never accept it.

Player A may react with irritation toward B, motivating a search for intrinsic reasons to reject its position. Alternatively, A may decide to accept B's position – or a position closer to B's than A's present one – and find ways to overcome the dilemmas this may create.

As said, the above four dilemmas are important when players have differing positions. Eliminating them brings players to a common position.

When all players take the same position, two dilemmas can remain – the dilemmas of **cooperation** and **trust**.

- Player A has a **cooperation** dilemma when it would prefer not to implement (its part of) its own position if others accepted its position and were prepared to implement their parts. Its position is then incredible. Others suspect that it will 'defect' from it. **Example:** In **Table 11: The US Has To Confront Either The Muslims Or The Serbs**, the US has a cooperation dilemma. The Serbs suspect that it would defect from their joint position and gravitate, in later negotiations, toward the Muslim position – which differs from the joint US-Serb position only in the playing or not playing of the US card 'propose strong Presidency'. **Another example:** In **Table 12: A Bosnian Prisoner's Dilemma**, each family has a cooperation dilemma. It cannot convince the other family that it would carry out its part of their joint position, if the other did so.

In general, more examples of cooperation dilemmas are revealed by looking at a proposed position in more detail – which is done by adding more cards and players.

A player may react to a cooperation dilemma by giving up its proposed position. Otherwise, it needs to feel and project positive emotion (goodwill, etc) to convince others that it does not intend to renege on its promise (ie, the selection of cards it promises to play as part of its position), or that it cannot or would not gain from doing so.

The cooperation dilemma is contingent upon there being a common position – and therefore upon the elimination of the deterrence and inducement dilemmas – in that player A will say, if there is no common position, ‘*even if* my position were accepted by all, they might not implement it, since they would not trust me to do so.’ Until there is a common position, the dilemma therefore remains hypothetical.

The **trust** dilemma is related to the cooperation dilemma. When all players take the same position, it is the same dilemma looked at from another’s point of view.

- Player A has a **trust** dilemma with respect to B when B would prefer not to implement (its part of) its A’s position if others were prepared to implement their parts. This again makes A’s position incredible. Others suspect that B would ‘defect’ from it. **Example: In Table 11: The US Has To Confront Either The Muslims Or The Serbs**, the US’s cooperation dilemma is the Serbs’ trust dilemma. As we have said, they suspect that the US would defect from their joint position and gravitate, in later negotiations, toward the Muslim position – which differs from the joint US-Serb position only in the playing or not playing of the US card ‘propose strong Presidency’. **Another example: In Table 13: Refugee Returns -- The IC vs Ethnic Party Leaders**, the IC has a trust dilemma with respect to each ethnic party – and also with respect to the ethnic parties as a group. While the parties formally accept refugee returns inasmuch as they are part of the Dayton agreement, they cannot be trusted to take steps to encourage them within their own party hierarchies.

As with the cooperation dilemma, more examples of the trust dilemma are revealed by adding cards and players to a proposed position as a way of examining it in detail.

Player A’s reaction to a trust dilemma with respect to B may be to change its position to one it can trust B to adhere to. Otherwise, it needs to feel and project positive emotion toward B in order to change B’s preferences toward adherence.

The trust dilemma, like the cooperation dilemma, is contingent upon there being a common position – and therefore upon the elimination of the deterrence and inducement dilemmas. Player A will say, if there is no common position, ‘*even if* my position were accepted by everyone, I could not trust B to implement it.’

2.5. Positions, goals and objectives

In using a card table, *positions*, *goals* and *objectives* need to be distinguished. First, a player’s position (a column in the card table) need not be the same as its *goal* – the column it is actually aiming at.

- A player’s goal may actually be the **threat** future – as we have supposed is the case with the Serbs in **Table 5: Serb Returnees Into A Muslim Area**. A player may be agreeing to a position in the hope that others will disagree and revert to the **threat** future.
- Another reason may be that the player faces a **cooperation dilemma** and secretly intends to renege on its promises by defecting from its position.

Note that while a player’s *position*, being a public statement, is in principle what it says it is, its *goal*, if different from its position, may have to be ascertained from intelligence sources.

Secondly, both positions and goals need to be distinguished from a player's *objectives*. Players at a moment of truth are deciding which cards, out of a given set under consideration, should be played and which should not. Their positions or goals are defined in terms of these. Their *objectives* need to be more broadly defined. A player may find ways to pursue the same objective by adopting a different position or goal, after changing the set of cards being considered. Objectives are thus pursued *through* particular sets of cards. They are not definable in terms of them.

A Commander will have objectives in a confrontation, rather than a goal or position, because he or his superior cannot lay down in advance the set of cards he will have to play with nor how he will be able to achieve his objectives through one or another selection of cards.

2.6. Card-table models held on computers

In a C2 system for confrontations, card-table models would be maintained on computers and transmitted over a network. When a card table appears on a computer screen, textual *interpretations* of cards, players and columns (representing players' positions and other relevant outcomes) can be called up by clicking on them. The interpretation of a player's position would generally say how it intends to pursue its objective through that position (or how it publicly pretends to, when its goal differs from its position).

Changes in a model held on a network may elicit warnings of the need for changes in *linked* models.

By attaching interpretations to the different part of a card-table model, a system of linked models becomes a powerful kind of database, one that presents information in a way that brings out its relevance for winning confrontations.

2.7. Simple vs complex models

Any model of a real situation may be made more simple or more complex. Complex models are appropriate for some purposes, simple models for others.

A simple model is appropriate at a moment of truth. This is because this model has to represent the players' common reference frame – which is the minimal common understanding of terms necessary for individual representatives (often suffering from tension, emotion or fatigue) to exchange implicit or explicit threats and promises and be sure that they understand each other.

Thus a card-table model of a moment of truth should be simple. But a Commander and his staff need other models as well.

They may need to look at the detailed assumptions behind simple models. Also, a Commander will typically be conducting a number of confrontations at once, and will need to maintain a number of linked, simple models. Thus a simple card table modelling a moment of truth may be made more complex for these purposes.

