A Concept for Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)

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Overview

• History
• The Joint Command and Control Issue
• Command and Control Shortfalls
• Near Term Challenges and Efforts
• Findings – Millennium Challenge 02
• SJFHQ Organization and Functions
• Employment Options
• JFCOM/SJFHQ Mission, Goal, Path
• Summary
Historical JTF Standups

- Just Cause
- Provide Comfort
- Somalia
- Haiti
- Kosovo
- Enduring Freedom
- JTF 510
- JTF 160/170
- JTF GTMO
- JTF 180
- JTF Horn of Africa
Chain of Command Gap

Peacetime Service Chain of Command

Not present for duty every day

Joint Warfighting Chain of Command

Component HQs

JTF HQs

Unit
Joint Command and Control Issue
(Two-Parts)

• The need for JTF Readiness
  • Combat Units Train the Way They will Fight
    • They are ready
  • JTF HQ’s rarely train the Way They Will Fight
    • Service HQ’s challenged to sustain readiness
  • Demand for JTFs increasing
    • Sustaining JTFs – challenge for all services

• Technology is available now to enable more rapid, effective decision-making and execution
  • But, increases HQ personnel readiness requirement
  • Collaborative environment drives both C2 processes and organizational changes

• No single command and control authority in DoD
Command and Control

Enables

People and Processes

Communication Capabilities

Planning
Deciding
Coordinating
Directing
Assessing

ALL are too slow and inefficient

We have force elements today who are able to deploy, employ, create effects quicker than we can “command and control” them!
Near Term Operational Arena

Legacy C2 will not meet this challenge

- Effects-Based Operations (EBO)
- Information Operations (IO)
- Force Projection
- Joint Tactical Actions (JTA)

Commanders are moving out – building CIEs, altering C2 CONOPs, writing SOPs – attempting to solve shortfalls and already employing some concepts
Regional Command Efforts to Meet the C2 Challenge

Once in the collaborative environment, must have both common tools and standardized C2 procedures
This is where we’re headed – not good

Higher HQs, RCCs, or National Level Agencies

JFHQ1

AOR 1

CIE

JFHQ2

AOR 2

CIE

Forces train/operate in more than one theater

If you’re in the CIE, and have standard C2 processes, you can play – If not in it, or non-standard, … handicapped

CIEs and procedures not standard

Components
This is where we want to go...
Global CIE standards and procedures

SJFHQs will foster interoperability – Up, Down, Across
Why SJFHQs?
... and Why SOPs/TTPs?

• For any crisis, all RCCs must:
  • Execute command and control functions
  • Plan and execute using the same forces provided
  • Coordinate with / employ multinational forces
  • Rely on the same ISR forces/sources/agencies
  • Receive guidance from same national authorities
  • Perform crisis action planning
  • Coordinate with the same national agencies
  • Perform assessment functions
  • Execute force deployment/redeployment
  • Employ the same national strategic capabilities
  • Execute Information Operations
  • Employ same SOF forces / “special” capabilities
  • Rely on same supporting commands
Joint Warfighting Needs

- Rapid activation of JTF HQ
- Skilled JTF HQ personnel, knowledge of joint capabilities and operational employment
- Immediate and continuing situational awareness and understanding
- Plan and execute faster than the adversary
- Focused effects for rapid and decisive execution

Possible Solutions

- Standing Joint Force Headquarters
  - Common SOPs/TTPs
  - Trained personnel
  - Organized to exploit Info Age tools
- Joint Interagency Coordination Group and Centers of Excellence
- Operational Net Assessment
- Collaborative Information Environment
- Effect Based Operations
A Concept For
Standing Joint Force Headquarters

- JFCOM model includes:
  - Modern, interoperable Collaborative Information Environment
  - Common architectures, joint SOPs, TTPs
  - Skilled warfighting headquarters personnel
  - Developed as a Command and Control “weapons system”
- Includes years of Joint Task Force Lessons Learned
- Includes changes in organization, procedures, technology and training.
- Improves Joint C2 readiness, awareness, decision-making
- The SJFHQ is the #1 warfighting priority from MC02.
“We took a small, fifty, fifty-five people group in this contingency – about right – they were focused, clear and very useful . . . it doubles or triples the capacity of three-star headquarters in our DOD to go do things for us; so, it’s a combat multiplier of the highest order. It doesn’t threaten headquarters; it multiplies the utility of the headquarters.”

