INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

&

NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

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JCS J-6

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Purpose

- Review the Basics of Information Superiority and Network Centric Warfare

- Provide Examples of the Growing Body of Evidence

- Discuss IS and NCW-related Experimentation

Agenda

- **Purpose**

  ✓ INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

  - NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

- **Thoughts on Experimentation**

Information is Different

- Develop Once - Use Many Times - and Simultaneously
- Value is Not Created Until the End of the Last Mile

Value Enhancers	Value Detractors
Sharing	Lack of Interoperability and Disconnects
Timeliness	Delays
Assured Availability	Disruptions and Lack of Reliability
Security and Confidence	Compromise
Context and Fusion	Stovepiped Information
The Wheat	The Chaff and Overload
Accuracy and Completeness	Poor Quality

- A Vulnerability Created by One is a Vulnerability Imposed upon All
- A Deficiency Created by One is a Deficiency for All

## DoD-Wide Solution is Necessary to Create and Protect Value

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY : *What it is?*

The capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. *DPG and Joint Pub 3-13*

The

RIGHT

Information from Sources to People at Time and Place in Format. *DPG*

Assured Information on Demand Anywhere in Real Time with Zero Error

The Information Edge

Effectiveness

Information

Information Overload

Seamless Joint and Combined Interoperability

Different Perspectives, the Same Bottom Line: More for Us; Less for Them

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
DOMINANT MANEUVER
PRECISION ENGAGEMENT
FOCUSED LOGISTICS
FULL-DIMENSIONAL PROTECTION
FULL SPECTRUM DOMINANCE

Joint Vision 2010: The band where the miracle happens.

Two Sides of **I**nformation **S**uperiority

RBA   **RMA**

Network-Centric Enterprise
- Efficiency
- Responsiveness
- "Just in Time" Logistics
- Smaller Inventory
- Smaller Footprint

Less Tail

More Teeth

Network-Centric Warfare
- Increased Tempo
- Increased Lethality
- Improved Survivability
- Quicker Victory

Information Superiority

Infostructure

A Relative State that is Achieved when a Competitive Advantage is Derived from the Ability to Exploit an Information Advantage

Information Superiority

A ***Relative State***

achieved when a

Competitive Advantage

is Derived from the
Ability to Exploit an

Information Advantage

The ability to develop and use information

**while denying an adversary the same capability**

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Information Advantage

An ***Information Advantage*** is Achieved When One Competitor Outperforms its Competitors in the Information Domain

• **Information Quality**
  - **current**
  - **accurate**
  - **secure**

Blue Information Position

Red Information Position

Information Advantage

• **Content**
  - **completeness**
  - **relevance**

• **Timeliness**
  - **relative to task**

The Fourth Dimension (not shown) Involves the Information Topology (Degree of Sharing)

Information Superiority

Information Inferiority

Collaboration

Knowledge

Awareness

Sharing

Protection

Offensive IO

Awareness & Knowledge

- Battlespace Awareness results from the fusion of key elements of information which characterize the battlespace
  - Explicit Information (e.g. position of forces, geography, and weather)
  - Requires Little Interpretation
  - Can be communicated quickly and easily
- Battlespace Knowledge yields predictive ability based upon interpretations based upon experience and a priori knowledge
  - Tacit Information (e,g,. capability and tactics of an adversary, local customs, intent)
  - Supporting facts can be easily transferred, the underlying organizing logic can seldom be transferred quickly and easily.

Network-intensive

People-intensive

**Requires a Knowledge-Based Workforce**

Sharing

- Sharing Lies at the Core of IS & NCW
- Entry Fee is the "Network" (the GIG)
- Sharing Has an Organizational, a Behavioral, and a Technical Component
  - Interoperability v. Cooperability
  - Technical Component Enables
  - Organizational and Behavioral Components Generate Value

Platform-Centric

Network-Centric

**A Basic Paradigm Shift in Dealing With Information**

Collaboration

- Collaboration in the Information Domain Creates an Information Advantage

- Collaboration in the Operational Domain Creates Value by Exploiting an Information Advantage to Create a Competitive Advantage

- Collaboration Takes Places "on the Net"or is Reflected "in the Net"

- The Ability to Share Creates New Forms of Collaboration
  - e.g., Self-Synchronization