- To explore and check on the assumptions behind the simple confrontational model.
- To amalgamate linked, simple models into a single model in which to explore linkages.
- To explore how a Commander's confrontational strategy should be devolved to lower levels of command. See the following section CONFRONTATION STRATEGIES AND HOW TO DEVOLVE THEM.

Complexification is done by adding players and cards to the model, thereby adding detail to the description of each column. Any number of players and cards can be added.

Complexification, once done, may point to the need to revise a simple model. For example, adding a player may reveal that it has a crucial role not adequately represented in the simple model. Thus during preparation of a model there may be alternation between simple models and complex ones. Complex models are used to check simple ones. Simple models are used to sum up complex ones.

3. CONFRONTATION STRATEGIES AND HOW TO DEVOLVE THEM

3.1. *Sequences of confrontations*

Just as war-fighting operations are sequenced, a Commander's *confrontation strategy* (or that of the civilian-military coalition he works with) will involve planning for a *sequence of confrontations*.

Each confrontation in the sequence is conducted on a number of levels. The authority to conduct confrontations with specific parties, together with the mission objectives for those confrontations, is delegated from higher command levels to lower ones. In Bosnia, for example, the IC confronts the national ethnic parties to obtain their acceptance of refugee returns, as a result of which regional officers and officials belonging to the IC confront regional representatives of ethnic parties, as a result of which local officers and officials conduct local parties.

At each level, a Commander's mission objective may be described as *bringing non-compliant parties into compliance with the will of his superior*.

Such a state of compliance will be the position taken by the Commander in the final, top-level confrontation in his planned sequence of confrontations – ie, the final confrontation at the level of the Commander (or his coalition).

The confrontation strategy a Commander needs to pursue to reach this objective typically goes through two stages, which divide his planned sequence of confrontations in two. The two stages are:

- **STAGE 1: BRINGING NON-COMPLIANT PLAYERS INTO APPARENT COMPLIANCE.** *Apparent compliance* is obtained when all parties publicly adopt the Commander's final, top-level position. It may differ from *actual compliance* in that the parties may not intend to implement the position they have adopted. The first, necessary step is, however, to obtain apparent compliance.
- **STAGE 2: ENSURING THAT NO PLAYER OR GROUP OF PLAYERS CAN GAIN FROM NON-COMPLIANCE.** If any player or group can gain from not implementing their publicly declared position, this means that players face *cooperation* and *trust* dilemmas. Overcoming these dilemmas after obtaining *apparent compliance* is the way to obtain actual compliance with the Commander's mission objective.

These stages will be described one by one.

3.2. *Stage 1 (achieving apparent compliance)*

Stage 1 is fulfilled by eliminating three dilemmas – the threat, deterrence and inducement dilemmas. This is because:

- If all deterrence and inducement dilemmas are eliminated then it can be proved (see Howard, 1998) that all players have adopted the same publicly stated position.
- The deterrence and inducement dilemmas are contingent upon elimination of the threat dilemma.

The other dilemmas add to the description of stage 1. However, they do not affect its basic structure. The sequencing of confrontations needed to bring non-compliant players into apparent compliance depends only upon resolving these three dilemmas.

Let us suppose, first, that there is only one non-compliant player.

IF THERE IS ONLY ONE NON-COMPLIANT PLAYER, the Commander first adopts, with the compliant players, a fallback position that makes the **threat** future **credible** and the Commander's position **inducing** to the non-compliant player – ie, that eliminates all threat dilemmas and gives the non-compliant player an inducement dilemma. This gives the First Confrontation in the sequence.

Initiative and creativity may be necessary to find such a fallback position. It will be necessary for each non-compliant player to adopt a credible fallback position. The non-compliant player's fallback position can be made credible by assessing that player's most likely reaction and making it clear that this reaction is anticipated.

The Commander then chooses one of two alternatives.

- He may proceed to eliminate any inducement dilemma faced by himself and other compliant players (giving a Second Confrontation in the sequence). This gives the non-compliant player a deterrence dilemma, which it must overcome either by *compliance* (ie, accepting either the Commander's position or another position equally in line with the Commander's objective and acceptable to other, compliant players) or by *escalation*. The Commander has to judge the likelihood and dangers of escalation, the effect of which is generally to restart the sequence of confrontations at a higher level of potential or actual damage to players' interests. Escalation may sometimes be forestalled by adopting a fallback position that explicitly responds to any escalation by further escalation, thereby out-escalating the opponent.
- Alternatively, the Commander may accept the inducement dilemma facing himself or other compliant players and look for an alternative *compliant* position that (a) fulfils his superior's intent (b) is such that the non-compliant player as well as already compliant ones can be persuaded to accept it, given that the alternative is the **threat** future. Sometimes a cosmetic (inessential but face-saving) change to the Commander's position is enough. Adopting such an alternative position gives another kind of Second Confrontation, also leading, if successful, to compliance.

In every case, a Commander should listen to suggestions by other players, including the non-compliant player, and use creativity to think of 'win-win' alternatives.

The need for creativity and adaptability emphasises the need for a Commander's mission statement to give him flexibility in achieving his superior's intent. Unforeseen reactions by other players or his own side (which we recall is often a civilian-military coalition) may always cause the current confrontation to change in unforeseen ways, adding to the sequence that has to be gone through.

When there is more than one non-compliant player, a more complex sequence of planned confrontations may be necessary.

IF THERE IS MORE THAN ONE NON-COMPLIANT PLAYER, a **threat** future that simultaneously induces all of them may not exist – particularly in peace operations, where a threat harmful to one is often welcomed by another for that very reason.

In such cases, the necessary sequence of confrontations may go through the above compliance-inducing steps more than once, so as to bring players *successively into compliance*.