Lieutenant General B.B. Bell
Commander III Corps
SJFHQ Organization for MC02

- An in-place capability for seamless planning and execution
- Able to operate across the spectrum of conflict

Which … focuses on Cdr’s intent

MC 02 Showed Us These are Special People!
How SJFHQ Might Fit

SJFHQ processes support both internal and external organizations.
SJFHQ Employment Options

I

SJFHQ
Staff

JTFHQ

Functional Components

Built around SJFHQ

II

SJFHQ
Staff

JTFHQ

Functional Components

Built around JTF HQ

III

SJFHQ
Staff

JFHQ

Sub-JTFs or Functional Components

Built around RCC HQ

6/30/2003
Joint Capability

- Stood up SJFHQ Prototype
- Further refinement required
- Regional Command liaisons est’d
- Task is executable
  - Technology already exists

Actionable Transformation Recommendations

SJFHQ

JROC

Millennium Challenge 2002

Further Experimentation

JE Mission begins

RDO Analytical Wargame

LOEs

Unified Vision 2001

LOEs

Time

99 00 01 02 03 04

6/30/2003
The Goal

A standing joint team capable of executing transformational command and control functions from pre-crisis to crisis termination – through the exploitation of information age communications, equipment, organization and procedures.

This team is skilled in the employment of advanced warfighting concepts in the direction, coordination, and control of joint force operations.
Deliverable Capabilities

• An in-place, coherently joint team, experienced in:
  • Joint operations & doctrine
  • Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning
  • Joint Force command and control functions and processes to employ advanced warfighting concepts in joint fires, joint ISR, etc.
  • Building and exploiting an Operational Net Assessment (ONA)
  • Planning and executing Effects Based Operations (EBO)
  • Functional SOPs, TTPs for execution within collaborative environment
  • Ability to exploit collaborative tools/processes in the joint planning and decision-making process
  • Service Doctrine & TTPs

• With:
  • In-place systems architecture with collaborative tools and reachback
  • Inherent understanding of RCC/strategic-level policy & perspective
  • Knowledge and understanding of the area of operations, key issues and “players”
  • In-place continuity for seamless planning and execution
    • Pre-crisis through termination

Maintains high state of readiness
What We Owe Combatant Commanders

• **Doctrine**
  • CONOPs for SJFHQ employment in three alternative modes:
    • The core around which a JTF headquarters is built
    • “Plug” into a service component designated JTF headquarters
    • The core around which a combatant commander, as the JFC for an operation, can build his staff
  • SOPs and TTPs for SJFHQ – individual and collective – operating in a collaborative environment
  • Procedures for employment of enabling concepts,
    • e.g. ONA
  • Procedures for internal and external collaboration,
    • e.g. JIACG, OSD, Joint Staff
  • Individual and collective task lists and standards

• **Organization**
  • Baseline organizational structure
  • Organizational relationships within collaborative environment
What We Owe Combatant Commanders

- **Training**
  - Training assistance - individual and collective - to achieve IOC
  - Proficiency training model – individual and collective - to maintain readiness
  - Model to integrate SJFHQ into regional joint exercise program

- **Materiel**
  - Documented materiel (hardware & software) requirements for SJFHQ – all modes
  - Documented CIE architecture

- **Leadership** development solutions for SJFHQs

- **Personnel** requirements, by position

- **Facilities** requirements

- **RCC Specific** needs addressed

- **Support Plan** for long-term sustainment of SJFHQ weapons system
Multinational Challenges

- Interoperability
- Language
- Culture
- Processes
- Rules
- Security
- Laws
- Organizational Structures
- Command and Control
- Unity of Command
- Unity of Effort
- Rapid HQ establishment
- Use of special coalition expertise

• These issues exist today

• They will exist in the Collaborative Information Environment (CIE) as well

BUT! SJFHQ, CIE, and use of standard procedures offer possibilities to reduce the impact of these challenges
Summary

• SJFHQ is **Actionable** Transformation

• Transforming How We will Command and Fight
  - How we Organize, Plan, and Execute
  - What We Emphasize in Joint Operations – (EBO)
  - Achievable Level of Awareness & Understanding – (ONA)
  - Improved Decision Making capability
  - Improved Joint Force Headquarters execution

• Training the Way We Will Command the Fight
  - Improved Readiness to Command and Control

  … Changing How We Think
Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)

- Changing How We think
- Transforming How We’ll Command and Fight
- Training the Way We Will Command the Fight
- Enabling Decision Superiority and Rapid Execution
Backup
JFCOM / SJFHQ Mission

Develop a Standing Joint Force Headquarters model for implementation by regional combatant commanders. Validate and verify DOTMLPF recommendations for common architectures, Joint TTPs, and SOPs required for SJFHQs to execute joint force command and control functions. Support each Combatant Commander in the establishment of a SJFHQ within their region during FY05 to enable more rapid and effective joint operations through enhanced joint command and control processes, joint interoperability, knowledge management, and decision superiority.

