

Chasing Autonomy: How Much is Enough and How Much is Too Much?

19th International Command and Control Research Symposium "C2 Agility: Lessons Learned from Research and Operations" Track: 7

Presenters: Mr. Bryan Tollefson and Captain (Ret.) George Galdorisi Co-Authors: Ms. Rachel Volner

SPAWAR Systems Center Pacific



"Continuing a trend that began in the late 1990s, U.S. forces will increase the use and integration of unmanned aerial systems."

> Department of Defense *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* March 2014



"My view is that technology sets the parameters of the possible; it creates the potential for a military revolution."

> Max Boot War Made New





Making UxS More Autonomous, Affordable, and Obedient

▼ The Plan for Autonomous Systems

- ▼ The Challenge of Sustaining Autonomous Systems
- Sustaining Autonomous Systems through C4ISR Innovation

▼ Is there a "Dark Side" to UxS Autonomy?

▼ Designing in the *Right* Degree of UxS Autonomy



The Plan for Autonomous Systems



DoD's Vision for Unmanned Systems



DoD will develop and field affordable, flexible, interoperable, integrated, and technologically advanced unmanned capabilities that will:

- Prevail in the full range of contingencies and in all operating domains, including cyberspace
- Enable decisive force effectiveness in Joint and coalition operations
- Emphasize missions according to strategic guidance from ISR; counterterrorism; counter-WMD; and operations required to operate across all environments, including A2/AD
- Protect the homeland;
- Be able to surge and regenerate forces and capabilities.



- ▼ Interoperability and Modularity
- ▼ Communication Systems, Spectrum, and Resilience
- ▼ Security
- ▼ Persistent Resilience

Autonomy and Cognitive Behavior

Weaponry

Enhance Capability and Reduce Cost



Navy's Plan for Unmanned Systems



- We will <u>innovate to use new</u> <u>technologies</u> and operating concepts to sharpen our warfighting advantage against evolving threats.
- The <u>reach and effectiveness</u> of our ships and aircraft will be greatly expanded through new and updated weapons, <u>unmanned systems, sensors,</u> <u>and increased power</u>.
- Unmanned systems in the air and water will employ greater autonomy and be fully integrated with their manned counterparts.



- More collectors increases time on station
- Modular Open Architecture, scalable, reconfigurable, automated processing
- Common/Interoperable Command and Control
- Focused collection & reduced manpower
- Federated architecture enabling adaptive operations & information sharing



Increasingly Unmanned, Automated & Integrated

Cross-Domain Challenges

- Energy & Propulsion
- Autonomy
- Reliability



- Operational Integration across all Domains
- Data formats & standards
- Processing



We Need Common Solutions for Multi-domain Missions



ONR's "Science of Autonomy": Basic Research Investment Areas





ONR's "Science of Autonomy": Long-Term Goals

Human Interaction Greatly reduced manning requirements (numbers & skill/training); Human/machine hybrid teams as (or more) effective as human/human ones Perception & Intel. Control Adapt to complete mission tasks at operationally useful speeds & increasingly challenging environments with greatly reduced need for human intervention Scalable Collaboration Scale approaches to greater numbers of systems, more complex mission tasks, & larger areas while reducing communications requirements <u>rchitectures</u> Reasoning, learning, decision making in increasingly contested, ntelligent unstructured, & uncertain environments; Tighter integration with perception & control



The Challenge of Sustaining Autonomous Systems



"One of the largest cost drivers in the budget of DoD is **manpower.** A significant amount of that manpower, when it comes to operations, is spent directing unmanned systems during mission performance, data collection and analysis, and planning and replanning. Therefore, of utmost importance for DoD is increased system, sensor, and analytical automation that can not only capture significant information and events, but can also develop, record, playback, project, and parse out those data and then actually deliver "actionable" intelligence instead of just raw information."

FY 2013-20328 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap



The Total Ownership Cost Challenge

- The irony of "unmanned" systems they typically require more manpower
- Total operating costs of UAS are dominated by increasing manpower costs
- Data overload exacerbates the challenge by requiring more personnel to analyze the data gathered
- C4 technological innovation is a prerequisite for success in overcoming these challenges



Manpower Costs Have Reached An All-Time High



Data from: Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government, FY 2012, Historical Tables



Sustaining Autonomous Systems Through C4ISR Innovation



"We will win – or lose – the next series of wars in our nation's laboratories."