Example: Two steps in the current crisis over Kosovo (it is now March 24th, 1999) are modelled in **Table 9: Step 1 Of The IC's Confrontation Strategy Over Kosovo** and **Table 10: Step 2 Of The IC's Confrontation Strategy Over Kosovo**. Table 9 shows the situation as it appeared to be before the IC succeeded in pressuring the ethnic Albanians (EAs) into accepting the IC's position – which was that suppression of the EAs should cease and the EAs should accept autonomy within Serbia, as distinct from independence. The IC's strategy was to make clear to the EAs that unless they accepted this, the IC would take no action against the Serbs, giving the Serbian army a free rein to 'ethnically cleanse' Kosovo. The EAs finally succumbed to this pressure, whereupon the confrontation shifted to that in Table 10, where the Serbs are being pressured to accept the same position with the threat that, if they do not, NATO will bombard them (thereby giving air support to the EA fighters in Kosovo as well as directly damaging Serbian forces).

The non-compliant player that the IC is aiming, in a particular confrontation, to bring into compliance is the IC's *target* in that confrontation.

Enmity between two initially non-compliant players can mean, as in Table 9 and Table 10, that the goal (or even, in Table 9, a position), of the current non-target is actually the **threat** future. This has the advantage of making the **threat** future credible, in that the IC has no difficulty in getting the non-target to adopt the desired fallback position. It also makes the **threat** future inherently repugnant to the target, making it hard for the target to escape its inducement dilemma by preferring the **threat** future to the IC's position. The IC's position is itself a compromise between the positions of the two targets.

The same phenomenon of enmity may mean (as in **Table 10**), that one of the initially non-compliant players prefers the **threat** future (which punishes the other) to the position it has been induced to take. A Commander must beware of such a player's clandestine or uncooperative efforts to sabotage his confrontation strategy.

3.3. A branching sequence: contingent objectives vs main objectives

The sequence of confrontations needed to bring about apparent compliance must take account of the possibility that deterrence will fail. This means that the sequence must diverge, at each confrontation, into two subsequences that the Commander must plan for – one that is pursued if the target becomes compliant, the other if it does not. .

It may also diverge into subsequences that depend upon external factors of which the Commander has not yet got good intelligence.

However, the possibility that deterrence will fail – ie, that the target will refuse to comply – is a particular risk that must always be faced. *It is a risk necessarily present in confrontations*, or it would be possible to prove an absurdity, viz that both sides in a confrontation can be sure of winning contradictory objectives.

Thus the Commander in a confrontation must always have contingency plans for implementing the **threat** future. For a military Commander this often – though not always – means war-fighting. It is more likely to mean this in the earlier stages of an intervention. In the later stages it may mean the imposition of non-military penalties.

Whether it means war-fighting or not, it is essential to have in reserve a clear objective for this contingency, since if realised, it ceases to be a contingency and becomes the actual future. If, therefore, a Commander does not have a *contingent objective* for this eventuality, he will be in a situation that may involve war-fighting without having a clear objective to pursue.

Having a contingent objective also helps the Commander to eliminate his threat and inducement dilemmas.

The contingent objective should fulfil his superior's intent, yet may be forced to diverge from the superior's main intent. Consequently the mission statement delegated to a Commander may need to include both his *main objective* (the one that assumes confrontational success) and one or more *contingent objectives* (in case he has to implement the **threat** future in certain confrontations).

Note that there is often a difference in how main objectives and contingent objectives are presented. A player's main objective is achieved through its publicly stated position. A contingent objective may be merely implied or threatened – at least while the player is still hoping to achieve its main objective. This helps create a positive atmosphere for negotiations. It may also lead to lack of clarity and hence credibility; that is, uncertainty over a contingent objective may create or enhance a threat dilemma.

In any case, once the **threat** future becomes the **default** future, irreversibilities are often created that make the main objective impossible to achieve. When this happens, the contingent objective must become a publicly stated main objective. In this way it often happens, as in World War 2, that countries discuss and proclaim their war aims only after having started to fight.

Example: The IC's main objective in the confrontation of **Table 4: The IC Gets Tough With The Serbs** was to obtain its stated position – cessation of Serb 'aggression' with lifting of economic sanctions. Its contingent objective, if the Serbs would not agree, was military intervention (as in the **threat** column) – which meant giving air and other support to the advancing Muslim-Croat coalition until that coalition took back much of the ground the Serbs had gained in Bosnia. This objective would, even if pursued further, have been jettisoned in favour of the main objective, appropriately modified, had the Serbs sued for peace. This follows the pattern set out in Figure 1. If pursued far enough, however, it might have made attainment of the main objective impossible.

3.4. Stage 2 (*achieving actual compliance*)

Turning apparent compliance into actual compliance is a matter of getting players to adhere to their publicly stated positions.

Table 13: Refugee Returns -- The IC vs Ethnic Party Leaders illustrates the kind of problem a Commander faces. Here, while all three ethnic parties apparently agree to refugee returns, they prefer not to actively encourage them within their party organisations. Thus the **default** future in Table 13 remains at non-compliance, despite the common position. The consequence is that the commanders involved in local confrontations (illustrated by **Table 5: Serb Returnees Into A Muslim Area** and **Table 6: Croat Returnees To A Serb Village**) are not supported by a higher-level agreement; that is, the local ethnic leaders they negotiate with are not receiving instructions to comply from within their party organisations.

To achieve actual compliance is a matter of eliminating players' cooperation dilemmas (which are the same, assuming a common position, as *other* players' trust dilemmas). **Example:** In Table 13: Refugee Returns -- The IC vs Ethnic Party Leaders, the ethnic leaders have both individual and joint cooperation dilemmas – ie, each of them prefers not to encourage returns whether the others do so or not.

In planning his confrontation strategy, a Commander will concentrate on dilemma-elimination methods that do not involve sacrificing his objectives. Any alterations to the common position to make it more stable should not, therefore, involve sacrifice of objectives. This means concentration on setting up mechanisms to ensure that no player or group of players gains by 'defecting' from a common position that, even though it may have to be modified, should continue to represent achievement of objectives.

Setting-up of mechanisms to ensure cooperation can and should be done in an atmosphere of cooperation and goodwill, based upon common acceptance of the same position. **Example:** In **Table 13: Refugee Returns -- The IC vs Ethnic Party Leaders**, each ethnic leader could be asked to co-operate in installing mechanisms to detect and deter its own and others' defection. Here the term 'mechanism' should be understood in a wide sense. One 'mechanism' might be a requirement for ethnic leaders to go on TV and publicly encourage returns along specific axes. Compliance with this would have to be prepared via internal discussions within a leader's party, and would therefore represent something of an irreversible change; that is, a leader would prefer *not* to renege on such a public commitment – unless, indeed, it can claim provocation such as renegeing by another leader.