Ref: DPG FY04-09, CJCS 2 Nov 01Memo
### Command Group (4)
- Commander
- Chief of Staff
- Dep Chief of Staff
- Admin/Support Coordinators
- SJA, PAO, Surgeon, Chaplain

### Knowledge/Info Management (6)
- Knowledge Management Officer (4)
- Joint Network Control Officer
- Network Management Specialist
- Communication Support

### Information Superiority Team (10)
- Info Superiority Director
- ISR Collection Manager
- Intelligence Supervisor
- Effects Awareness Analyst
- Information Operations Supervisor
- IO Planners (2)
- ONA Network Supervisor
- ONA Network Analyst
- ONA Effects Analyst

### Plans Team (22)
- Plans Director
- Intel Planner
- ISR Planner
- Planners (7)
- Effects Assessment Planner (2)
- IO Planner
- Logistics Coordinator
- Strategic Lift Planner
- Sustainment Planner
- Deployment Planner
- Logistics Sustainment Planner
- Blue/Red Planners (2)
- Political / Military Planner
- Ops Law Planner
- Force Protection Planner
- (TBM/WME)

### Operations Team (16)
- Operations Director
- Current Intel Integrator
- Info Superiority Ops
- Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Ops
- Land Ops (2)
- Maritime Ops (2)
- Aerospace Ops (2)
- Special Ops Force (SOF) Ops (2)
- Information Operations Officer
- Transportation Ops
- Logistics Ops
- Fires/Target Ops

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**Supported by Mission-Tailored Augmentees, Plugs, & Liaisons**
SJFHQ Lessons From MC02

- SJFHQ increases readiness of HQ
  - Reduces ad hoc nature of today’s JTF ops
  - Facilitates more efficient, effective JTF standup
- Allows greater utilization of service headquarters
- Skilled SJFHQ personnel bring situational awareness and understanding for the RCC and JTF commander
- Brings RCC intent, coherent jointness, service core competencies, and regional expertise to JTF HQ
SJFHQ Lessons From MC02

- Key enablers are:
  - CIE (collaborative information environment)
  - ONA (operational net assessment)
- Reduces JTF HQ footprint forward
- JTF HQ requires more “core competencies” than SJFHQ brings (logistics, comm, intel, PA, med, etc.)
- Cross-functional organization works
  - baseline for SJFHQ prototyping
Collaborative Information Environment
(An Inevitable C2 Requirement)

• Most significant info age impact on Joint C2
  • Key driver in transforming Joint C2
  • Critical for both planning and execution
  • Drives both C2 processes & organizational changes
  • Requires skill, thorough training & proficiency
  • Technology is available to move out now

• But **must** have interoperable tools & procedures
  • Separate, ad hoc approaches risk effectiveness
    • Incompatible standards and procedures are the result

• SJFHQ will foster global stds. & procedures in CIE and employment of CIE capabilities
Readiness

Result of continuous pre-crisis collaboration

Knowledge

SJFHQ w/Service Hq

Legacy Service Hq JTF

WARN ORD ALERT ORD EX ORD EXECUTE BACKFILL

Situation Development Crisis Assessment COA Dev JMD

Joint Pub 5-00.2
Command and Control Shortfalls (Legacy)

**People and Processes**
- Ad hoc establishment
- Lack of readiness - untrained HQ personnel
  - Individual
  - Collective – JFC/JTF/CTF/CC HQ staff level
- Takes too long to stand up
- Takes too long to organize
- Nonstandard or nonexisting procedures
- Too long to “gel” as a team
- Too long to learn to use equip, software tools, rules, how a headquarters works
- Too long to gain situational awareness
- Lack of expertise in joint force planning
- Too long to begin planning, produce COAs
- Lack of doctrinal expertise / skills employing warfighting concepts in operations
- Insufficient joint/multinational interoperability

**Communication Capabilities**
- Non-standard tools
- Incoherent architectures
- Legacy technology mixed with new
- Modern C4I too complex to employ on “walk-in” basis
- Lack of decision tools for Info Age
- Varying standards
- Incompatibility
- Information stovepipes
- Lack of ‘business rules’
- Lack of database visibility
- Non-responsive environment
- Limited horiz & vert integration

(From Regional Combatant Command Survey)