Transformation of European Defense Cooperation: A Complex Endeavor

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Content

• **Introduction:** The Transatlantic Gap in NATO Military Capabilities: A perennial issue and a critical challenge for the **European Pillar** as US rebalances its strategic doctrine toward the Asia-Pacific (Pivot) and Russia becomes more assertive vis-à-vis its borderlands;

• **Meeting the Challenge:** Enhancing Europe’s Collective Military Capabilities despite austerity through a **Transformation of European Defense Cooperation** in both the operational and defense planning arenas;

• **NATO NEC C2 Maturity Model** (N2C2M2): Conceptual Basis for the Transformation of Defense Cooperation in Europe (efficient C2 and convergent defense planning);

• **Recent European Defense Improvement Initiatives:**
  – Bilateral UK-France Cooperation Treaty (2010);
  – EU Ghent Initiative (2010);

• **Concluding Thoughts and Caveat**
Common Principle for Building Down the Transatlantic Capability Gap for Crises Response Operations (CRO)  
[Huber and Schmidt, 1999]

“Stepwise reduction of manpower and conscript levels in a manner that the highest possible level of modernization can be reached without having to increase the defense budget in real terms and subject to the constraints that

• the existing capability for out-of-area (OOA) deployments (in the context of CRO) is not decreased and

• active manpower levels must not decline below a level that is required for maintaining a sufficient pool of reservists for replacement and build-up as long as the resurgence of a massive ground force threat against NATO-territory may not be dismissed altogether.”
The Transatlantic Gap 1998

CRO Capabilities of European NATO Allies relative to US Capability given different levels of sustained defense spending (Huber and Schmidt, 1999; Huber; 2003)
Convergent Defense Planning:
Reasons why the Common Principle (CP) was dismissed

- **Spending cuts:** By 1998, the average defense spending of the European members of NATO had fallen to 1.7 of their GDP compared to 2.5 percent in the early 1990s;

- **No commitment** to sustain or increase 1989 defense spending in real terms. (Today, only UK reaches NATO’s agreed benchmark of 2.0 percent GDP).

- **Differing interests:** Promoting, among NATO member nations, the idea of the Common Principle (CP) was – and still is – dismissed as unrealistic: “Defense planning is a national Responsibility” (Item 7 of NATOS’s 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration);

- **No validated conceptual models** for the implementation of CPs.
Enhancing European Defense Cooperation

• Purely national capabilities insufficient to address complex emergencies (e.g. Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, Central Africa);
• Today’s independent national defense planning approaches in Europe need to be replaced by cooperative ones supporting a convergent development of national capabilities that are
  1. efficient (maximizing synergies between them, no duplication);
  2. complementary (closing capability gaps);
  3. agile enough to meet new security challenges.
Cooperative Defense Planning and N2C2M2

- N2C2N2 is a validated conceptual basis for improving collective capabilities through network-based cooperation among a collective’s entities.

- Thus, it is proposed that N2C2M2 be extended to serve as conceptual underpinning for the evolution of increasingly cooperative national defense planning approaches in NATO/EU and convergent national capabilities.
The NATO NEC C2 Maturity Model [SAS-065]
Characteristics of Conflicted C2 [SAS-065]

- No collective objective;
- No distribution of information between or among entities;
- No interactions at all among entity clusters.

With regard to defense planning, the entity clusters comprise the national organizations responsible for planning each NATO nation’s defense capabilities.
Characteristics of De-Conflicted C2 [SAS-065]

- Partitioning of the problem space across geography, time/space, echelon and function;
- De-confliction of intents, plans, actions and the ability to recognize potential conflicts;
- Limited distribution of information and limited interaction.
Characteristics of Coordinated C2 [SAS-065]

- Development of a degree of common intent. Entities are constrained by the common intent;
- Linking of plans and actions to reinforce and enhance effect;
- Clusters of interaction appear involving two or more entities working together.
Characteristics of Collaborative C2 [SAS-065]

- Collective negotiates and establishes a collective intent and a single shared plan;
- Entities are symbiotic and interdependent;
- Rich sharing of non-organic resources some pooling of organic resources;
- Formation of task related clusters.
Characteristics of Edge C2 [SAS-065]

- Patterns of interaction are dynamic and continuous and reflect confluence of mission and circumstance;
- Distribution of information is emergent as a result of dynamic patterns of interaction;
- Rich shared understanding within the collective with rich and continuous interaction;
- Task related clusters of entities dominate but are emergent and not static.
Transformation of European Defense Planning
A Complex Endeavor

1. **Conflicted Planning:** independent / disjointed (no interactions between national planners);