Cooperation and goodwill should be assumed, and should be forthcoming, from the player with a cooperation dilemma – the player that is suspected of intending to defect. This player is, after all, facing a dilemma that motivates it to show goodwill and seek ways of becoming trustable and trusted.

A player has this motivation if its goal is the same as the common position. In the case of a player whose goal is defection (and whose goal therefore differs from its position), this cooperation and goodwill are, in a sense, hypocritical. The player is nevertheless obliged to project them in order to maintain its publicly stated position. If it did not, it would be seen as moving away from that position and taking the defection as its goal. This would lead to a new confrontation that, presumably, it wishes to avoid. Meanwhile, its projected (though hypocritical) cooperation and goodwill can be accepted and built upon.

It is important to emphasise that a player whose goal is defection can nevertheless be brought into actual compliance provided deterrent mechanisms are put in place. Moreover, its cooperation with installing these mechanisms can and should be sought. The same is true of a player whose goal is a breakdown of negotiations leading to the **threat** future.

3.5. *Devolving a strategy to lower levels of command*

To begin with, the Commander must take the viewpoint of his superior in seeing the whole of his mission as a single confrontation. He models this overall confrontation by a single card-table model, to which others may be linked.

Example:Table 2: Serbs vs The International Community 1991-94, represents an overall, high-level model that might have been built by an UNPROFOR Commander. Linked to it might be models of the IC confronting the Croats, the IC confronting the Bosnian government, Russia confronting the West over Balkan foreign policy, and so on.

The Commander must define linkages from other models to his main model in order to clarify and alter as necessary the assumptions he makes in his main model.

Models are linked when changes in one affect the other. Relevant changes may be in characters' positions, the **threat** future or the **default** future, or in interpretations of the consequences or credibility of these. For example, a change in a confrontation involving the US, the Croats and the Muslims would be reported when a Muslim-Croat coalition agreed a common strategy against the Serbs. This would mean that their positions had converged to a common position; it might also mean that this common position had been made credible by changes in their beliefs or preferences.

This would affect the model in Table 2. It might make the **threat** column worse for the Serbs. In any case, it would affect the interpretation of the **threat** column – ie, the consequences to be expected from it

Another example: a change in a Commander's position or objectives (which will involve a change either in his position or in its interpretation) will, in general, affect the position or objectives of Commanders at lower levels who report to him.

If linkages between models are defined formally, then alterations in one model will trigger warnings of effects on other models. If both models are held on the same network, users of the affected model will receive automatic warnings at the same time.

Changes in interpretations (text attached to cards, players and columns and called up by clicking) would be reported across a system when they are significant – eg, not when a mere matter of spelling.

Having set up his overall confrontation in terms of a single model, the Commander breaks this model down *chronologically* into the (branching) sequence of confrontations that constitutes his confrontation strategy.

He also breaks down each confrontation *vertically* into confrontations that are implied in implementing its details.

The breaking-down process is the same in each case. It consists of adding players and cards to the columns of the higher-level model in order to examine its detailed implementation.

Table 15: Enlarged card table showing devolved default future and objective, shows in a schematic and simplified way how this works. We suppose that the Commander in **Table 13: Refugee Returns -- The IC vs Ethnic Party Leaders**, is using the method to set objectives for lower-level confrontations derived from his overall objective. In **Table 15** he and his staff (working with other players in the IC coalition) have broken down the **default** column and the column **COMM POSTN** that appear in Table 13.

Breaking down the **default** column is simply a matter of judging what are the policies presently being pursued in relation to cards that are added.

Breaking down the column **COMM POSTN** is conceptually less straightforward. Adding detail to this column will inevitably reveal differences between the players, all of whom are taking this general, simplified column as their joint position. These differences mean that different players can and will pursue different objectives within this column.

The breakdown in **Table 15** is not, therefore, intended to represent a common position, even though it is constrained to lie within the column **COMM POSTN** defined at high level in Table 13. It sets out detailed objectives for the IC within this general position. These will differ from other players' objectives. This is why it has been renamed **IC objective**. The reason why it is constrained to lie within **COMM POSTN** is that this column does represent the IC position, as well as the publicly declared position of the other players, at the level of detail set out in Table 13.

Note that the IC's detailed objectives are conveyed not just by the cards specified in the column **objective**, but by the **interpretations** attached to the column and the cards – interpretations that would be called up, in a computerised system, by clicking on a column, card or player.

In setting out these objectives, the Commander (working with the IC) has first added all the cards he can think of that the IC might play. Just two of these are shown in Table 15 – the cards 'decide axes and numbers for refugee returns' and 'make local aid conditional on returns'. We may suppose that these are the only two that survived brain-storming sessions in which many more were discussed.

By adding these two cards, the Commander has added details of the way in which he will implement his card ‘aid reconstruction’. However, while in the **default** column the card ‘aid reconstruction’ is played, the other two cards are not played. This indicates that a change will be required in moving from the present situation (the **default** column) to the **objective** column. Aid is (we suppose) already being distributed by international agencies. However, it has not been made conditional on local refugee returns, and ‘axes’ and amounts of aimed-for returns have not been decided.

The first card (‘decide axes and numbers’) will be carried out by IC staff at high level, through consultation with lower-level staff. Note that this card does not imply agreement as to axes and numbers with ethnic parties. It merely implies deciding what the IC’s aims in such agreements should be. Any confrontations involved are internal, between different parts of the IC, and as such are not modelled in **Table 15**, which models how the IC confronts external players.

The second card (‘make local aid conditional on returns’) implies confrontations between IC representatives and local ethnic players in localities all over Bosnia. These have to be added to the card table. As an example, the confrontation modelled in **Table 5: Serb Returnees Into A Muslim Area**, has been added. This is just the kind of confrontation that would be implied by this high-level policy.