Protect, Deny, and Exploit

Blue Information Position

Blue IA

Blue Offensive IO

Exploit Adversary Information

Destroy

Deny

Deceive

Red Information Position

Red Offensive IO

- **IO is Dynamic and N-Sided**
- **Blue, Red, Others (e.g. CNN)**

The Objective is to Improve Blue's Relative Information Position

Agenda

- **Purpose**

- INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

- ✔ NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE

- **Thoughts on Experimentation**

Network Centric Warfare

**A Warfighting Concept
that Enables a Network Centric Force
to Significantly Increase Combat Power by Achieving**

Increased
Awareness

Ability to
Self-Synchronize

Shared
Awareness

Degree of
Interoperability

Operational
Tempo

Attributes of
Platform-Centric
Operations

Attributes of
Network-Centric
Operations

Survivability

Lethality

Responsiveness

Translates Is into Combat Power

Information Advantage

Increased Awareness

Ability to Self-Synchronize

Shared Awareness

Degree of Interoperability

Operational Tempo

Survivability

Lethality

Responsiveness

Attributes of Platform-Centric Operations

Attributes of Network-Centric Operations

Networking the Force

- A network-centric force is an *interoperable* force
- A network-centric force provides Commanders with the capability to dynamically network (connect, share, and collaborate)
  - Sensors (regardless of platform)
  - Decision-makers (regardless of location)
 - Shooters (regardless of service)

Networking The Force

Sensor / Awareness

Shooter / Transaction

Information Timeliness

Sub-seconds

Seconds

Minutes

Information Accuracy

Sensor Networks:
Joint Composite Tracking Network (CEC)
< 100 Users

Joint Data Network (Link 16/11)
<500 Users

Joint Planning Network (GCCS)
~1000 Users

Sensor Fusion

Weapons Control

Force Control

Self-Synchronizing Forces

Force Coordination

CEC: Cooperative Engagement Capability
GCCS: Global Command and Control System

Variable Quality of Service

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Shared Awareness

- A network-centric force has the capability to generate shared battlespace awareness


The generation of shared battlespace awareness requires the *robust* networking of the blue force.

Increased Awareness

A *network-centric force increases battlespace awareness by overcoming the limitations of standalone sensors through employment of sensor networks*

Sensor Network "Applications and Peripherals"

- **Sensor Networks enable Commanders to**
  - Rapidly generate Battlespace Awareness
  - Synchronized with operations
- **Components of Sensor Networks**
  - Space, Air, Sea, Ground and Cyberspace Based Sensors
- **Operational Capabilities**
  - Improved Data Fusion
  - Dynamic Sensor Tasking
  - Universal Sensor Recruitment

Increased Battlespace Awareness

*Current Capabilities to Generate **Engagement Quality Awareness** Against Adversary Forces Across Various Battlespaces*


Timeliness (y-axis): Days, Hours, Mins, Secs

Target Types (x-axis): Fixed/Transportable, Movable (At Rest), Moving (Ground, Sea, Undersea), Moving (Air), Moving (Space)

Legend: Satisfactory, Problems, Unsatisfactory

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Threat Trends

Signature and "Volatility" Trends Stress
Both Sensing and Engagement Time Lines

Reduced

Signature

Normal

* Mobile SAMs

* SCUD

* → * Embassy *or* Bridge with Traffic

Stationary

Transient

Operational "Volatility"

Increased Awareness

Ground Picture with Platform-Centric Operations

Ground Picture with Network-Centric Operations

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
•TThree (3) Sensor Position Estimates ("Hits")
•DDown-Range Error (σ_{dr}) = 5
•CCross-Range Error (σ_{cr}) = 1

•FFused Sensor Position Estimate
–DDown-Range Error (σ_{dr}) = 1.00
–CCross-Range Error (σ_{cr}) = 0.67

# Cooperative Engagement

Sensor Network

E-2C Hawkeyes

Cruisers

- Generates *engagement quality* Battlespace Awareness with reduced timelines
- Fuses multi-sensor data
- Quantum improvement in track accuracy, continuity, and target identification
- Extends detection ranges

Sensor Data Fusion Decreases *Time* Required to Generate Engagement Quality Awareness

**Track Accuracy (Uncertainty)**

Engagement Quality Accuracy

Stand Alone Sensor

Sensor Network

Time

Time Compression

Benefits of Real-Time Fusion

Benefits of Sensor Network
- **Near Real Time Exchange Of sensor measurement data**
- **Cueing Of Remote Sensors**
- **Jam Resistance/low Probability Of Intercept**