Admiral James Stavridis "Deconstructing War" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* December 2005



Making UxS Smarter: Some Overarching Goals

- ▼ Automated TCPED processes
- ▼ Ability to sense and adapt to the environment
- Autonomous collaboration

▼ One operator, multiple UAS



Making UxS Smarter: Some Representative Projects

- Distributed Control of Unmanned Systems Using Widgets
- ▼ ICOP: Intelligence Carry on Program

MOCU: The Multi-Robot Operator Control Unit

 UV-Sentry: Project for enabling cooperative autonomy and autonomous command

- JUDIE: The Joint Unmanned Aircraft Systems Digital Information Exchange
- ▼ UCAS-D: Unmanned Combat Air System-Demonstrator



Multi-Robot Operator Control Unit (MOCU)

Normal

MOCU is a flexible software framework capable of monitoring and controlling unmanned systems across multiple domains.

- ▼ Modular, open architecture
- Government developed and owned
- ▼ Widely adopted



Is There a "Dark Side" to UxS Autonomy?



"Astronauts David Bowman and Frank Poole consider disconnecting HAL's (Heuristically programmed ALgorithmic computer) cognitive circuits when he appears to be mistaken in reporting the presence of a fault in the spacecraft's communications antenna. They attempt to conceal what they are saying, but are unaware that HAL can read their lips. Faced with the prospect of disconnection, HAL decides to kill the astronauts in order to protect and continue its programmed directives."

From Stanley Kubrick's 2001: A Space Odyssey



- Warfighters want UxS to operate inside the enemy's "OODA" (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) Loop
- What they may be *less* comfortable with is UxS operating inside their OODA loop
- When they will need to intervene in actions the UxS takes is often unknown and sometimes "unknowable"
- There is a growing body of work of lessons learned from warfighters experience with UxS



"If you find the use of remotely piloted warrior drones troubling, <u>imagine that</u> the decision to kill a suspected enemy is not made by an operator in a distant control room, but by the machine itself. Imagine that an aerial robot studies the landscape below, recognizes hostile activity, calculates that there is minimal risk of collateral damage, and then, with no human in the loop, pulls the trigger. Welcome to the future of warfare. While Americans are debating the president's power to order assassination by drone, <u>powerful momentum</u> <u>– scientific, military and commercial – is propelling us toward the day</u> when we cede the same lethal authority to software."

> Bill Keller "Smart Drones" The New York Times March 2013



"Human input and ongoing verification are required for autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems to help prevent unintended engagements. **These systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force**. Humans who authorize the use of, or operate these systems, must do so with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules and applicable rules of engagement. An autonomous system is defined as a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator."

> The Honorable Ashton Carter Deputy Secretary of Defense November 2012 Directive



Designing in the *Right* Degree of UxS Autonomy



"Goldilocks went for a walk in the forest. Pretty soon, she came upon a house. She knocked and, when no one answered, she walked right in. At the table in the kitchen, there were three bowls of porridge. Goldilocks was hungry. She tasted the porridge from the first bowl. "This porridge is too hot!" she exclaimed. So, she tasted the porridge from the second bowl. "This porridge is too cold," she said. So, she tasted the last bowl of porridge. "<u>Ahhh, this porridge is just right</u>," she said happily and she ate it all up.

From *Goldilocks and the Three Bears* By Robert Southey



Designing in the *Right* Degree of UxS Autonomy

- ▼ Make the C4 architecture a priority in UxS development
- Build in a "sense and adapt" capability in all UxS
- Concurrently develop CONOPS and tactics, techniques and procedures for each UxS
- Leverage queuing theory to enable UxS to balk or renege on a mission
- Develop target recognition algorithms that are on a par with those of manned systems
- Develop anticipatory intelligence and decision support software into unmanned systems



"Instead of viewing autonomy as an intrinsic property of unmanned systems in isolation, the design and operation of unmanned systems needs to be considered in terms of human-systems collaboration...A key challenge for operators is maintaining the human-machine collaboration needed to execute their mission, which is frequently handicapped by poor design...A key challenge facing unmanned systems developers is the move from a hardwareoriented, vehicle-centric development and acquisition process to one that emphasizes the primacy of software in creating autonomy." The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems Defense Science Board Report



A Summing Up



Technology as an Enabler



Recent experience suggests that the right technology, used intelligently, makes sheer numbers irrelevant. The tipping point was the Gulf War in 1991. When the war was over, the United States and its coalition partners had lost just 240 people. Iraq suffered about 10,000 battle deaths, although no one will ever really be sure. The difference was that the allied forces could see at night, drive through the featureless desert without getting lost, and put a single smart bomb on target with a 90 percent probability." **Bruce Berkowitz** The New Face of War



For Your Consideration