*Setting out these two columns (**default** and **objective**) with their associated interpretations is the suggested general procedure for a higher-level Commander to devolve his strategy to lower levels.* In doing so he assigns objectives to lower-level Commanders without dictating in detail how they are to achieve them – though in assigning his Commanders local control (in cooperation with other local IC players) over the cards ‘give reconstruction aid’ and ‘replace local officials’, he is assigning confrontational resources (threats and promises) to enable objectives to be achieved.

Thus while the superior Commander assigns confrontational resources to the lower-level Commander, he does not dictate how he should use them. He does not assign him a card-table setting out each local player’s position and fallback position. He merely suggests the cards that might be used in such a table. Setting out the local players’ positions, with changes to the cards and interpretations to reflect local conditions, is the local Commander’s responsibility.

Note the following points.

- The local Commander alters his model as necessary to reflect local realities. For example, the ‘provoke’ card in **Table 14: Muslim Defection And Serb Provocation**, might be added locally.
- If different command levels are on a network, the original assignment of objectives and resources is communicated to the computer screens of local Commanders by giving each local Commander his own local model set within his superior’s overall model. He does not need to know about other local models, unless linked to his own.
- The model he receives is schematically like that in Table 15: Enlarged card table showing devolved default future and objective. Being on a computer screen, it also has interpretations called up by clicking.
- The local Commander’s alterations to his model are communicated back to his superior through the network. Thus the superior Commander is kept informed both of actual changes in the local situation (via changes to the **default** column) and of changes in the way the local Commander proposes to reach his objectives (changes in the **objective** column).

4. Conclusion

Our discussion of a C2 system for Conflicts Other Than War has been illustrated with examples drawn from the kind of confrontations going on in the Bosnia theatre, many of them based on interviews with past and present Commanders and responsible civilian officials working for the International Community in Bosnia.

The ease with which the 'confrontation' paradigm is accepted by officers and officials with experience of these problems leads us to conclude that a C2 system based on Confrontation Analysis would be of benefit. A COTW Commander is usually part of a **civilian-military coalition**. He can help this coalition to 'win' by maintaining a C2 (command and control) system for the benefit of all coalition members, so enabling or improving the following:

- modelling of confrontations and **linkages** between them;
- analysis of **dilemmas** and check-list of methods for eliminating them;
- **database** for information about confrontations sorted according to relevance for dilemma-elimination and hence relevance for resolving the confrontation;
- formulation by the Commander (in coalition with others) of a **confrontation strategy**;
- **devolution** of a strategy to lower levels of command and **coordination** of strategies between horizontally linked confrontations;
- **communication** of relevant new intelligence or strategy between levels of command and linked confrontations;
- **briefing** of newly-arrived officers with full understanding of current confrontations and strategies for resolving them;
- **understanding** of how a confrontation was or was not resolved enabling lessons to be learnt and training to be given.

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6. Tables and Figures




Figure 1: Peace, Conflict and War (Source: ADP Vol 1, Operations)

| | PARA | COM | threat | default |
|---------------------------------|------|-----|--------|---------|
| <u>PARAMILITARIES</u> | | | | |
| dismantle roadblock | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>COMPANY COMMANDER</u> | | | | |
| call air-strikes | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- *Players* are listed at left. They are PARAMILITARIES and COMPANY COMMANDER. There can be any number of players – but a simple model with few players is most useful.
- Beneath each player are listed the *cards* it can play (or decide not to play). These are the actions or policies it can take (or not take). Each player can have any number of cards – but again the model should be kept simple. Here each player has one card.
 - *Players' positions* are shown as columns.
- Column **PARA** shows the PARAMILITARIES' position. This is that neither of the two cards should be played. '0' stands for not playing a card.
- Column **COM** shows the COMMANDER'S position. This is that the PARAMILITARIES should play the card 'dismantle roadblock', whereupon he will not play 'call air-strikes'. '1' stands for playing a card. *Is are placed inside red rectangles to look like cards.*
- Column **threat** shows the result of each player carrying out its *fallback position*, or 'threat'. PARAMILITARIES are threatening not to dismantle the roadblock, whereupon COMMANDER is threatening to call air-strikes.
- Column **default** shows present policies. No decision has yet been taken to play either card.

Table 1: A Company Commander Confronts A Roadblock

| | SERBS | IC | threat | default |
|-----------------------------------|-------|----|--------|---------|
| <u>SERBS</u> | | | | |
| continue 'aggression' | ↓ | 0 | ↓ | ↓ |
| <u>THE INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | | | |
| impose economic sanctions | 0 | 0 | ↓ | ↓ |
| intervene militarily | 0 | 0 | ↓ | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- This card table represents the IC's confrontation with the Serbs prior to 1995. The card 'intervene militarily' stands for both direct and indirect use of force – ie both NATO bombing and support to the Muslim-Croat coalition that was encouraged by the US to form against the Serbs starting in 1994.
- The IC's threat dilemma consists in the fact that, when faced with carrying out its threat of military intervention, it prefers not to do so. On balance (though there were disagreements between the US and Europe) it prefers the default future in which Serb aggression continues, being punished by economic sanctions alone. Many reasons were given in the period 1991-95 as to why the **default** column, though unpleasant, was nonetheless preferable to the **threat** column.
- The word 'aggression' is used in naming the Serbs' card, although the Serbs themselves would not use this word. It is normal for different sides to use different terminology within a common reference frame – what matters is that they understand each other enough to exchange threats and promises.
- Key preferences of players can be indicated, as here, by arrows drawn on the card table. This does not give a complete picture of preferences. To show all preferences between the columns laid out on the table, each column can be assigned a preference ranking for each player.

Table 2: Serbs vs The International Community 1991-94

| | SERBS | IC | threat | default |
|----------------------------|-------|----|--------|---------|
| <u>SERBS</u> | | | | |
| continue 'aggression' | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>THE INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | | | |
| impose economic sanctions | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| intervene militarily | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Comments on this Card Table

- This is the table that would have existed between the players if the IC had finally eliminated its threat dilemma in Table 2 by withdrawing its threat of military intervention. Its fallback position would then have been to merely impose economic sanctions, so that the **threat** future would have been as shown.
- In fact, the IC often gave the impression of withdrawing its threat in this way, but in the end changed its preferences so as to make its threat credible instead.

