This book is about the implications of the new nonlinear sciences for national security and military affairs. Uncertainty is with us, and chaos theory rooted in physics and chemistry tells us why it is inevitable, pervasive, and won't go away. Fortunately, there is the "companion" new science of complexity, rooted in biology, which provides insights into what we can do about that.
I have adopted the term nonlinearity as a convenient umbrella for all of the various terminology and concepts which have proliferated in the field-deterministic chaos, fractals, self-organizing systems far from thermodynamic equilibrium, complexity and complex adaptive systems, self-organizing criticality, cellular automata, solitons, and so on-because they all globally share this property.
Nonlinearity reflects the science of the Information Age, rather than its technology. Currently, the awareness level about that science is low in comparison to the omnipresent technology. This book is intended to help correct this dangerous imbalance. In fact, the Information Age and its technology are largely considered to be synonymous in both the public and the military mind. The Revolution in Military Affairs debate to date has largely been shaped by that technology, including the pervasive rush of chip advances, computer utilities, and an increasingly Internetted world. The science is in its infancy, and is more about biology than about physics. It is some 20 years old, and required the computer to be invented before it could itself be discovered. This science has its own jargon: phase states, bifurcations, strange attractors, emergence, criticality and path-dependence, to name a few. However, its message is post-Newtonian.
By Newtonian, we mean the arrangement of nature-life and its complications-to be a linear phenomenon. Inputs in a linear phenomenon are proportional to outputs, facilitating prediction by careful planning; success is by detailed monitoring and control; and a premium is placed upon linear reductionism, rewarding those who excel in such reductionist processes. Linear reductionist analysis consists of taking large, complex problems and reducing them to manageable chunks. This form of reductionism works in environments that are effectively linear, where the test of wills, the conflict of interests, and the collision of agendas are largely absent.
By post-Newtonian, we mean the arrangement of nature-life and its complications, such as warfare-to be nonlinear, where inputs and outputs are not proportional; where phenomena are unpredictable, but within bounds are self-organizing; where unpredictability frustrates conventional planning; where solution as self-organization defeats control as we think of it; and where a premium is placed on nonlinear reductionism. And where rewards go to those who excel in coping with the bounds in order to command and manage-not on prediction and control.
I have become convinced that nonlinearity does not pose a revolutionary challenge in the sense of being a trumpet of the "new," or yet another siren song for novelty. Instead, it for the most part privileges, reinforces and gives the edge to certain practices over others forged in the school of hard knocks and trial and error. Humankind has been around a long time and is very resourceful. The effect of conscious nonlinearity will largely be to go back over alternatives and choices with a different lens and say, "Hey, you overlooked this," or "That one is better," or " Yes, you were right all along." The nonlinearist job is not so much to invent, but to reaffirm, review, and improve. The human being is smart, and has through history tried lots of things. With our new knowledge, we can make good those efforts where they fit, by recognizing them and promoting them. It may be that the strength and staying power of nonlinearity will turn out to be that, like Clausewitz's On War, it operates in a deeply historical, organic context, as opposed to "cutting-edge" faddism.
In fact, Clausewitz is the emblem of nonlinearity in military affairs. It is said that Clausewitz is more often quoted than read. The reason is simply that he is hard to read linearly. We only learned this in 1992, with the publication of "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," by Alan Beyerchen. The message is both profound and fundamental. This paper is so important that it is reproduced in its entirety in the appendix. It forms the basis for the neo-Clausewitzian view: the synthesis of nonlinear science and Clausewitz's words to form a powerful and contemporary message. The rest of this book can be regarded as a supplement.
| Coping with the Bounds Index | Foreword | Acknowledgments | Introduction | Part One Introduction | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3 | Chapter 4 | Part Two Introduction | Chapter 5 | Chapter 6 | Chapter 7 | Chapter 8 | Chapter 9 | Chapter 10 | Conclusion | Appendix 1 | Appendix 2 | Appendix 3 | Appendix 4 | Appendix 5 | Appendix 6 | Notes |