2. **De-conflicted Planning:** avoiding the generation of incompatible structures/capabilities (limited interactions and information exchange between national planning authorities);

3. **Coordinated Planning:** linking plans and capabilities (sufficient interactions and continuous information exchange between national defense planning authorities);

4. **Collaborative Planning:** nations establish collective intent and develop common reference plan for national defense planning, integration of national plans into overall collective defense plan, adjusted cooperatively to cope with changes in the operational and strategic environment;

5. **Edge-like Planning:** national planning must be become part of a highly agile multilateral (supranational) defense planning approach.
Current Situation in Europe

- Independent National Defense Planning each reflecting national political preferences of 28 sovereign countries ("The development and deployment of defence capabilities is first and foremost a national responsibility". (Item 7 of the NATO 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration “Towards NATO Forces 2020).

- NATO/EU collective military capabilities for deployment “out-of-area” are compiled ad hoc from whatever capabilities “willing” nations have and are prepared to contribute;

- Defense Cooperation has been and still is largely limited to Pooling and Sharing (P&S) in the context of bi- and multilaterals projects and agreements that reflect the national preferences;

- Aware of the European capability gaps (Libya, Mali, Central, Africa) three initiatives for improving defense cooperation Europe have been recently started.
Recent Initiatives for Improving Defense Cooperation in Europe

• **The Bilateral UK-France Cooperation Treaty** (2010)
  - Combined Joint Expeditionary Force CJEF);
  - Maritime task group around French carrier *Charles de Gaulle*;
  - Shared R&D;
  - Joint modernization of Nuclear Facilities/Capabilities.

• **The Ghent Initiative (EU)**
  - German-Swedish Initiative (2010);
  - Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing (EDA, 2012): to be implemented on a national and voluntary basis, in line with defense policies of EU Member States;
  - Annual EDA report on the state of P&S and EU capabilities.

• **Smart Defense concept (NATO)**
  - Encouraging allies to cooperate (P&S) in development, acquisition and operation of military capabilities in accordance with NATO’s strategic concept (2012 Munich and Chicago);
  - 20 bi- and multilateral cooperation projects approved by NATO leaders at Chicago 2012 Summit.
German-Swedish Initiative (2010)
Cooperation Categories

• **Limited Cooperation**: Essential for the nation and therefore maintained on a strictly national level (cooperation limited to improving interoperability): *de-conflicted planning*;

• **Closer Cooperation** is possible without creating too strong dependencies (such as pooling of strategic and tactical airlift and logistics capabilities): *coordinated planning*;

• **Mutual dependency and reliance on European partners is acceptable** in an international role-and-task sharing framework (e.g. support structures for education, training, and exercises; test and evaluation facilities; aerial and maritime surveillance such as, e.g., in the Baltics: *collaborative planning*.)
Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing (P&S)

- Systematically consider cooperation from the outset, in national defense planning of Member States, the whole life-cycle of a capability, including R&D;

- Accord P&S projects a higher degree of protection from potential cuts;

- Take advantage of synergies with wider European policies, including regulatory frameworks, standards and certification;

- European Defense Agency (EDA) is mandated to
  - serve as a platform for information exchange to avoid gaps or duplication, to share expertise and best practices and to increase transparency (coherence);
  - annually report to Defense Ministers the status of current P&S initiatives, new opportunities and an analysis of the capability situation in Europe (assessment).
Conclusions

• Changing nature of crises and conflicts: uncertainty and complexity;
• Large scale complex emergencies exceed national capabilities;
• Need for effective and efficient collective capabilities (intervention and deterrence) including agile C2 and management systems;
• Enhanced cooperation between national defense planners -> more convergent development of collective military capabilities;
• Convergence improves with the degree to which intent, information, and planning processes are shared.
Return on Defense Investments: 
A Quote from 20 Years ago

“Nothing short of

• replacing the many national defense and armaments planning bureaucracies with common European defense planning and RDT&E agencies;

• consolidating European defense industries into viable business enterprises; and

• integrating the European militaries into European Armed Forces

will ever yield a return on defense investments comparable to that achieved by the United States” (Huber, 2003, p. 149.)
Building Down
NATO’s Transatlantic Capability Gap

• Enhancing defense cooperation in Europe is key to building down NATO’s transatlantic gap (Convergent Defense Planning → European Armed Forces);

• Building down, and eventually eliminating, the transatlantic capability gap
  • supports the US in rebalancing its strategic interests between Europe and Asia (Pivot) while strengthening NATO’s “European Pillar”;
  • widens the freedom of action for US, NATO, and EU to cope with the uncertainties of the security environment.
Caveat

This paper reflects the views of the authors only and is not the official position of any organization!