Table 3: Serbs vs IC If IC Had Withdrawn Its Military Threat

| | SERBS | IC | threat | default |
|-----------------------------------|-------|----|--------|---------|
| <u>SERBS</u> | | | | |
| continue 'aggression' | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>THE INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | | | |
| impose economic sanctions | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| intervene militarily | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- This table is the same as Table 2, except that the IC has now eliminated its threat dilemma by deciding to prefer military intervention (column **threat**) if Serb 'aggression' continues.
- The two tables are therefore the same except that the preference ordering of one player (the IC) has changed. This means we have a new common reference frame.

Table 4: The IC Gets Tough With The Serbs

| | SERB | MUS | IC | threat | default |
|-----------------------------------|------|-----|----|--------|---------|
| <u>SERB POLITICIANS</u> | | | | | |
| send returnees to Muslim area | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>MUSLIM POLITICIANS</u> | | | | | |
| obstruct Serb returnees | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>THE INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | | | | |
| give reconstruction aid | ~ | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| replace Muslim officials | ~ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- This is a three-person confrontation such as may occur in Bosnia when refugees who have been ‘ethnically cleansed’ try to return to their former homes. Here, the returnees are Serbs trying to return to an area run by Muslim politicians. Though willing volunteers, these families would not have embarked on this trial of strength without a decision by Serb politicians to send them, and will back out if those politicians so decide. Hence the confrontation is essentially between two sets of ethnic politicians and the International Community – which is a coalition of organisations (including SFOR, UNHCR, etc) headed by OHR (the Office of the High Representative). The two important cards in the hand of the IC are to give or withhold reconstruction aid and to use the powers of the OHR to replace local Muslim officials if they obstruct the returnees (by refusing them housing, police protection, utilities connection, etc).
- The position of the Serb politicians is that they should send the returnees back and the Muslim politicians should not obstruct them. They take no position in relation to the other two cards – ie, as to whether the IC should give reconstruction aid or replace Muslim officials. *This is indicated by the ‘~’ symbol, which means ‘no position on this’.* The Muslim position is that the Serbs should not send the refugees (or should send just a handful), in which case there will be no need to obstruct them.
- If players play their fallback positions, the **threat** is that returnees will be sent and will be obstructed, whereupon the IC will stop giving aid and will replace delinquent officials.

Table 5: Serb Returnees Into A Muslim Area

| | MAYOR PARTY | IC | threat | threat2 | default |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|----|--------|---------|---------|
| <u>SERB MAYOR</u> | | | | | |
| connect utilities to deserted village | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| <u>SERB ETHNIC PARTY</u> | | | | | |
| accept Croat returnees | ~ | 0 | ~ | 0 | 0 |
| <u>THE INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | | | | |
| allocate most houses to Serbs | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| allocate most to Croats | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| allocate all to Serbs | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- A deserted village, where Croats were previously in the majority, has had its houses repaired by the IC but utilities have not been connected. The village has been placed under SFOR security control, so if utilities are connected the IC can allocate houses either to local Serbs or to would-be Croat returnees. If utilities are not connected, no one will return.
- The local Serb Mayor's position is that he will connect utilities to the houses (whether or not his party approves) if the IC will allocate most of the houses to Serbs. His party's position is that this should be done only if all houses go to Serbs, none to Croats. The IC's position is that most houses should go to Croats, the original occupants. The **threat** future (the same as the **default** future) is that none are connected to utilities and hence none are allocated.
- **Threat2** represents the fallback future that would exist if the Mayor, thinking the IC accepted his position, connected the utilities – an irreversible action – only to find that the IC, maintaining its original position, still proposed to allocate most houses to Croats. Failure to agree would then result in the column **threat2**, in which the playing of the card 'connect utilities' is *fixed*.

Table 6: Croat Returnees To A Serb Village

| | MAYOR & PARTY | | | |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------|----------------|---|
| | IC | threat | default | |
| <u>SERB MAYOR</u> | | | | |
| re-connect utilities | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>SERB ETHNIC PARTY</u> | | | | |
| accept Croat returnees | 0 | ~ | 0 | 0 |
| <u>THE INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | | | |
| allocate most houses to Serbs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| allocate most to Croats | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| allocate all to Serbs | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- The Mayor's angry reaction to being deceived and preempted in the confrontation in Table 6 has been to give secret encouragement to sabotage of the connected utilities. This having been carried out, the question now is whether the utilities should be re-connected.
- We suppose that the Mayor's anger, and his complicity with the sabotage action, have led him to take the same position as his ethnic party in opposing any return of Croat refugees. Thus his position is now as in the column **MAYOR & PARTY**. Assuming the IC position remains the same, we have the confrontation shown. The IC once again has a deterrence dilemma.
- However, note that in Table 6, after the **threat** column had been replaced by column **threat2**, the Mayor had an inducement dilemma. His encouragement of sabotage was a preemptive action to eliminate this dilemma. As such, it will have tended to make the IC angry and on the look-out for ways of retaliating against him.

Table 7: Serb-IC Confrontation After Sabotage Of Utilities

| | ETH | IFOR | threat | default |
|--|-----|------|--------|---------|
| <u>ETHNIC ARMY</u> move weapons to cantonments | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>IFOR</u> destroy weapons not moved | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Comments on this card table

- This table illustrates a situation in which a threat dilemma and inducement dilemma coincide. In such a case (when player A, say, has an inducement dilemma with respect to B that is also a threat dilemma) B can pressure A by simply starting to implement its position (that is to say, its part of its position).
- The table shows the simple confrontation between IFOR and one (any one) of the three ethnic armies over the issue of moving heavy weapons into cantonments. IFOR announced unilaterally that it would destroy any weapons not moved. This card ('destroy weapons not moved') thereby became part of the **default** future and the **threat** future, as well as part of IFOR's position. The Ethnic Army – whose initial position, as shown, was that it should not move its weapons nor have them destroyed – was then faced with a choice of either implementing IFOR's position or seeing its weapons destroyed. It accepted IFOR's position – and implemented it, since there was no way it could benefit from not doing so.
- The confrontation was thus resolved when both parties took the column **IFOR** as their joint position and could trust each other to implement it.