E-2C
AWACS
LAMPS

TBM

JAMMERS

FADE ZONE
RAIN
HORIZON
SHORE

HORIZON
MULTI-PATH
JAMMING
SHIP

HORIZON
RAIN
JAMMING
INTERFERENCE
AIR

COMPOSITE TRACK

PATRIOT THAAD/GBR HAWK

COHERENT, FIRE CONTROL QUALITY TRACK PICTURE HELD BY ALL UNITS IN A COMMON, SHARED DATA BASE

Competitive Advantage

Information Advantage

Increased Awareness

Ability to Self-Synchronize

Shared Awareness

Degree of Interoperability

Operational Tempo

Survivability

Lethality

Responsiveness

Competitive Advantage

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AH-64

AH-64

Kill Zone

Increased Battlespace Awareness

- Where Am I?
- Where Are My Buddies?
- Where Is the Enemy?

Increased Combat Effectiveness

	Before/After	OPTEMPO	Lethality	Survivability
• **Plan Development (Div)**	**72 vs 12 hrs.**	■		
• **Call for Fire**	**3 vs 0.5 min**		■	
• **Deliberate Attack (Co)**	**40 vs 20 min**	■	■	■
• **Hasty Attack (Co)***	**39 x 112 Red Loss**	■	■	
• **Defense in Sector***	**Loss vs Win**		■	■
• **Movement to Contact***	**91 vs 128 Red Loss**		■	■

The **Bottom Line** is: The EXFOR Division killed
over *twice* the enemy in *half* the time,
over *three times* the Battlespace,
with *25% fewer* Combat Platforms
using Information Age Technology

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Counter SOF

**Network-Centric Warfighting**

Concept:

Land - Sea engagement network
  – Shared awareness
  – Increased engagements
• Efficient resource allocation
  – Weapon-target pairing
  – Self synchronization
• Multi-service solution
  – Coordination at "the seams"

Navy Component Commander's Number One Problem

Maritime
Air
Support
Operations
Center

FBE Results and Implications

	Before/After	Self Synchronization	OPTEMPO	Lethality
• **Avg Decision Cycle**	43 vs. 23 min	■	■	
• **Mission Timeline**	50% Decrease	■	■	
• **Shooter Effectiveness**	50% Increase	■		■
• **Assets Scrambled**	15% Decrease	■	■	
• **Leakers**	10x Decrease	■		■

The Bottom Line: FBE Delta demonstrated the potential for a networked force provided with *shared awareness* to *self-synchronize* and to accomplish the CSOF mission in *half* the time and to reduce SOF leakers by an *order of magnitude*.

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
EFX'98" Sharing and Collaboration

Before/After

- **Deployed Footprint**   1500-2000   vs.   100-300
- **Deployment Timeline**   10-15 Days   vs.   1-2 Days
- **Air Lift Required**   25 C-17 Loads vs.   2 - 3 C-17 Loads

Virtual Collaboration:
Moving Information - Not People

**Distributed
Rear JAOC)**

Source: EFX '98 Final Report

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Network-Centric Attack Ops

F15-C Air Ops: Active Missile Counter Tactics

Without JTIDS/With JTIDS

- **Information Advantage**   **Voice Only vs. Shared Tactical Picture**
- **OODA Loop**   **Baseline Compressed with Self-Synchronization**
- **Kill Ratio**   3.10:1   vs.   8.11:1

The Bottom Line: JTIDS Operational Special Project demonstrated networked air crews fighting with *shared awareness* could increase combat power by over *100 %*

Network Centric Operations

Strike Package

FAC

UAV

UAV Controller

Summary of Emerging Evidence

Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment

Faster, precision maneuver for lethal, evasive engagement of enemy ground force based on shared battlesspace awareness & tactical synchronization

Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) Delta

Internetting of AEGIS and Firefinder radars for counter-battery fires. Aggressive prosecution of Special Operations Forces (SOF) threat based on shared awareness and rapid, self-synchronized engagement

Expeditionary Force Experiment (EFX)'98

Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) Enroute
Bombers linked into tactical info grid for beyond-line-of-sight retargeting
Reduced Joint Air Operations Center (JOAC) forward footprint