Table 8: IFOR Disarms One Of The Ethnic Armies

| | SERBS | EAs | IC | threat | default |
|-----------------------------------|-------|-----|----|--------|---------|
| <u>SERBS</u> | | | | | |
| suppress ethnic Albanians | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| accept interim NATO force | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| give autonomy to Kosovo | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| give independence | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>ETHNIC ALBANIANS</u> | | | | | |
| fight Serbian occupation | ~ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>THE INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | | | | |
| bomb Serbs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- From published sources, this appeared to be the confrontation over Kosovo up till the point in March 1999 when the ethnic Albanians shifted position and accepted the IC position.
- The Serb position rejected autonomy or independence for Kosovo. It also rejected a NATO force and insisted on repressing the ethnic Albanians. The ethnic Albanians demanded independence, together with an end to repression and acceptance of an interim NATO force. The IC position was that the Serbs should grant autonomy within Serbia (not independence), cease repression and accept a NATO interim force.
- The **threat** future, like the **default** future, entailed continued repression against ethnic Albanian resistance. The IC's fallback position did not at this point include bombing the Serbs. This was because it was designed to bring pressure on the ethnic Albanians. The threat against them was that if they did not accept the IC's position, the IC would leave them to be 'ethnically cleansed' by the Serbs.
- This was step 1 of the IC's 2-step confrontation strategy to obtain apparent (publicly stated) compliance with the will of the IC. If and when the ethnic Albanians accepted the IC position, step 2 would start. This would consist of pressuring the Serbs to do likewise (see Table 10).

Table 9: Step 1 Of The IC's Confrontation Strategy Over Kosovo

| | SERBS | IC & EAs | threat | default |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------|----------------|
| <u>SERBS</u> | | | | |
| suppress ethnic Albanians | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| accept interim NATO force | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| give autonomy to Kosovo | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| give independence | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>ETHNIC ALBANIANS</u> | | | | |
| fight Serbian occupation | ~ | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>THE INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | | | |
| bomb Serbs | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- From published sources, this appeared to represent step 2 of the IC's 2-step confrontation strategy over Kosovo. To obtain apparent compliance with the will of the IC, the first step required bringing the ethnic Albanians (EAs) into line. Facing the credible threat set out in Table 9, the EAs accepted the IC's position (autonomy within Serbia) in mid-March 1999. Thus the first step was successfully completed. Note that though the EAs continued to say they hoped for independence, they accepted autonomy for the time being, even though it was generally accepted that if the Serbs agreed also then this would mean acceptance for the long run.
- In step 2 of the IC's confrontation strategy, shown here, pressure is brought to bear on the Serbs to accept the joint IC-EA position by threatening to bomb them if they do not – thereby both damaging them and aiding the resistance of the EAs. At the time of writing (morning of March 24th), the Serbs have refused to comply and NATO is about to bomb them unless they make a last-minute acceptance.

Table 10: Step 2 Of The IC's Confrontation Strategy Over Kosovo

| | SERBS & US | MUS | threat | threat2 | default |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|
| <u>SERBS</u> | | | | | |
| agree to US proposal | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| <u>MUSLIMS</u> | | | | | |
| agree to US proposal | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| <u>UNITED STATES</u> | | | | | |
| propose strong Presidency for Bosnia | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| accept partition | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- This represents a point in the pre-Dayton negotiations when the Serbs (led by Milosevic) had agreed to a unified Bosnian state provided it contained a Serbian region with considerable autonomy. The Muslims (Izetbegovic’s government) accepted this, but wanted a stronger Presidency than the US team (led by Holbrooke) had in mind. The implicit US fallback position, pressuring the Muslims to accept this, was that otherwise the US might accept partition – a solution favoured by Balkan ‘realists’ and liked by both Serbs and Croats. The fallback future was therefore as in the **threat** column.
- The US, however, had a positioning dilemma in that it really preferred the Muslim proposal to its own. The Muslim proposal did more to preserve Bosnian multi-ethnicity and less to reward Serbian aggression. However, Holbrooke felt that it would be impossible to get the Serbs to agree to it; that is, if the US had adopted the Muslim position and created the fallback future **threat2** in order to place pressure on the Serbs, then the Serbs (a ‘player’ made up of the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian Yugoslav government) would have ended up preferring **threat2** – even though it might involve renewed warfare – to this US-Muslim position.
- In fact, the US’s shuttle diplomacy seems to have alternated between adopting the Serb position (with fallback future **threat**) and the Muslim position (with fallback future **threat2**) depending on how a strong Presidency was defined and the players’ responses to these definitions. (Source: R. Holbrooke, *To End A War*, Random House, 1998.)

Table 11: The US Has To Confront Either The Muslims Or The Serbs

| | SERB IMPT | SERBS & CROATS | CROAT IMPT | threat | default |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|----------------------|---------------|--------|---------|
| <u>SERB FAMILY</u> surrender arms | 0 | ↓ | ↓ | 0 | 0 |
| <u>CROAT FAMILY</u> surrender arms | ↓ | ↓ | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- This card table models a micro-level problem in which, we suppose, two neighbouring families of Serbs and Croats have hidden caches of arms. The families are neighbours who fear each other, despite the fact that they have been friends for years. Both admit they would be better off if both disarmed, and this future (column **SERBS & CROATS**) is their joint position. However, each would feel still better off if the other alone disarmed (columns **CROAT IMPT** and **SERB IMPT**).
- Because the arms are held in secret and their amounts are not known, neither could be sure whether or not the other had actually disarmed, even if they were to bring out some weapons.
 - To be the only one to disarm would be the worst position for either player.
- The arrows leading from the column **SERBS & CROATS** show each player's cooperation dilemma – ie, the cooperation dilemma of the player whose preference the arrow indicates.
 - The same arrows show the *other player's* trust dilemma.
- If the players, in despair, were to adopt the **default** future as their joint position, they would have a group cooperation dilemma in having a joint preference for the column **SERBS & CROATS**.