JTIDS Operational Special Project

Attack Operations with Tactical Data Links

Operation Allied Force

Agenda

- **Purpose**

- **I**NFORMATION **S**UPERIORITY

- **N**ETWORK **C**ENTRIC **W**ARFARE

- **Thoughts on Experimentation**

From Concept to Capability

Concept

Discovery/Experiment

Preliminary Hypothesis

Maturity

Refined Hypothesis

Demonstration

Developed and Refined Military Capability

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Organizing Logic for Experimentation

- IS and NCW Concepts Provide an Organizing Logic for Concept-Based Experimentation Based upon
  - Elements of Information Superiority
  - Attributes of a Network-Centric Force
- This Organizing Logic Gives Rise to an Integrated and Coherent Set of
  - Hypotheses
  - Metrics (dependent variables)
  - Key Independent Variables ("treatments" and "conditions")

Evidence of Convergence

- The AOACMT Hypothesis
  - "IF we can establish a multi-spectral, cross-cued sensor network -- linked by a responsive decision mechanism to precision engagement means -- THEN we will be able to ...."
- and the Decomposed Version
- Represent Evidence of Intellectual Convergence with respect to Core IS and NCW Concepts and Metrics
- But We Need to Complete the Convergence
  - Separate Means from Ends (e.g. Sensor Networks from Awareness)
  - Develop Common Understanding of Key Cross-cutting Concepts and Metrics (e.g. Shared Awareness)

Experimental Space

Mission Capability Packages

Core IS / NCW Concepts

COLLABORATION & SYNCHRONIZATION

INCREASED AWARENESS

SHARED AWARENESS

"NETWORKED" FORCE

Experimental Space

AOACMT

Mission Capability Packages

IP&E

COLLABORATION & SYNCHRONIZATION

JAC2

CMT Cell

Core IS /NCW Concepts

INCREASED   AWARENESS

CROP + Sensor Net

SHARED   AWARENESS

CROP

"NETWORKED"   FORCE

GIG

Power of IS / NCW Core Concepts

- They Get at the Fundamentals

- Facilitate Sharing of Experimental Results Across Missions and Contexts

- Enable Creation of a Useful Body of Knowledge

- Bottom Line: More Bang for the Experimental Buck

Hypothesis Template

COLLABORATION & SYNCHRONIZATION

**THEN**

INCREASED   AWARENESS

fill in the mission

Success with

SHARED   AWARENESS

☑ **Higher Probability**
☑ **More Quickly**
☑ **More Efficiently**

IF

"NETWORKED"   FORCE

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Impact of NCW

Goals

- Shape security environment
- Deter aggression or abort conflict
- Deny occupation and defend friendly assets
- Neutralize or degrade an adversary's capabilities
- Across the spectrum of conflict

Enabling

- Preemptively foreclose adversary COA
- Shock and Awe (Paralyze, Shatter, Disintegrate)
- Increased Speed and Lethality
- Reduced Risk and Increased Survivability

NCW Characteristics and Capabilities

- Increased Battlespace Awareness and Knowledge
- Adaptive C2 Approaches and Organizational Structures
- Self-synchronizing Forces

## There is a growing body of evidence that

NCW Enables an Isoquantal Shift

Effectiveness / Forces Applied — Tomorrow / Today

Illustrative Metrics

Completeness
Consistency
Correctness of Classification
Currency
Distribution
Location Accuracy
Location/Vector Precision
Low Uncertainty
Timeliness

Shared& Increased Awareness

Speed of Command Functions
(e.g., prioritization and assignment)
Targets at Risk
Weapon Utilization

Collaboration / Synchronization

100% −

Destroyed
Damaged
Degraded
Suppressed
Rendered
Ineffective

=

% of
Target
Population
Active

Time

Neutralize Targets

Experimentation Lessons "Recorded"

- There is a Learning Curve
  - What Future Technology Can Do
  - How to Co-Evolve MCPs

- The Value of the "Pre" and the "Post"
  - Importance of Focus
  - Value of Analysis

- Projecting Future Technology is Necessary to Stay Ahead of the Power Curve
  - - Information Superiority Advanced Technology Plan

Summary

- **INFORMATION SUPERIORITY** & **NCW**   Translates into   **COMBAT POWER**

- It is All About Creating and Leveraging an Information Advantage

- Sharing and Collaboration are the Key Processes

- "The emerging evidence for Network Centric Warfare as the intellectual basis for Joint Vision 2010 is compelling"

  General Hugh Shelton, CJCS, June 22, 1999

- IS and NCW Core Concepts Provide an Effective Organizing Logic for Concept-Based Experimentation