Table 12: A Bosnian Prisoner's Dilemma

| | COMMN POSTN | threat | default | PREF'D BY SLs | PREF'D BY MLs | PREF'D BY CLs |
|-------------------------------|----------------|--------|---------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| <u>SERB LEADERS</u> | | | | | | |
| encourage refugee returns | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ~ | ~ |
| <u>MUSLIM LEADERS</u> | | | | | | |
| encourage refugee returns | 1 | 0 | 0 | ~ | 0 | ~ |
| <u>CROAT LEADERS</u> | | | | | | |
| encourage refugee returns | 1 | 0 | 0 | ~ | ~ | 0 |
| <u>INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | | | | | |
| aid reconstruction | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

Comments on this card table

- The three Bosnian co-presidents, representing the three ethnic parties, were present at the Madrid conference in 1998 when it was agreed that the international community should give reconstruction aid to Bosnia conditional upon the ethnic parties allowing the return of refugees. The co-presidents did not object to the final agreement. This was taken to mean that they accepted it and would encourage refugee returns.
- While this is their public position, it seems that the leadership of the three parties is not (as of March 1999) encouraging refugee returns. Local branches of the parties can be persuaded, largely by the promise of aid, to allow returns, but there is no general policy of encouragement from their leaders. Nevertheless reconstruction aid is forthcoming. Thus the present position is the **default** column.
- The **default** column seems to represent the **goal** of the parties, whereas the IC's goal is its position – the column **COMMN POSTN**. The parties seem to be in **apparent** but not **actual compliance** with the IC's goal. This is because they face cooperation dilemmas both individually (each prefers not to encourage returns, even if the others do) and together (they prefer not to encourage returns, even if the others don't). This is indicated by the last three columns, every future in each of which is (we are supposing) preferred to **COMMN POSTN** by, respectively, the Serb, Muslim and Croat leaders.

Table 13: Refugee Returns -- The IC vs Ethnic Party Leaders

| | COMMN POSTN | MUS IMPT | threat | default |
|-----------------------------------|----------------|-------------|--------|---------|
| <u>SERB POLITICIANS</u> | | | | |
| send returnees to Muslim area | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| provoke Muslims | ~ | ~ | 1 | 1 |
| <u>MUSLIM POLITICIANS</u> | | | | |
| obstruct Serb returnees | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| <u>THE INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | | | |
| give reconstruction aid | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| replace Muslim officials | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |

Comments on this card table

- Here we suppose that the confrontation over Muslim obstruction of Serb returnees in Table 5 has led to acceptance by all parties of a common position. In return for reconstruction aid, the Muslim politicians have agreed not to obstruct returnees, and the Serb politicians have had to accept that aid will be given and officials will not be replaced.
- However, the Muslims prefer to obstruct the returnees. They therefore face a cooperation dilemma (how to persuade the IC that they will not obstruct returnees) and the IC and Serbs face a corresponding trust dilemma (they cannot trust the Muslim politicians).
- This trust dilemma is secretly welcomed by the Serbs: they are glad they cannot trust the Muslims – simply because their objective is the **threat** future, which they prefer to the common position. They may therefore continue to try to wreck the agreement by provoking Muslim obstruction in the hope that the **threat** future will be implemented. Our model supposes that the common position does not explicitly exclude such provocation – ie, the agreement takes no position in relation to it. If the agreed common position did exclude it, then for the Serbs to ‘provoke Muslims’ in this way would represent defection from the agreement.

Table 14: Muslim Defection And Serb Provocation

| | default | IC objective |
|--|---------|--------------|
| <u>SERB LEADERS</u> | | |
| encourage refugee returns | 0 | 1 |
| <u>MUSLIM LEADERS</u> | | |
| encourage refugee returns | 0 | 1 |
| <u>CROAT LEADERS</u> | | |
| encourage refugee returns | 0 | 1 |
| <u>INT'L COMMUNITY</u> | | |
| aid reconstruction | 1 | 1 |
| decide 'axes' and numbers for refugee returns | 0 | 1 |
| make local aid conditional on returns | 0 | 1 |
| ... | ... | ... |
| <u>SERB POLITICIANS IN LOCALITY X</u> | | |
| send 1000 returnees to locality Y | 0 | 1 |
| <u>MUSLIM POLITICIANS IN LOCALITY Y</u> | | |
| obstruct returnees from Y | 0 | 0 |
| <u>IC REPRESENTATIVES IN LOCALITY Y</u> | | |
| give reconstruction aid | 0 | 1 |
| replace local officials | 0 | 0 |
| ... | ... | ... |
| <u>CONFRONTATIONS IN OTHER AREAS</u> | | |
| ... | ... | ... |

Comments on this card table

- This table illustrates how the objective in a high-level confrontation is analysed to examine its lower-level implications. The first eight rows are as in Table 13: Refugee Returns -- The IC vs Ethnic Party Leaders. The other rows have, we suppose, been added to this high-level card table by the Commander and his staff. Note that the table is illustrative only. It does not claim to be an accurate model of decisions in Bosnia.
- The IC has decided that it will determine 'axes' (specific flows) of refugee returns and make local aid conditional on acceptance of these returns. This means devolving local confrontations to local Commanders, including those in locality X (from which Serb refugees would be sent, according to Table 5: Serb Returnees Into A Muslim Area) and locality Y (to which the same Serbs would return).
- The resulting confrontation in locality Y has been added to the table, showing the **default** situation and the objective for the local Commander. For a full picture, many more confrontations would be added, including those in locality X. A confrontation would be added for every locality sending or receiving returnees.
- Each local Commander would adjust the players and cards defined for his locality to reflect local realities – eg, by adding the 'provoke' card shown in Table 14: Muslim Defection And Serb Provocation.

Table 15: Enlarged card table showing devolved default future and objective